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This dissertation is concerned with aspects of
Quine's philosophy directly connected with his thesis of
indeterminacy of translation and his views on relativity
of ontology.
In Chapter I, I discuss observation sentences.
Quine makes claims which fall into two clearly distin-
guishable groups
,
which I call two accounts of observa-
tion sentences. These accounts are difficult to recon-
cile. This discussion provides the necessary background
for explicating the underdetermination and indeterminacy
theses
.
In Chapter II, I make use of Harre ' s distinction
between reticular and explanatory theories. I consider
two arguments for applying the underdetermination thesis
even to reticular theories. Only the first assumes that
there are only denumerably many names
.
The underdetermination thesis is needed in Quine's
argument for indeterminacy of translation, as Quine
(iii)
I i < < I l i i
il li/
describes indeterminacy as underdetermination in second
intension. The indeterminacy thesis has two parts. First,
alternative, incompatible manuals of translation are com-
patible with speakers' dispositions to verbal behavior.
Second, analytical hypotheses, about translation of the
referential apparatus
,
are not about any matter of fact
and so are not genuine scientific hypotheses. The argument
for the first part requires the underdetermination thesis.
That for the second reiqhiffes Quine’s views about meaning,
reference, and propositional attitudes.
In Chapter III, I reconstruct Quine’s argument that
ontology must be relative if statements about reference
are to be meaningful. The reconstruction depends on my
earlier discussions of Quine’s views about reference,
quantification, and translation. I conclude with explana-
tion and criticism of ontological relativity. I argue
that Quine’s resolution of problems resulting from in-
determinacy is inadequate.
My criticisms of Quine’s views on ontological rela-
tivity and observation sentences throw serious doubt on
some of his important claims about meaning and reference
and about related issues in the philosophy of science.
(iv)
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PREFACE
My interest in Quine's work developed as I studied,
with some puzzlement, Word and Object . It soon became
clear that an understanding of that work depended on some
understanding of Quine's epistemology and philosophy of
science. In particular, it seemed necessary to come to
grips with Quine's conception of observation sentences.
This was needed to understand the reasons for Quine's
claims in Word and Object about the yield of the lin-
guist s method. My attempt to do this resulted in Chap-
ter I
.
Some of Quine's later discussions of indeterminacy
make it clear that this thesis is very closely related
to his claim that physical theory is underdetermined by
all possible observations. As Quine puts it, indetermi-
nacy is underdetermination in "second intension." Thus,
the first section of Chapter II is devoted To explica-
tion of the underdetermination thesis. In the second
section of that chapter, I discuss the indeterminacy thesis
directly
.
In Chapter III, I take up one very important consequence
of the indeterminacy thesis. I discuss Quine's argu-
ment for "ontological relativity." According to Quine,
it is necessary to introduce ontological relativity pri-
marily because indeterminacy of reference applies to one’s
own case, and this causes difficulties for the theory of
reference. The indeterminacy of reference is in turn a
consequence, in part, of the indeterminacy of translation.
Thus, the first chapter and the first part of the sec-
ond chapter provide the necessary tools for my explica-
tion of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation, while
raising some serious philosophical issues on their own.
The third chapter draws out some of the consequences of
the thesis of indeterminacy of translation. This is the
general structure of the thesis. Now I will say in more
detail how the parts of the thesis fit together.
Chapter I has two major parts. I begin the discussion
of observation sentences by considering the claims about
such sentences made by Quine in various places. These
claims are made primarily (though not exclusively) in con-
nection with Quine’s discussions of language-learning, of
evidence, and of the indeterminacy thesis. There are two
quite different accounts of observation sentences that
appear, though not explicitly, in Quine’s works. I ex-
plicate these and offer a suggestion as to how they are
related. Then I discuss the relation, for Quine, of
observation and theory.
In the second part of the chapter, I discuss the
definition of 'observation sentence’ given by Quine in
Word and Object and elaborated upon in "Epistemology
ix
Naturalized." In my discussion I point out how the defi-
nition is related to the claims about observation sentences
discussed in the first section. Finally, I sketch a view
of observation sentences that Quine rejects as a basic
account. It is a view that is quite similar to Quine’s
second account, and this is the reason for introducing
it in some detail. In Section 1(C) and again in Section
11(B) of Chapter I, I make some claims about the bearing
of the indeterminacy thesis and related views on Quine’s
account of observation sentences. I return to these
claims in Chapter II, at the end of the first section, and
again at the end of the section, when the grounds for my
claims should be clearer to the reader.
Chapter II is devoted to explicating the thesis of
indeterminacy of translation. As I have already noted,
an understanding of Quine’s claim that physical theory
is underdetermined by all possible data is needed for this
explication. I consider this claim in the first section.
The concept of an observation sentence is used in Quine
explanation of the thesis of underdetermination of physical
theory. In order to explicate this thesis, I make use
of Harre ' s distinction between reticular and explanatory
theories and consider whether Quine would hold that the
underdetermination thesis applies to both kinds of theories.
Then I argue that it is only on Quine’s first account of
observation sentences
,
according to which they are theory-
neutral
,
that the underdetermination thesis could hold in
Xany straightforward way.
In the second half of Chapter II, I turn to the thesis
of indeterminacy of translation in a more direct way. I
begin by describing the thesis, which I find it convenient
to consider tin two parts. I discuss these two parts of
the thesis separately. Thus, in Subsection A, I try to
show what Quine’s reasons for holding that there are al-
ternative, incompatible manuals of translation, each of
which is compatible with all of a speakers' dispositions
to verbal behavior. This requires a short discussion of
what Quine takes to be the methodological restrictions on
the field linguist. In Section B, I turn to the second
part of the indeterminacy thesis, according to which some
purported hypotheses made by the field linguist--analytical
hypotheses--are not genuine hypotheses. I consider three
different interpretations of this part of the thesis, the
first two of which I reject.
Chapter III c cntinues the discussion of indeterminacy
of translation by considering one of its consequences.
Quine argues in the essay "Ontological Relativity" that
the thesis of indeterminacy of translation implies that
"there is no difference between a rabbit and each of its
parts." The argument for this conclusion is somewhat
obscure. It is seen to be a result of two facts about the
indeterminacy thesis: First, reference (and not just
translation) is indeterminate. Second, the indeterminacy
X 1
thesis applies to one's own use of one's language.
Thus, the first part of my discussion is intended to
show why, given Quine's discussions of reference, I am
concerned with general terms. I then consider some
reasons why Quine takes reference to be indeterminate.
This requires a discussion of some of Quine's views on
quantification, since Quine takes quantification to be
an "encapsulation" of reference. I then defend Quine's
claim that indeterminacy applies to one's own case if it
applies to the interlinguistic case. With these parts of
Quine's argument elucidated, I consider some reconstruc-
i
tions of the argument according to which there is no
difference between a rabbit and each of its parts. I
show that Quine rejects this argument, as he has it in
mind in "Ontological Relativity," because it requires that
one accept incompatible manuals of translation. Though
I formulate an argument with the same conclusion that is
not subject to Quine's criticism, the conclusion is con-
ditional upon the acceptance of an appropriate kind of
manual. My argument is thus not so serious a threat to
Quine's treatment of reference as was the argument he had
in mind.
Quine's introduction of ontological relativity makes
explicit that questions about and statements of the ref-
erence of a term can be made only relative to the accep-
tance of some manual of translation and a . Ian-*,
guage. So it shows why the arguments whose conclusion was
Xll
that there is no difference between a rabbit and each of
its parts does not go through. This solution involves
Quine m a sort of regress, however. The final section
of Chapter III is an attempt to explicate Quine's
proposal for stopping this regress. I find no way of
explication the proposal that will be acceptable, given
indeterminacy of translation and indeterminacy of refer-
ence. I take this to be a serious shortcoming of Quine's
philosophy of language, since it means that he cannot
give an adequate account of semantical statements about
the reference of linguistic items.
I wish to thank Professor Quine
,
who very kindly sent
me his most recent bibliography and a number of reprints
of recent publications
,
as well as a copy of the unpub-
lished Carus Lectures for 1971. The latter was particu-
larly valuable in my examination of Quine's work. '
Nonny Burack's intelligence and efficiency in typing
a penultimate draft of the dissertation is greatly ap-
preciated .
Bruce Aune and Jeffrey Sicha read many drafts of my
work. Their criticisms and requests for clarification,
though not always appreciated at the time, greatly im-
proved the final product. For these, and for the many
we have had while I have been a graduate
student, I thank them. I look forward to many more.
CHAPTER I
OBSERVATION SENTENCES
INTRODUCTION
This first chapter, on observation sentences, is in
large part introductory
; it is preparatory to succeeding
chapters . In Chapter I
,
I introduce several of the topics
taken up later. The thesis of underdetermination of
theories and that of indeterminacy of translation, dis-
cussed in Chapter II, make substantial use of the concept
of an observation sentence. These two theses provide much
of the motivation for discussing observation sentences.
Observation sentences are important also in Quine's dis-
cussions of language-learning, of evidence for theories,
\
and of meaning. In "Epistemology Naturalized," he pro-
vides a statement of the role of observation sentences in
his philosophy.
Clarification of the notion of observa-
tion sentences is a good thing, for the
notion is fundamental in two connections.
These two correspond to the duality that
I remarked upon early in this lecture: the
duality between concept and doctrine, be-
tween knowing what a sentence means and
knowing whether it is true. The observaa
2tion sentence is basic to both enter-
prises.
. . . Observation sentences
are the repository of evidence for
scientific hypotheses. Its relation
to meaning is fundamental too, since
observation sentences are the ones
we are in a position to learn to
understand first, both as children
and as field linguists.
i
The ways in which observation sentences are sup-
posed to be basic to knowledge and meaning will become
clearer in Chapters II. and III. My aim in this chap _
ter is to clarify Quine's conception of an observation
sentence in preparation for the discussions in those
chapters. This chapter has two main divisions. In the
first section, I examine Quine's claims about the role
of observation sentences in language-learning. This
examination uncovers some major theses about observation
sentences. In the second section, I examine the definition
of 'observation sentence' given in "Epistemology
Naturalized." This examination includes a comparison
with the definition given in Word and Object
,
2 of which
Quine claims the "Epistemology Naturalized" definition
to be a clarification. I also consider in that section
some objections to Quine's conception of an observation
vsentence
.
I. OBSERVATION SENTENCES AND LANGUAGE-LEARNING
A. The First Account
3
I distinguish two accounts of observation sentences
to be found in Quine's writings-. The distinction is not,
of course
,
explicitly made by Quine
. I characterize
the first, or primary, account by a discussion of seven
claims about observation sentences that are implicit or
explicit in some of Quine's discussions. In this sub-
5 I discuss these seven claims and provide tex-
tual support for my attribution of each to Quine. The
claims are
:
(1) Learning some observation sentences
is a necessary condition of learning
to speak a language.
(2) Observation sentences are sentences
that can be learned by ostension.
(3) Observation sentences do not refer
or contain referring items
.
(4) Observation sentences are learned as
single units; they do not have
terms as parts
.
(5) An observation sentence can be learned
independently of other sentences and
terms. Learning an observation sen-
tence requires no prior linguistic
acquisition
.
(6) An observation sentence has meaning of
its own, apart from its role in a theory.
4(7) An observation sentence is accepted
or rejected on its own, apart from
its role in a theory
.
The first claim is supported by Quine in his (1969a),
where he says
,
. . . Observation sentences are the ones we
are in a position to understand first, both
as children and as field linguists. For
observation sentences are precisely the o
ones that we can correlate with observable
circumstances of the occasion of the ut-
terance or assent
,
independently of varia-
tions in the past histories of individual
informants. They afford the only entry to
a language . 3 '
Further support is given the claim in Quine’s article
"The Grades of Theoreticity . V He says there,
Such [observation] sentences are
necessarily our entering wedge into
our first language. . . .
Observation sentences have this special role, he
says
,
because the only we can begin to learn a language
is by connecting the utterances we hear with the stimula-
tions we undergo at the time of hearing them. We, in
turn, utter the sounds and are confirmed in these utterances
by speakers who undergo the same stimulations. As we
shall see later, this explanation of how observation
sentences are learned is very important to Quine’s whole
account
.
This support for the first claim leads to the
second claim:
(2) Observation sentences are sentences that
can be learned by ostension.
5Not every speaker learns every observation sentence by
ostension, of course. That is not Quine's claim. Rather,
he claims that observation sentences are of the sort
appropriate for learning by ostension. He makes this
poirit clearly in his "Grades of Theoreticity "
:
• . . An observation sentence may have
been learned in the ostensive way only
by some speakers and in other ways by
others. What distinguishes it is just
that the general usage conforms to con-
current observation in about the way
that it would if everyone had learned
it ostensively
.
5
It does not matter how an observation sentence
has in fact been learned by a speaker. If it is an ob-
servation sentence
,
it will be related to observation and
stimulation in such a way that the speaker could have
learned it by ostension.
The third claim is related to the second, since
referring items cannot be learned ostensively. That
\
claim is
:
(3) Observation sentences do not refer or
contain referring items.
^
According to Quine
,
the learning of observation sen-
tences precedes any learning of a theory of objects.
Such a theory of objects, on Quine's view, comes into play
when language comes to have a referring use. It is neces-
sary for this that the learner have learned some observa-
tion sentences. But the learning of observation sentences
6(or some of these) must precede the acquisition of a
theory
.
The third claim comes out more clearly in Word and
Object
. In Section 10
,
Quine claims that the meaning of
an observation sentence is its stimulus meaning. As he
puts it
,
Their stimulus meanings may without fear
of contradiction be said to do fulljustice to their meanings.
?
Because their meanings are their stimulus meanings
,
observations sentences can be translated on the basis of
speakers' dispositions to verbal behavior. The only
indeterminacy involved in their translation is the
"residual" indeterminacy that is due to the translation
of native speakers' terms for assent and dissent. For his
purposes in Word and Object
,
Quine is willing to ignore
that indeterminacy.
While observation sentences can be translated this
way, terms cannot be. Quine makes the point made in claim
(3) with an example. As we will see in Chapter II, the
distinction between a one-word observation sentence and
a related term is very important. Given the definition
of 'observation sentence' in Word and Ob j ect , the "meaning"
of two one-word observation sentences may be the same, even
though the extensions of their related terms may differ.
The observation sentence 'Rabbit', for example, can
be translated on the basis of the speakers' dispositions
to verbal behavior, but the associated term 'rabbit'
7cannot be. The translation of 'rabbit*, the term, re-
quires accepting (more or less arbitrarily) some set
of analytic hypotheses. These analytic hypotheses go be-
yond anything implicit in native speakers' dispositions
to verbal behavior.
The moral I draw from section 12 is that, where re-
ference is involved, translation is indeterminate--even
given the acceptance of hypotheses about assent and
dissent. Since translation of observation sentences is
no 't indeterminate, given such hypotheses, these sentences
do not involve reference. 8
Quine puts this point in "The Roots of Reference"
by saying that the learning of observation sentences
does not involve a theory of objects. 9 I take this to
be additional support for the third claim. Learning those
parts of a language that involve reference requires
learning a theory. Since learning observation sentences
does not require learning a theory, I take it that such
learning does not require or include the learning of parts
of language that involve reference.
From Quine's treatment of the learning of observation
sentences by ostension in Word and Object and "Grades of
Theoreticity , " we have the related claim
(4) Observation sentences are learned
as single units : they do not have
terms as parts. 0
8In discussing the importance of the distinction be-
tween terms and sentences in Chapter I of Word and Object
,
Quine says
,
'Red* and 'Square', when used in isola-
tion.
. . are likewise best looked upon
as sentences. Most sentences are longer.
But even a longer sentence may still be
learned as a single unit, like 'Ouch',
'Red'
,
and 'Square'
,
by a direct conditioning
to some sensory stimulation. 11
Claim (4) has some interesting consequences. An example
of an observation sentence that is longer than the ex-
amples cited in the previous quotation is
The cat is on the mat.
This example is used by Quine in "Grades of Theoreticity .
"
According to claim (4), this sentence does not contain
the term 'cat', except (to use a Quinean example) in the
sense that 'Socrates' contains a 'rat'. It is perhaps
misleading to write the sentence as I have done. It might,
better be written as
Thecatisonthemat
to show that the usual conventions about spacing are not
being made use of.
From claim (3) we know that this sentence does not
refer to cats. It is not "about" a cat except in the limited
sende that when there is or appears to be a cat on the
mat one who has learned this observation .[sentence is
disposed (other things being equal) to respond to the
9stimulation it evokes by uttering the sentence, and not
otherwise
.
According to this conception of the observation sen-
tence, one could have learned this sentence and utter it
in the appropriate situation, yet not be disposed either
to respond to any questions about the cat oi? about cats
or to token any other "related" sentences such as
The mat is under the cat.
This seems surprising. One might suppose that, in
a more fully developed theory
,
some observation sentences
would be associated with one another in such a way that
one would not be said to have learned a given observa-
tion sentence unless one had also learned other, related
observation sentences. If this were so, we still might
not expect the speaker to have the ability to answer
questions about cats after having learned the observation
sentence
The cat is on the mat.
But we would expect him to have learned some other ob-
servation sentences. Among these might be
Cat
.
There is a cat.
This is a cat.
This is a mat.
The cat is grey.
The mat is brown.
The mat is under the cat
.
10
This is not so, however. Quine distinguishes among
various methods of learning language
,
some of which re-
quire prior linguistic acquisitions, others of which do
not. Learning by ostension does not, and observation
sentences can be learned by ostension . 12
As I have already noted, in the discussion of
claim (2), observation sentences are of the sort of
sentence that can be learned by ostension. Though not
every speaker actually learns all observation sentence
this way
,
every observation sentence could
-have been
so learned.
A related claim is made by Quine in "Epistemology
Naturalized . V He notes in that essay an important dif-
ference between observation sentences and theoretical
sentences. Observation sentences have "empirical con-
sequences*' of their own, while theoretical sentences
do not. Theoretical sentences have (empirical) meaning o
only by virtue of belonging to a.! language that taken
a whole has such consequences Similarly, observation
.
sentences are judged--accepted or rejected--on their own.
They "face the tribunal of sensory evidence" on their
own, while more theoretical sentences are judged only in
a body. On the whole, it is theories to which evidence
applies and not sentences
; ,
observation sentences are an
V
11
exception. I have already noted (pages 6 • and 7)
that observation sentences are independent in that
their learning requires no prior linguistic acquisition.
That there are two additional ways in which observation
sentences have a sort of independence that other sen-
tences do not have is suggested by this discussion of
• These considerations give us support for the
last claims about observation sentences that characterize
this account
:
(5) An observation sentence can be learned
independently of other sentences and
terms
. Learning an observation sen-
tence requires no prior linguistic
acquisition
.
(6) An observation sentence has meaning of its
own, apart from its role in a theory.
(7) An observation sentence is accepted or
rejected on its own, apart from its
role in a theory.
Claims (5), (6), and (7) can be summarized in a Humean
phrase: Observation sentences are loose and separate.
It might, of course, still be true as a matter of
fact that one observation sentence is ordinarily learned
in association with another. The sentences "about"
cats listed earlier might well be learned together, by at
least some language-learners. But on Quine's view of
observation sentences given in his discussions of language-
learning, learning one observation sentence does not
require learning any other observation sentences
.
12
What, then, is it to "learn" an observation sentence
There are really two questions here: How, on Quine’s
account, does one learn an observation sentence? What
has one learned when one has learned an observation sen-*
tence? Initially, one learns observation sentences by
ostension, and any such sentences can be learned in this
way. What is learned is a kind of behavior: the use of
the sentence. Learning an observation sentence is
developing a disposition to utter the sentence in some
particular set of (i.e., the appropriate) circumstances.
When one has learned an observation sentence--by whatever
method--one is disposed to respond to certain stimuli by
the production ofecertain sounds or symbols.
Ostensive
. learning
,
Quine says, requires a "sense
of similarity, a sense of subjectively natural kinds." 16
When learning by ostension, one must come to discern
relevantly similar circumstances. This procedure is a
matter of trial and error. We make mistakes and correct
,
our errors The sense of similarity is described also
as a sort of innate prelinguistic quality space. 16
In both "Natural Kinds" and "Grades of Theoreticity
"
Quine says that ostensive learning is "an implicit case
of induction
.
nl 9 But the sense in which this is so is
rather obscure. It is obvious, as even Quine says, that
the learner does not infer some general statement about
the use of a sentence from sentences of the form
13
T1 ottered ’A* in circumstances C at t]_
uttered ’A’ in circumstances C at t 2
•
;
\
t 2 ottered ’A' in circumstances C at t 3
and statements about the utterer having received approval
upon himself having uttered ’A' in circumstances C at
various times. As we have already seen, learning ob-
servation sentences requires no prior linguistic acquisi-
tion, and such inference does require linguistic acquisi-
tions—of rather a sophisticated sort.
Quine says of the sort of induction involved,
This learning process is a process of in-
duction. The other fellow has affirmed or
assented to the observation term or sentence
in question, or has approved our assent to
it, amid various scenes that were somewhat
similar to one another; and we predict that
he will do likewise in similar scenes here-
after. . . .
The generality reached by our induction is
rather a habit than a law, since we do not
have words to state it with; we are only'
then engaged in learning to put a word to the
generality in question. What we learn by the
induction is the full range of scenes
,
or
stimulatory situations
,
to which the word
is appropriate--in short its stimulus meaning.
14
Both the statement that the learner predicts ^ future
verbal behavior of a speaker and the statement that we
learn the full range of stimulatory situations are
misleading. Such a description of the learning process
attributes to the learner quite complex linguistic abilities
,
abilities which he surely does not have in the early
stages of language-learning, and which, according to
Quine, are not needed for learning observation sentences.
Quine does not explain in what sense one learns "the
full range of scenes. . . to which the word is appropriate."
One does not learn that the stimulatory situations to
which a sentence is appropriate are of a certain sort
.
This description would attribute too much to the learner.
It seems more nearly correct--and closer to what
Quine describes when he discusses ostension--to say that
to learn an observation sentence is to acquire .the habit
or disposition to utter a sentence, or to assent to or
dissent from it, in a particular sort of circumstance.
When we say that a child has learned an observation sentence
we should not say that he has acquired knowledge or that
he makes predictions, as Quine’s description of induction
might suggest. As Quine says, "the generality reached
by our induction is rather a habit than a law. . . . "21
We should then say, then, that the child has acquired a
habit
.
15
B. The Second Account; And A Reconciliation
In the account of observation sentences discussed
in Subsection A, the following are among the seven
claims attributed to Quine: •
(3) Observation sentences do not
refer or contain referring items
.
an<^ Observation sentences are learned
as single units; they do not
have terms as parts
.
These claims will be especially important in my dis-
cussion, in the next Subsection, of how the learner comes
to be a full-fledged speaker of the language
,
having
caught on to the theory of enduring bodies.
There appears to be a different account of observa-
tion sentences in Quine’s work, in which claims (3) and
(4) are not made. Such an account would avoid some of
the problems raised in the next Subsection. According
to this second account of observation sentences
,
these
sentences do involve reference. The sentence
The cat is on the mat,
.
for example, is, on this second account, about cats.
Quine introduces this account in many places. In
Word and Ob j ect , after giving a definition of ’observa-
tion sentence’, he says
Our version of observation sentences
departs from a philosophical tradition
v in allowing the sentences to be about
ordinary things instead of requiring
them to report sense data. . . . 22
16
In "Epistemology Naturalized," he makes a similar
statement, again after presenting a definition of ’observa-
tion sentence'. He says there,
There is generally no subjectivity in the
phrasing of observation sentences
,
as
we are now conceiving them; they will
usually be about bodies
. Since the
distinguishing trait of an observation
sentence is intersub j ective agreement
under agreeing stimulation, a corporeal
,
subject matter is likelier than not .
In the discussion of observation sentences in
"Grades of Theoreticity , " he says,
Observation sentences at their
strictest are sentences that we
learned to use
,
or could have
learned to use, by direct con-
ditioning to socially shared
concurrent stimulation. Typically,
they are sentences about external
things, not sense-data .^*4
Clearly
,
observation sentences as described in
these three passages do refer and contain referring
items. They do have terms as parts. So, claims
(3) and (4) are false on this account. This is es-
pecially puzzling since each of the three passages
quoted follows a definition or discussion of ’observa-
tion sentence* that conforms with the seven claims made
in the first account* The two apparently quite dif-
ferent accounts seem to require reconciliation, since
the passages in question appear as glosses on the first
account
.
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We have already seen that according to the second
account claims (3) and (4) are false. Two related claims,
(2) and (5) are also false on this account. These
claims were
(2) Observation sentences are sentences
that can be learned by ostension.
cl
and (5) An Observation sentence can be
learned independently of other
sentences and terms
. Learning of
an observation sentence requires
no prior linguistic acquisition.
Consider claim (5) first. On the second account,
observation sentences do contain terms. The distinction
between one-word sentences and terms is no longer impor-
,
since observation sentences now involve reference
and thus a theory of objects. Since the sentence
The cat is on the mat
is now supposed to contain the term ’cat’
,
we can expect
one who has learned this sentence to have learned the
following sentences as well:
Cat
.
Mat.
This was not the case on the first account. Since the
observation sentence is not a unit learned as a whole on
this account, one would not say (on this account) that a
learner has learned the first sentence unless he has
also learned the second and the third. While it is not
clear that learning an observation sentence requires
18
££ior linguistic acquisition, it is clear that observation
sentences are not learned independently of other sentences
and terms
.
In considering the second claim, that observation
sentences are sentences that can be learned by ostension,
the "aboutness" of these sentences, on the second account,
important. Quine's account of learning by ostension
was built on a stimulus-response model of learning. In-
dividual sentences were learned as units. To learn a
sentence was to acquire a disposition to use the sentence
in appropriate circumstances (or at least in circumstances
similar to those in which the sentence was uttered and in
which one was rewarded for uttering it). It was im-
portant in Quine's account of ostensive learning of observa-
tion sentences that these sentences were a first step
!oward learning physical theory.
On the second account, however, these sentences al-
ready involve a theory of objects. They are (typically)
.
physical objects. While Quine's discussion
of ostensive learning by a stimulus-response method might
account for the acquisition of dispositions to verbal be-
havior, it does not account for the acquisition of a
theory. Quine is quite clear about this matter. This
sort of consideration was one motivation for his charac-
terization of observation sentences as described in the
first account.
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These considerations suggest an explanation of the
two quite different accounts of the observation sentence.
The first account is prominent in Quine's discussions of
language-learning, though it also appears elsewhere. This
account might, then, be a preliminary or only partial
account. It might be that it is limited to the observa-
tion sentences as used by language-learners, but not as
-
used by full-fledged speakers of the language.
Something like this is, I think, correct. But we
should keep in mind that Quine's discussion of observa-
tion sentences in Chapter II of Word and Ob j ect and
in Epistemology Naturalized" are general discussions
and are not restricted to observation sentences as used
by learners of a language. Observation sentences are,
in Word and Object
,
explicated solely in terms of the
circumstances of utterance, stimulations that prompt
speakers to assent or dissent when queried with such
a sentence. If the reconciliation is to be made, some-
thing more must be said about the difference between the
sentences for a learner and the sentences for full-
fledged speakers of a language.
When we ask what the difference between the learner
and the speaker is, we find that the speaker of the
language has a theory of the world that is embodied in
20
his language. The learner, at this stage, has no such
theory. And, indeed, the difference between the two
accounts is that for the first no theory is involved in
observation sentences while for the second a theory is
involved
.
The primary account of observation sentences is
,
I claim, the first account. This is the account that
is needed if observation sentences are "necessarily
our entering wedge into our first language. It is
the account made use of in the discussions of indetermi-
nacy of translation and underdetermination of theories.
^
I explain, or explain away, the second account as
the view of observation sentences from within a theory .
Observation sentences
,
Quine says
,
are to be considered
as units
,
keyed as wholes to the circumstances of ut-
terance. When we consider the observation sentence
from the vantage point of some theory, we describe the
circumstances in terms of our theory. Observation
sentences are typically about physical objects because
the theory in which we describe the circumstances of
their utterance is typically a theory of physical objects.
And when the observation sentences are viewed from within
a theory
,
they can be thought of as having grammatical
parts with semantical functions. They have as parts
terms that refer to objects. But that is just because
i
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we are no longer viewing the observation sentence in iso-
lation but are bringing into play those elements of lan-
guage such as quantification and identity that involve a
theory of objects. The discrepancy between the two ac-
counts is only apparent. The difference is a difference
of point of view. Whether Quine can successfully reconcile
the two views expressed in his work is difficult to de-1
termine. In Section C of this Chapter I discuss one
difficulty with the suggested reconciliation. In Chapter
ii I discuss some additional difficulties.
C. Observation Sentences and Theory
I have argued that the account of observation sentences
needed by Quine for his account of language-learning is
the account I discussed in Subsection A. In that Subsection
I considered seven claims about observation sentences
.
The first of these was that learning some observation sen-
tences is a necessary condition of learning to speak a
language . It might be added that learning observation
• sentences is a necessary condition for learning a theory,
though observation sentences do not themselves involve
a theory at this stage. Quine and Ullian say that after
learning some observation sentences a speaker can gradu-
ally catch on the theory of physical objects. And when
this is accomplished, the observation sentences can be
used as sentences that have structure and reference.
22
We can, they say, "attribute corporeal reference to
component words" of these sentences, once they are seen
from the vantage point of a theory . 27
We have already seen that one can be said to have
learned an observation sentence without having acquired
any knowledge as such. To learn an observation sentence
is to acquire a habit of a specified sort. One could,
for example, have learned the observation sentence 'Dog',
or That’s a dog', and yet have no knowledge of dogs, no
idea what a dog is. Using the observation sentence, i.e.,
uttering it in the appropriate circumstances
,
does not
involve reference to a dog.
Given the nature of observation sentences
,
how do
they provide an entrance into the language? How does the
learning of observation sentences enable one to "catch
on" to the theory of enduring bodies? The significance
of these questions becomes more apparent if we put the
question in a different way: What, on Quine's view, is
the relation between observation sentences and theory?
These are the questions I discuss in this Subsection.
In his discussions of objectivity in language-learning
Quine says some things that bear on these questions. In
the first chapter of Word and Object
,
he says the following
In general, if a term is to be learned
by induction from observed instances
23
where it is applied, the instances
have to resemble one another in two
ways: they have to be enough alike
from the learner's point of view,
from occasion to occasion, to af-
ford him a basis of similarity to
generalize upon, and they have to
be enough alike from simultaneous
distinct points of view to enable
the teacher and learner to share the
appropriate occasions. 2
8
He goes on to say that terms for observable physical
objects generally meet these requirements, "and thus
if is that such objects are focal to reference and
thought. "29 The idea that terms are to be learned
by induction is presented in the antecedent of a
conditional and one might be loathe to attribute this
view to Quine. Nevertheless, I think we can do so,
since he is concerned in that section to explain what
kinds of instances might conform to these requirements.
There is something odd in Quine's talk of a term's
being learned by induction. Either the learner learns
the term by making an inductive inference or induction
is merely the development or acquisition of a habit.
Surely the learner cannot be supposed to be making an
inductive inference. This supposition would require that
he make some inference--perhaps that he infer a general
statement from a group of instances, for example. This
use of inference would require sophisticated linguistic
behavior, including the use of predicates and quantifica-
tion. If the learner were able to use this complicated
24
apparatus
,
he would already have learned the use of such
terms. But it is just such learning that is to be ex-
plained. The learning of terms cannot be explicated
in terms of a method that requires that the learner al-
ready be able to use such terms
.
In my earlier discussion of learning observation
sentences (pp. 12-14), I noted that Quine explained the
learning of such sentences in terms of a sort of induction.
There induction involved the acquisition of a habit of
uttering a sentence in circumstances of an appropriate
^•dnd . The habit, it was claimed by Quine, is acquired
by the learner when the teacher repeats the sentences
in question in similar situations and rewards the learner
for doing so. It would have to be this sort of induction
that is involved in the learning of terms as well. Given
this understanding of what is involved in learning terms
by induction, we can now consider how the language-
learner comes to catch on to the theory of objects.
In the first sentence of the quotation it is as-
sumed that the term to be learned is being applied in
a variety of instances. It must be the teacher, and
not the learner, who is thus applying the term. The
language learner is assumed to have learned only the
•use of observation sentences, and these do not (at
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this stage) contain terms, except in the sense that
Socrates' contains 'rat'. In any case, the learner
is, by hypothesis, incapable of applying terms in any
instances
,
whether they in any sense appear in the
observation sentences he has learned or not.
We cannot suppose either that the learner has
learned the application of a term in any instance at
all. What is to be explained here is how the applica-
tion of terms is learned. The only linguistic abilities
he has thus far developed are those involving observa-
tion sentences
. He has learned these by a form of
stimulus-response conditioning. He is specifically
assumed not to have yet begun to learn the application
of terms
.
There are different kinds of examples one might use
in explicating this passage. The teacher may use the
term being taught as one-word sentences, for example.
If the term to be learned is 'cat', the teacher would
use the one-word sentence 'Cat'. Or the teacher might
use a number of different sentences
,
each containing
/
(in some sense) the term 'cat*.
Suppose the teacher uses the one-word sentence
'Cat' exclusively. What stands out is that the learning
situation is identical to that in which the observation
sentence is learned as a whole as a response to some
26
stimulation of an appropriate sort. There is no reason
to suppose that this same learning situation could re-
sult in the child’s learning the application of the term
associated with the observation situation. If it could
do so, then observation sentences would not have the
special role claimed for them by Quine. Language-
learning could begin with the learning of observation
terms just as well as with the learning of observation
sentences
.
Quine, of course, denies that this is so.
One might suppose that the teacher does not use
the one-word sentence, but just uses the term ’cat’. But
the teacher's use of term rather than sentence does not
show itself in the learning situation. There are no
behavioral differences to clue the learner. Using the
term and uttering the sentence come to the same thing
insofar as the learner is concerned. This does not pro-
vide a way for the learner to distinguish between terms
and sentences and thus to learn to apply the term.
The suggestion that the teacher uses one-word sen-
tences to teach the associated term is unpromising. Sup-
pose instead that the teacher uses a variety of sentences
,
each containing the term to be used. Again, I use the
example of 'cat'. Among these sentences might be:
k
The cat is on the mat . :
The cat is on the hearth.
The cat is eating.
27This is the cat.
There is the cat
.
The cat is grey.
The cat is chasing the mouse
.
From the repeated use of sentences such as these in
appropriate occasions accessible to both teacher and
learner, the teacher is to bring it about that the
language-learner learns to use the term 'cat’, and that
he acquires the theory of ordinary bodies for its use.
Such a theory is required because the learner is to learn
the application of the term.
It seems that what is to happen is that the learner
come to see that all these sentences have something in
common. For the learner, these sentences were already
learned as observation sentences. They do not therefore
contain, for him, the word ’cat’, except in the sense
that ' common ’ contains ’on* and ’rabbit' contains 'rabbi'.
iii- -it i
There is something that all the occasions on which these
sentences might be used correctly have in common. We
might say that each involves a cat (or a cat stimulation)
.
It is suggested that the learner comes to associate these
two "commons "--the common occurrence of 'cat' and the
common occurrence of a cat—and thus learn to apply the
term 'cat' to cats.
One should note, however, that the sentences have
more in common than that each contains, in this sense,
28
'cat'. Each also contains a 'the', a 'th', a ’thee’, a
ca
,
and so on. There is no reason to suppose that ’cat 1
should be picked out as the word, or even as the or an
important word, that the sentences have in common.
If we suppose that the learner has also learned
the observation sentence
Cat
,
•
i
however, the suggestion that he picks out ’cat’ becomes
more plausible. This addition would at least cut down
the number of sign designs that the sentences have in
common. It seems initially plausible that ’cat* should
be picked out rather than ’c* or ’a’ or 'ca' or 'at',
and so on.
This is not really so plausible, however. We might
suppose that the word that the sentences have in common
is 'at'. The occurrence of the "one-word" sentence is
misleading. The 'c' in this sentence might have a
special, and rather peculiar, function: it might en-
sure that the sentence does not begin with the letter
'a' (perhaps because of some tribal taboo)^
My general claim is that if sentences are learned
as wholes in the way Quine describes the learning of
observation sentences
,
then there is no clear-cut
way of picking out from the sentences those sign designs
that function as words or significant units of speech
for the full-fledged speaker of the language. We have
29
already seen the difficulties with 'oat'. The observation
sentences might be written as follows to show their
structure for the full-fledged speaker:
Thee at is on the mat.
Thee at is on the hearth
.
Thee at is eating.
and so on. The addition to the list of
Cat
.
is misleading. The term in the "one-word" sentence
is actually 'at', and the sentence does after all have
structure of a sort. The initial letter 'c' occurs
because of some convention or taboo about the ways in
which a sentence may begin.
This part of Quine's explanation of the learning
of terms founders on what would seem to be a simple
problem. picking out the sign designs in the sentences
"that function as words
. We need from Quine some explana-
tion of how it is that the child comes to see that these
sentences have in common the sign design 'cat' in some
way other than that in which they have in common the
sign design 'at'. Though Quinedoesn't discuss this
matter in connection with language-learning, he does
raise the problem of determining what are the significant
units of speech in his (1961b).
An explanation of how the child manages to pick
V
out the relevant items (e.g., cats) in the occasions
30
of utterance is even more difficult, especially for Quine.
The only learning theory that Quine provides is a stimulus-
response theory. But I shall maintain that, in the light
of Quine's views on translation (discussed in Chapter II),
his account of stimulus-response learning cannot ex-
plain how one catches on to one theory (e.g., that of
enduring bodies) rather than some other theory.
As we shall see in Chapter II
,
there are special
problems about the application of general terms
. The
use of general terms involves a theory of objects . 30
General terms are introduced together with identity
and quantification (or their natural language counter-
P^-^Ts ) . These items involve theoretical commitments .
Quine claims that alternative
,
incompatible theories
are consistent with all possible observation sentences.
For him, the learning of a number of observation sen-
tences (even all of them) is not sufficient for learning
a theory. The ostensive method is inadequate for teaching
what Quine calls a theory of enduring bodies
,
and this
method is the only method that Quine presents.
An additional problem is posed by the interaction
of the teacher and the student of a language. As we shall
see in Chapter II, it is Quine's view that nothing in
their dispositions to verbal behavior uniquely pick out
31
a theory. All of their dispositions to verbal behavior
are consistent with alternative, incompatible theories
of the world . 32 Given this view, Quine cannot explain
how the language-learner comes to catch on to a particular
theory on the basis of the teacher's utterances in special
circumstances
. Those utterances are consistent with
different, and incompatible, theories
.
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There are two separate problems here : First
,
the
observation sentences do not uniquely pick out any one
theory; they are consistent with different theories.
Even if the child were completely rational and had access
to all possible observation sentences
,
these sentences
would not determine that he catch on to one theory rather
than another. Second, even if the child did in some way
catch on the some theory of the world, there would be
no way for his teacher to determine which theory he had
\
caught on to. Similarly, the child could not catch on
to the teacher's theory by considering the sentences
uttered by the teacher in certain conditions. These
utterances would be consistent with different theories.
On Quine's account, observation sentences are
learned ostensively and independently of any other lin-
guistic acquisitions. The ostensive learning is ex-
plained in terms of the acquisition of linguistic habits
r
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by stimulus-response conditioning. Quine provides no
explanation of how, given this account of observation
sentences, the learner is to go beyond these sentences
to learn the use of general terms and the concomitant
theory of objects. 3 His failure to do so is important,
not just for his discussion of language-learning, but
for his epistemological views
. Observation sentences
are to provide evidence for theories. Unless we know
more about the relation between observation and theoretical
sentences
,
we do not know how observation sentences
can have the evidential function Quine claims them
to have
.
II. DEFINITIONS
In Section I, I discussed the functions of observa-
tion sentences
,
particularly their role in language-
learning. My discussion brought out seven claims made
by Quine in connection with what I have called his
first account. These were:
(1) Learning some observation sen-
tences is a necessary condition
of learning to speak a language.
(2) Observation sentences are sentences
that can be learned by ostension.
(3) Observation sentences do not refer
or contain referring items.
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(4) Observation sentences are learned
as single units
; they do not have
terms as parts
.
(5) An observation sentence can be learned
independently
^ of other sentences and
terms
. Learning an observation sen-
tence requires no prior linguistic
acquisition
.
(6) An observation sentence has meaning
of its own, apart from its role
in a theory
(7) An observation sentence is accepted
or rejected on its own, apart from
its role in a theory.
In this section, I consider the definition of
observation sentence
' offered by Quine
,
as opposed to
the more general characterization provided by the seven
claims. In Subsection A, I present the definition as
given in Word and Ob j ect and elaborated upon in
Epistemology Naturalized." Then I consider some short-
comings of the formulations of the definition. In
Subsection B, I consider an objection to Quine's concep-
tion of observation sentences based on the views of other
contemporary philosophers. Finally, in Subsection C,
I provide a brief summary of the chapter.
A. Statements of the Definition
( i ) Criteria for the definition
In Chapter II of Word and Object
,
Quine develops
a definition of observation sentence that is to be suit-
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able for his discussion of translation and meaning. His
primary criteria for such a definition are that it allow
minimal scope for collateral information and that it
be given m behavioral terms, that is, in terms of
native speakers’ dispositions to verbal behavior.
To define 'observation sentence', Quine first in-
troduces two other concepts, that of stimulus meaning and
that of the occasion sentence. Stimulus meaning is
introduced in terms of the methods of a linguist at-
tempting a translation of the language of a "hitherto
untouched people. "35 It supposed that the only
data available to the linguist are the native speakers'
dispositions to behavior, including and especially their
dispositions to verbal behavior. After making some pre-
liminary studies
,
the linguist develops hypotheses to
the effect that certain of the natives' utterances are
sentences, and perhaps working hypotheses about these
sentences. He also develops hypotheses about what to
count as assent and dissent in the native speakers
'
language
.
The stimulus meaning of a sentence is the ordered
pair of the class of stimulations that would prompt
assent to the sentence and the class of stimulations that
would prompt dissent. Stimulations that would inhibit
V
response are not included in the stimulus meaning. The
35
classes of stimulations are to include all stimulations
that would prompt dissent or assent, not just those that
the linguist actually perceives or even just those that
actually occur. Stimulus meaning is defined for a
sentence, for a speaker, at a time. This allows that
stimulus meaning might differ from speaker to speaker
and might differ for a given speaker from time to time.
i
When it comes to defining 'observation sentence',
Quine first points out that these sentences are to be
those whose stimulus meanings do not vary under the
influence of collateral information. He says of ob-
servation sentences that
their stimulus meanings may without
fear of contradiction be said to do
full justice to their meanings. These
are the occasion sentences that wear
their meanings on their sleeves. 36
After introducing the notion of "degrees of observa-
tionality," he says
In behavioral terms
,
an occasion
sentence may be said to be the more
observational the more nearly its
stimulus meanings for different
speakers tend to coincide. 37
The meaning of an observation sentence is its stim-
ulus meaning- Stimulus meaning is defined relative to
persons and times. Nevertheless Quine claims that he
has uncovered a social or intersub j ective notion of
observationality
. This claim rests on the further claim
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that the stimulus meaning of observation sentences
does not vary with differences in collateral information.
This further claim apparently is based on the way
in which observation sentences are said to be learned,
by ostension. In discussing degrees of observationality
,
Quine says
,
If a sentence is one that (like 'Red'
and 'Rabbit’) is inculcated mostly
by something like direct ostension,
the uniformity will lie at the surface
and there will be little variation in
stimulus meaning; the sentence will
be highly observational. If it is one
that (like 'Bachelor') is inculcated
through connections with other sen-
tences, linking up thus indirectly
with past stimulations of other sorts
than those that serve directly to
prompt present assent to the sen-
tence, then its stimulus meaning will
vary with the speakers
'
pasts and the
sentence will count as very unobservational . ^8
In "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation,"
Quine makes use of the term 'observation sentence' in his
statement of the thesis of underdetermination of theories.
^
He says there that the concept was introduced in Word and
.
Ob j ect and has since been clarified in "Epistemology
Naturalized." I want now to turn to the definition of
and discussion of the term given in "Epistemology Natura-
lized." As we shall see, this definition appears to be
quite different from that given in Word and Object . One
of- the virtues of the discussion in the later paper is
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that it brings out some of what Quine takes to be im-
portant considerations in the development of the concept
of an observation sentence.
Before arriving at a satisfactory definition, Quine
offers and then rejects several formulations. He says
that
vaguely speaking, what we want of ob-
servation
. sentences is that they be
the ones in closest causal proximity
to the sensory receptors . 40
This consideration is one that we came upon in "Grades
of Theoreticity , " where observation sentences were said
to be at the "basic level for conceptualization of the
"unprocessed information" provided by the firing of
nerve endings. 41
According to the first formulation,
The sentence is an observation sentence
if our verdict depends only on the
sensory stimulation present at the
time . 4z
This formulation of the definition is rejected on the
ground that language-learning requires the storing of
some information without which one would have no basis
for assenting to or dissenting from a queried observa-
tion sentence.^
The second formulation meets this objection, but
is subject to another. According to the second
formulation
,
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A sentence is an observation sen-
tence if all verdicts on it depend
on present sensory stimulation and
on no stored information beyond what
goes into understanding the sentence. 44
Naturally, Quine rejects this definition. He does not
believe that it is possible to distinguish between in-
formation that goes into understanding a sentence and
information that goes beyond this
. He argues against
such a distinction, for example, in his rejection of
the analytic-synthetic distinction. 1^
Quine finally accepts the following definition:
An observation sentence is one on which
all speakers of the same language give
the same verdict when given the same
concurrent stimulation. To put the
point negatively
,
an observation sen-
tence is one that is not sensitive to
differences in past experience within
the community. 46
This definition seems quite unlike that given in
Word and Ob j ect , of which it is supposed to be an
elaboration. It does not contain any reference to
stimulus meanings
,
which was an important concept in
• the discussion of observation sentences in Word and
Object
.
Quine would argue, however, that the defini-
tions are equivalent, since for a sentence to have the
same stimulus meaning for two speakers would require
that the two speakers agree in their verdicts under the
same concurrent stimulation.
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Quine gives a "behavioral definition" for observa-
tion sentences in "Methodological Reflections on Current
Linguistic Theory" that is like that in Word and Object
.
He says that
An observation sentence is a sentence
whose stimulus meaning is the same forjust about all speakers of the language. ^7
This definition, like the behavioral definition in
^
orc^ Object
,
makes use of ’stimulus meaning'. It,
too, would pick out the same observation sentences as
the definition given in Word and Object
,
according to
Quine. Note, however, that these behavioral definitions
assume that all speakers have had pretty much the same
training, and so have learned the use of roughly the same
observation sentences.
Let us turn again to the definition of 'observation
sentence' given by Quine in "Epistemology Naturalized."
He gave both a positive and a negative formulation. Con-
sider for the moment only the positive statement of the
definition. The definition is supposed to meet two
criteria:
(1) According to it, observation sen-
tences are "to be the ones in
closest causal proximity to the
sensory receptors .
"
It does not rely on a distinction
between the information that goes
into understanding a sentence
and ( 2 )
40
and the information that goes
beyond this understanding.
The positive statement of the definition does
not satisfy both (1) and (2), if (1) i s taken on a
natural reading to be
(3) A sentence is an observation sentence
if and only if it is one of those
in closest causal proximity to
the sensory receptors
.
The positive statement satisfies (1) only if (1) is
construed more weakly as
(4) If a sentence is one of those
in closest causal proximity to
the sensory receptors it is an
observation sentence.
The positive statement does not satisfy the converse of
(4). This failure is the price of satisfying (2), that
is
,
of avoiding the distinction between information that
goes into understanding a sentence and other information.
Such sentences as
There have been black dogs
will be an observation sentence. So will any other sen-
tence on which there is community-wide agreement. This
might include such sentences as
2 + 2 = 4
and
The valence of oxygen is -2
,
given the appropriate community of speakers. These
41
sentences are not in close proximity to the sensory re-
ceptors, as Quine explains the phrase. The causal proxi-
mity to sensory receptors is explained by Quine's account
of the learning Qf observation sentences by stimulus-
response conditioning. 48
A statement made before he gives the definition might
suggest that Quine is aware of and willing to accept this
result. Discussing the fact that there is likely to
be community
-wide agreement on, and indeed acceptance of,
such sentences as ’There have been black dogs', he says,
My rejection of the analyticity notionjust means drawing no line between
what goes into the mere understanding
of the sentences of a language and
what else the community sees eye-to-
eye on. I doubt that an objective
distinction can be made between
meaning and such collateral informa-
tion as is community-wide
.
4 9
Another interpretation of this passage, however, is that
Quine is here noting only that his criterion for analyticity
(community-wide acceptance) does not exclude such sentences
as There have been black dogs
' ,
and explaining why
• that result is acceptable.
It also happens that such sentences along with what
might be called analytic sentences are also not excluded
by Quine's definition of 'observation sentence'. If
Quine is right about the consequences of the claim that
observation sentences can be learned ostensively
,
then
42
he can be fairly confident that (4) will hold, though
there might be some question about that. But, unless
he can put appropriate additional restrictions on
that definition, the converse of (4) will not hold. The
problem arises because members of the community would
assent to such sentences as *2 + 2 = 4’ and 'There
have been black dogs', and so would agree in their
verdicts under the same concurrent stimulations. The
restriction needed would have to express Quine's in-
tuition that the response to queries about observation
sentences [but not that to queries about "analytic"
ones] is causally related to the stimulations under
which the sentence is queried. Moreover, it would
have to express this intuition in extensional, and
preferably behavioral, terms. I am quite pessimistic
about the chances for the success of such an attempt.
It is open to Quine, of course, to simply accept this
result as a necessary evil to be submitted to in order
to avoid dependence on an extremely problematic dis-
tinction, one which he thinks cannot be made.
It is not clear that the definition picks out
all those sentences that are in closest proximity to
the sensory receptors. That is, it is not clear that
it meets even the weak form of criterion (1). If there
were significant differences within the community in
43
training, it might well result that different persons
learned different "observation" sentences. This dif-
ference might have the effect of inhibiting some members
of the community from responding to queries of some
sentences
,
and thus prohibit community-wide agreement
on a verdict . Such a difficulty could be avoided in
a fairly simple way
,
and one that seems appropriate in
the light of Quine ’ s remarks about stimulus meaning in
Wo^d an<3 Ob j ect . One might say that an inhibited re-
sponse is not a verdict and so does not imply disagree -
men ~t under concurrent stimulation. And, one might add,
what is really at issue is not the responses of all
speakers of the language but the responses of all the
speakers of the language who give a verdict. This
would resolve the supposed difficulty and allow the
definition to conform the the first criterion. '
( ii ) Positive and Negative Formulations
The difficulties with the definition that I have
already discussed come up again in connection with its
positive and negative formulations. Consideration of
these formulations should be instructive, for it should
show where the difficulty lies. The two statements of
the definition are not equivalent. According to the
V
negative statement
,
4 4
an observation sentence is one thatis not sensitive to differences in
past experience within the speech
community
.
According to the positive statement,
an
. observation sentence is one on
which all speakers of the same
language give the same verdict when
given the same concurrent stimulation.
The positive statement does not distinguish between
(a) sentences upon which all members
of the community agree because
as a matter of fact they have
had similar or shared past
experiences
and
(b) sentences that are not sensitive
to differences in past experience.
Quine's positive formulation makes use only of the notion
of community-wide agreement under same concurrent stimu-
lation. This notion is to be an adequate representation,
in behavioral terms
,
of the dispositional notion of
sensitivity to differences in past experience that occurs
in the negative formulation.
Consideration of an example of a sentence that con-
forms to the positive statement but not to the negative
statement might help make this point clear. Consider one
of Quine's examples of a sentence on which we can expect
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community
-wide agreement
;
There have been black dogs.
I shall argue that, though Quine may be right about actual
community agreement, and thus that the sentence conforms
to the positive statement of the definition, the sentence
does not conform to the negative statement. As a con-
sequence, a new way of putting the difficulty discussed
earlier is that the positive formulation fails to ade-
quately capture the dispositional notion of sensitivity.
Community agreement is a product of the members of the
community having in fact shared relevantly similar
experiences
. They need not have done so
,
of course
,
and had they not done so the sentence would not be an
observation sentence.
All members of the community need not have had the
s ame kind of experience. Some may have had, in the past,
a direct confrontation with a black dog . Others may have
some general knowledge about dogs and have additional
information of various sorts to decide that dogs proba-
bly come in a variety of colors, including black. Others
may have seen pictures of or have been told about black
dogs
.
We can suppose, however, that some member of the
community had no such experience (direct or indirect)
of dogs at all. Such a person might respond to the
46
query
Have there been black dogs?
in a variety of ways under situations of stimulation in
which the other members of the community would assent.
If the person were queried in an "irrelevant" stimulus
situation, he would probably give an inhibited response.
This would not count as a verdict.
In other situations
,
depending on the stimulation
and information given the person, we might get a dis-
senting verdict, an assenting verdict, or an inhibited
response. We are interested primarily in the dissenting
verdict
,
for such a verdict would change the sentence
from an observation sentence to a non-observation sen-
tence, on the first Cor positive) formulation of the
definition
.
Consider the sorts of stimulations and information
we might offer. If we were to show the person a (non-
black) dog and perhaps tell him a little about how dogs
function in our society (as hunters, pets, and so on),
his response when queried could reasonably be positive,
negative, or inhibited. That would depend, in part, on
other information at his disposal. His response might
be inhibited, for example, if he knew only that some
sorts of animals occur in a variety of colors and others
in only a very limited range (sparrows and lions, for example).
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He might be inclined to dissent if the stimulation given
involved a white husky and the information included some
discussion of the husky's performance in snowy countries.
At this point, the sentence in question is not an ob-
servation sentence, on either definition.
If we were to continue our questioning, however, we
should be able to provide stimulation and information
sufficient to elicit- an assenting verdict. The simplest
thing to do would be to show the person a black dog and
provide the information that it was a dog. We could
certainly expect an assenting verdict under that condition.
He should also be disposed thereafter to assent to the
sentence under all stimulations
,
as do the other members
of the community. On the basis of this new experience,
he would join the rest of the members of his community.
The sentence has become an observation sentence
according to the positive statement of the definition.
But, according to the negative statement, it would not
be an observation sentence. The story I have told shows
that the sentence is_ sensitive to differences in past
experience. It is precisely because the sentence is
thus sensitive that the changes in our speakers response
have occurred.
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The difference between the two statements is, as
I have noted, that the negative statement makes use
°f the dispositional notion of sensitivity to dif-
ferences
,
whereas the positive statement is concerned
only with agreement of verdict over the community.
The verdict one makes can, in cases such as the one I
have discussed, be based, in part, on one's past ex-
perience-including the experience of learning ob-
servation sentences.
Surely there are many sentences such that
(a) had the members of the speech
community had past experiences
that differed in certain ways
the members would differ in
their verdicts under the same
concurrent stimulation
and yet such that
(b) as a matter of fact the members
have had the same kind of or
relevantly similar experiences
and thus agree on the verdict.
Any such sentences conform to the positive statement of
the definition but not to the negative statement.
Both the positive and the negative formulations of
the definition embody principles that are important to
Quine. The positive formulation brings out the notions
of objectivity and intersubjectivity by its emphasis on
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agreement among members of the community of speakers.
It is important to Quine’s task in the first chapters of
Word and Object to have an objective criterion of
observationality
. In his accounts of language-learning
mtersubjectivity is very important. For Quine, these
two notions are very closely related. This is, in
part, the point of the account of language-learning ac-
cording to which ostension, socially inculcated responses,
and stimulus-response conditioning play a necessary
role in such learning. The positive statement of the
definition is supposed to reflect the result of these
teaching and learning methods
,
for it is observation
sentences that are said to be learned by them.
In a sense, the negative formulation of the defi-
nition is also supposed to bring out the objective
nature of observation sentences. What it tries to get
are those responses that all members have in common
irrespective of differences in past experiences
. The
stress here, as it was in Word and Object
,
is on those
sentences to which collateral information would make
no difference. Quine, of course, finds there to be
grave difficulties in attempts to distinguish between
community-wide collateral information and information
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that goes into meaning. 50 if he is to use this nega-
tive formulation, he needs to explain what "sensitivity"
is and to show how appeals to sensitivity avoid the dif-
ficulties he finds in distinguishing between collateral
information and information that goes into meaning of a
sentence
.
Quine's objections to such a distinction might lead
him to reject such examples as 'There have been black
dogs'. He might hold that any "speaker" who was at odds
"the rest of the community on such a sentence was
not really a member of the relevant speaker community.
The speakers bizzare verbal behavior would be said to
show this . 51 When the speaker's behavior comes into
line with that of the community, he becomes a member
of the community.
This suggestion would presuppose that the change
in the speaker's dispositions to verbal behavior is
not a matter of his having had certain experiences (and
thus the appropriate collateral information) but rather
of his having now learned the language. This move,
of course, is simply to make the distinction between
what information goes into meaning and what goes beyond
as collateral information at a different level. Should
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the distinction be made at that level, it could equally
well be made within the language
.
Another way of putting my objection is that Quine
needs some way of determining what is to count as
"speaking a language" or "being a member of a speaker
community." For Quine, any method of making such a
determination must not make use of the distinction be-
tween the information involved in meaning and community-
wide collateral information. On the other hand, no
one would wish to allow any disagreement between two
speakers to count as a difference in the language they
speak. Speakers of the same language can have genuine
disagreements
. Yet is difficult to see how one could
avoid this result without drawing a distinction like the
one Quine rejects. Difficulties about determining
language is and who are its speakers will
come up again. I discuss Quine’s suggestion about the
means of determining membership in a community of
speakers in subsection (iv) of this chapter.
(iii) Degrees of observationality
The positive formulation of the definition of 'ob-
servation sentence' has an interesting weakness. It
tends to include any sentence whatever as an observation
sentence. This is because the only criterion for observa-
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tionality is agreement within a community of speakers.
If a community were educated in a sufficiently authori-
tarian manner, it would be possible to ensure that all
members of the community agree on any sentence. A
Leibnitzian dictator might ensure that all members of
his community assent to the sentence 'Apperceptions are
of petit perceptions '
. This sentence would then be an
observation sentence. This result is certainly non-
intuitive
.
Though there is a tendency for the positive formu-
lation of the definition to include any sentence what-
ever as an observation sentence, it seems likely that
there are in fact, according to the positive formulation,
very few (if any) observation sentences. Many sentences
that might be expected to count as observation sentences
would be excluded by the definition. Here are some
examples
:
(1) The middle C on that piano is flat.
(2) The circuit breaker is tripped.
(3) The muffler if blown.
(4) The dancer on the left is doing a pli£.
(5) The Phillips screwdriver is on the bench. 52
These sentences might be commonly used by the members
of some subgroup within the community. All are sentences
that all members oJf the subgroup would give the same
verdict on under the same concurrent stimulations . They
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are not, however, sentences that all members of the
speaker community at large would in fact agree on. Thus
they are not, according to the definition, observation
sentences. The lack of agreement does not seem to
reflect the theoretical (as opposed to observational)
nature of such sentences. It reflects the knowledge
of the speakers of the language about the objects or
activities involved. In short, the disagreement on the
verdict seems to be due to differences in past experiences.
They are sentences that are
,
to use a phrase from the
negative formulation, "sensitive to differences in past
experience .
"
Consider in this connection such sentences as
Red
,
Table'
,
and 'Rabbit*
. These sentences are used
by Quine as examples of observation sentences. They
should then--unlike the five sentences discussed above--
not be sensitive to differences in past experience with-
in the speech community. It is obvious, however, that
agreement on these sentences is due to the fact that
all or most members of the speech community have had
relevantly similar experiences. It was, in most cases
,
by virtue of training in the language--hearing utterances
of the appropriate sentence in the appropriate circumstances
and so on--that the speakers acquired their dispositions
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to assent to or dissent from the queried sentences
under various situations of stimulation. This point
raises the question whether one must have learned
these sentences in order to be a speaker of the language,
and thus whether one must have had the appropriate
stimulations with the concomitant training.
Quine considers this suggestion in Word and Object
when he introduces the notion of degrees of observation-
ality
. 'Red' and 'Rabbit' are both treated as observation
sentences. 'Red' is, however, said to be more observa-
tional that 'Rabbit*.
There is
. less scope for collateral
information in deciding whether
a glimpsed thing is red than in
deciding whether it is a rabbit . 53
admits
,
however
,
that there is
,
even in the case
of 'Red*
,
some scope for collateral information. In-
formation about lighting conditions
,
and knowledge about
their relevance, might affect one's response to the query
'Red?' under some stimulations.
Though the role of collateral information in the
case of color words is played down by Quine
,
it seems
clear that such information is important. Suppose that
one were in the presence of what appeared to be a red
rabbit and were queried 'Red?' Knowing what we do of
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rabbits we might well dissent, even though there were
no other reason to suppose that there was anything
funny about the situation. Rabbits are not character-
istically red. This collateral information would lead
one to dissent, perhaps on the assumption that some-
thing had been done to the lighting. Someone not
having this knowledge would, presumably, assent to the
sentence
.
Many such cases could be constructed by the use of
examples of natural objects that occur in only some
colors
. A sophisticated user of the language is aware
,
moreover, of such things as subtle effects of differences
in lighting on the appearance of an object and the
effects of such things as drugs on the observer.
This awareness will enter into his judgments. Quine
admits this
,
but treats it as though it were of impor-
tance only in those cases in which something odd occurs
.
In fact, this knowledge must always come into play. The
judgment that an object is red, even when made in normal
conditions, is conditioned by the assumption that the
conditions are normal. Thus the collateral information
about the effects of light on the appearance of the ob-
ject is called into play in the assent to or dissent
from the queried sentence.
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Thus, the positive formulation is so strong that
few, if any, sentences turn out to be in fact observation
sentences. It does not take into account errors in
application of collateral information such as principles
relating lighting conditions to color. On the other
hand, because one can be trained to assent to virtually
any sentence in virtually any circumstances
,
it allows
any sentence at all to be an observation sentence, given
the appropriate training of the members of the speech
community. The negative formulation seems to be quite
useless. Every sentence is sensitive to differences in
past experience. Even color sentences such as ’Red*
must be learned in appropriate circumstances
. Such
sentences are obviously sensitive to differences in the
of different speakers. There is no guarantee
that every member of what one would want to call a
speech community will have had relevantly similar ex-
periences. Perhaps most important, the use of even
color sentences
,
which are most observational
,
requires
the application of collateral principles and collateral
information or hypotheses about present conditions and
own’s own present recognitional capacities.
(iv) The absolute standard
One of the weaknesses I found in Quine's defini-
tion concerned the difficulty of identifying a community
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of speakers. I was concerned that distinguishing such
a community might require a distinction similar to the
analytic-synthetic distinction, a distinction between
information pertaining to meaning and community-wide
collateral information
.
54 I was also concerned that,
without such a distinction, Quine might be unable to
distinguish cases in which speakers disagreed over
the facts from those in which they were speaking dif-
ferent languages
.
Quine considers the problem of presenting a cri-
terion for membership in a community of speakers
:
And what is the criterion of member-
ship in the same community? Simply
general fluency of dialogue. This
criterion admits of degrees
,
and
indeed we may usefully take the com-
munity more narrowly for some studies
than for others. What count as observa-
tion sentences for a community of
specialists would not always so count
for a larger community . 55
This passage speaks directly to my objections in
connection with such sentences as 'The circuit breaker
is tripped'. Such sentences seemed to be cases of ob-
servation sentences, yet they would be excluded from
the class of observation sentences on Quine's definition.
Sentences like these, he says are observation sentences
for some subgroup of the community . Such groups are
to be considered, for some studies, to be speakers of
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a different language, one with a different class of observa-
tion sentences, from the rest of their "community." Since
the responses of the members of the subgroup are suf-
ficiently bizarre compared to those of the rest of the
larger community, we count them, for some purposes, as
a separate community.
One person may, I assume, belong to a number of
different such linguistic communities. The philosopher
who plays ragtime and the auto mechanic who is a
devotee of the ballet belong to several different sub-
communities
. I am not convinced that "general fluency
of dialogue is a satisfactory criterion for membership
in a community of speakers. My reasons for this will
come up in the following discussion of Quine’s claims
about the objectivity of observation sentences as he
conceives of them.
Quine says that one important aspect of his defi-
nition is that observation sentences are not subjective.
On his definition, he says,
a corporeal subject matter is likelier
than not
.
He compares his view with an older view according to
which such sentences are associated with
a subjective sensory subject
matter .
^
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Quine says that the rejection of the older view
by other philosophers has resulted in a reaction that
he calls "epistemological nihilism." He finds this
nihilism to be reflected somewhat in the attitudes
of such contemporary philosophers as N. R. Hanson,
T. S. Kuhn, and Michael Polanyi. He says of these
philosophers that they tend
to belittle the role of evidence
and
. to accentuate cultural rela-
tivism.
.
Hanson ventured even todiscredit the idea of observation,
arguing that so-called observations
vary from observer to observer with
the amount of knowledge that the
observers bring with them . 57
Quine's account, as we have seen, depends on inter
subjective agreement on observation sentences under
similar stimulations. He claims that collateral in-
formation is irrelevant to these sentences. He must,
therefore, respond to a view of the sort described in
this quotation. He does so in a discussion of an
example used by Hanson:
The veteran physicist looks at some
apparatus and sees an x-ray tube. The
neophyte, looking at the same place,
observes rather 'a glass and metal
instrument replete with wires, re-
flectors, screws, lamps, and push-
buttons.' One man's observation is
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another man’s closed book orflight of fancy. The notion
of observation as the impartial
and objective source of evidencefop science is bcinkpupt
.
^ 8
Note that the objectivity in question here is not, at
least directly, concerned with the objects to which
such sentences may refer. Indeed, in this part of
his discussion Quine makes use of the primary account
of observation sentences, according to which they are
not about anything
,
since they have no semantical
function
.
Quine s response to this view is interesting. On
the one hand, he seems to think that it is correct and
to claim that he has already handled such examples by
introducing the notion of variation in observationality
according to "the width of the community considered . "59
On the other hand, he maintains, against what he takes
to be the denial by such philosophers as Kuhn and Hanson,
that the observation sentences are the impartial and
objective source of evidence for science.
In maintaining that observation sentences are the
impartial and objective source of evidence, Quine
introduces what he calls an "absolute standard" for
observationality
.
Now my answer to the x-ray example
was already hinted a little while
back: what counts as an observa-
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tion sentence varies with the
width of community considered. But
we can also get an absolute
standard by taking in all speakers
of the language, or most. 60
Since Quine accepts variation within the com-
munity about what is an observation sentence, it is es-
pecially important that he provide a criterion for mem-
bership in the community that will alow the application
of the absolute standard. The criterion he has sug-
gested is "simply general fluency of dialogue. "61 His
acceptance of the example of the x-ray tube suggests
that this criterion is problematic. To some degree,
subgroups within the larger community do not have general
fluency of dialogue with other speakers of their lan-
guage. We need to distinguish those whose lack of gen-
eral fluency is due to their being members of some sub-
group of the community (as well as of the larger com-
munity) and those who are not members of the community.
Quine does not say enough here about what is to be re-
quired for "general fluency" to determine whether the
criterion will be adequate.
Quine’s suggestion, in his presentation of the ex-
ample of the x-ray tube, that observation sentences
the objective source of evidence for science is also
are
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problematic. It is not clear how observation sentences
as he construes them can serve this function. In the
next section I consider a general view that is in im-
portant respects like the one Quine ascribes to Kuhn,
Hanson, and Polanyi. Then I consider briefly Quine’s
claim that this view implies the bankruptcy of observa-
tion as a source of evidence, and consider whether on
his own account of observation sentences these sentences
can serve as the impartial and objective source of
evidence for science.
B. An Opposing View of Observation Sentences
When he introduced the notion of an observation sen-
tence in Word and Object
,
Quine said that he could say
"without fear of contradiction" that the stimulus meaning
of observation sentences does full justice to their meaning
His views on observation sentences are not, however, so
lacking in controversy as this statement suggests
. In
this subsection I consider the views of some philosophers
.
who would disagree with Quine's conception of observa-
tion sentences.
Quine notes in "Epistemology Naturalized" that
Kuhn, Hanson, and Polanyi would raise objections to his
definition. I discussed his response to one such ob-
jection in the last section. In this section I want to
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consider the objections in more detail. In introduce
the general view in which I am interested by discussing
some claims made by Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific
-.
^Xi'-LUtion . I then consider a refinement of the general
view based on some arguments given by Bruce Aune in
Knowledge Mind and Nature . 6 3
In response to anticipated objections to his def-
inition of observation sentences, Quine suggests an
absolute standard. When this standard is applied, all
or most speakers of the language must agree on their
verdict for a sentence to be considered to be an observa-
tion sentence. The intuition is that while some members
of the community might form sub- communities in their
agreement about certain sentences that other members
of the community disagree about, there will be some group
of sentences that all members of the larger community
agree on.
One obvious subgroup is the scientific community.
In proposing his absolute standard, Quine supposes that
when a member of the scientific community utters 'Red'
he is using the same sentence as a member of the larger
community who is not a member of the scientific com-
munity. All members of the larger community are sup-
posed to agree on the verdict about the same sentence.
Some philosophers, because they disagree with Quine's
claim about the meaning of observation sentences
,
would
deny that this is so.
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Consider Kuhn's views, as given in his (1962). For
him, the very conception of what it is to be a physical
object is determined by the conceptual scheme of the
speaker. The utterance 'Physical object' by a Newtonian,
for example, is about a different kind of object than. is
the utterance of ’Physical object' by an Einsteinian. Phys-
ical objects have radically different properties in the
different conceptual schemes. 6l+
Kuhn presents this position in a discussion of the
concepts of space, time, and mass.
The physical referents of the Newtonian
concepts are by no means identical
with those of the Einsteinian concepts
that bear the same name. (Newtonian
mass is conserved; Einsteinian is con-
vertible with energy. Only at low
relative velocities may the two be
measured in the same way, and even
then they must not be conceived to
be the same. 6
5
Both scientists say that physical objects have mass; but
in using the sign design 'mass', they ascribe radically
different properties to objects. Kuhn calls this "the
displacement of the conceptual network through which
scientists view the world" when one scientific view
succeeds another. 66 It is almost as though two people
have used the name 'Tom' but were referring to different
people
.
Kuhn's emphasis in this book is on the influence
of theories, or paradigms, on what is observed. For him,
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the difference between the paradigm of the scientific
community and that of the other members of the larger
community would result in their speaking different lan-
guages
,
even though they might make use of some of the
same sign designs. Kuhn would deny that the use of an
observation sentence such .as 'Red’ by members of the
scientific community is the same as that of the rest
of the community. He would object to Quine's ab-
solute standard on the ground that it falsely supposes
’Red' to have the same meaning for all members of the
putative larger speech community.
While Kuhn’s position is very interesting, it is
a rather special case of the general position I wish to
consider. In particular, Kuhn is committed to the
view that scientific (and other) theories are incom-
mensurable. The incommensurability thesis does not,
however, seem to be what Quine is attacking in his dis-
cussion of objectivity in science. Rather, his objections
are raised in connection with the view, shared by Kuhn,
Hanson, and Polanyi, among others, that observation is
theory-laden. This view does not by itself entail the
incommensurability thesis. Thus, though Kuhn's remarks
serve as an introduction to the alternative view of
observation sentences that I wish to discuss, I now
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turn to works of other philosophers in order to con-
tinue my description of the more general view that I
take Quine to be attacking. In the remainder of this
section, I make use of passages from the work of Bruce
Aune and Wilfrid Sellars.
In his discussion of "Common-Sense Colors and
Theoretical Science," Aune takes up the issue whether
a word such as red' has the same meaning in scientific
and in common sense languages. This question is
relevant to the evaluation of Quine's absolute stan-
dard. Aune uses the example of the word 'red'.
From the fact that even philosophically
minded scientists
—those with con-
sidered views on the relation between
science and common sense—commonly use
ordinary words one cannot infer that
these words
,
as they use them continue
to possess their ordinary meanings
.
On the contrary
,
it would be entirely
natural to suppose that anyone who
explicitly resolved a conflict between
his ordinary and his scientific no-
tions (assuming that one existed) might
well continue to use many of the same
words, such as "red", in response to
the same sensory experiences as before.
What would be different about his use
of these words would be their radi-
cally changed liaisons with other
expressions of his total language.
Given this sort of change
,
one
might say that while many of the
utterances he makes are still trig-
gered by the same sensory experiences
,
they would no longer have the same
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meanings as before and hence would
not involve the same claim. 67
Like Kuhn's discussion, Aune's is, in the begin
ning, about words and not sentences
. According to the
view Aune describes, the meaning of the word 'red'
uttered by members of a scientific community is dif-
ferent from the meaning of 'red' uttered by other
members of the "larger community." Though the sign
design is the same in both cases, the meanings are dif-
ferent. They do, in some, perhaps many, cases, pro-
duce the same designs in similar circumstances; to make
the point more Quinean, they agree on their verdict when
someone queries them with the sign design 'Red?' in
the same situations of stimulation, for example.
Aune and Kuhn do not argue that the stimulus mean-
ings of sentences differ for the scientific and the lay
communities
. It does seem reasonable to suppose that
there will be some differences even here, however. These
srences might involve ways of deciding what are
,
for
the lay community, borderline cases. They might also
result from differences in the background knowledge that
a scientist brings to a situation. He would perhaps be
more likely to make discriminations on the basis of back-
ground information about the states of observers (in-
cluding himself) and the nature of the circumstances in
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which a sentence is queried. But such disagreements are
not the primary ones. The primary disagreement between
Qume on the one hand and Aune and Kuhn on the other is
over Quine's claim that the stimulus meaning of an
observation sentence does full justice to its meaning.
This disagreement involves disagreement over the ways
m which these sentences are learned and over the role
of the sentences in the language.
The issues are complicated by the fact that Aune
speaks of the meanings of words and Quine speaks of the
"meanings" of sentences. Quine might be inclined to
agree with Aune that the scientist's use of the word
’red' is different from the layman's. Even if he did
so, he would maintain that the meaning of the sentence
'Red' is the same for both. Any cases of differences
in verdict would probably not be important to him, since
they are likely to involve borderline cases about which
there is no general agreement within the lay community
in any case. For Quine, the observation sentence 'Red'
(in this context) does not contain its associated term
'red'. The meaning of the sentence is its stimulus
meaning . 6
8
Aune would, I think, say that 'Red', if it is a
sentence at all, is shorthand for something like 'This
is red' and claim that the sentence does, contrary to
Quine's view, contain the predicate 'red'. Quine's
;
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gloss of the sentence 'Rabbit' as 'Lo, a rabbit' suggests
that 'Red' is a shorthand for a sentence that is more
easily recognizable as a sentence in English, and that
'This is red' might do. But Quine does not think that
the sentence 'This is red', as observation sentence, has
structure or semantical function. For him, the sentence
is a whole unit that is independent of any other lin-
guisiiic items and is learned by ostension.
Aune denies that sentences are learned as units
independent of any other sentences. 69 He also argues
that ostension does not play the role in language-
learning that philosophers like Quine claim for it. 70
He would, however, agree that "observation sentences"
are uttered as responses to stimulation, that they are
causally related to the world. But observation sen-
tences are not just responses to external stimuli, as
Quine's view suggests; they are linguistic responses.
As linguistic items
,
they must be capable of function-
ing in the language, for example, in inferences. Quine's
non-s tructured observation sentences cannot function
in inferences .
Wilfrid Sellars ' discussion of observation sentences
in "Some Reflections on Language Games" brings out this
last point. 71 He draws an analogy between speaking a
language and playing a game of chess. We can think of
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sentences as marking positions in the game of language,
which we occupy when we utter them. We move from one
position to another in the game when we do such things
as making inferences. We might, for example, move
from the position 'This is red' to a position such as
'This is colored'.
It is important to note that 'This is red' is a
position m the game. Because it is a position, we must
be able to come to occupy that position and to move from
that position to other positions. If one has learned the
sentence, one is able to use it in making moves in the
language game as_ well as to respond to the appropriate
stimuli by producing it. 7 2
The view under consideration rejects the atomistic
account of observation sentences offered in Quine's
primary account. On this view, the sentence 'This is
red' does contain the predicate 'red'. Since it is also
claimed that the predicate 'red' as used by the scientist
is different from the predicate 'red' used by the layman,
the observation sentence 'This is red' (or its ab-
breviation 'Red') also differs in meaning for the two
communities
.
It is claimed, then, that the scientist and the lay-
man are responding to different sentences when they as-
sent to or dissent from queries such as 'This is red?'
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Quine's absolute standard supposes that there is only one
sentence. Thus, the absolute standard is rejected by
philosophers who hold the general viewed described.
When Quine discusses a view of the sort I have
described, he makes several rather strong claims about
it. First, he describes the view as reflecting a mood
of epistemological nihilism". After discussing an ex-
ample, one used by Hanson, he suggests that, according
to this view,
The notion of observation as the
impartial and objective source of
evidence for science is bankrupt. ^ 3
My descriptions of the views of Kuhn, Aune
,
and Sellars
are by no means complete
,
and I have not defended these
philosophers against Quine's charges of subjectivity.
But there is nothing in the views as I have so far
described them that makes it obvious that they abandon
objectivity or that they reflect a mood of "epistemologi-
cal nihilism". It is
,
I think, up to Quine to state clearly
his standards of objectivity and to argue that views of
the sort described fail to meet these standards. The
comments he makes on the example from Hanson's writing
provide neither a statement of these standards nor any
argument to show that the philosophers have abandoned
objectivity
.
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It is also incumbent upon Quine to show how, on
his account, observation remains the impartial and ob-
jective source of evidence for science. Note that the
account of observation sentences that Quine must use
m showing this is the primary account, that account
discussed in Subsection A of Section I. According to
the secondary account, observation sentences are about
objects. This is the account in which observation
sentences are understood from the point of view of a
theory. This secondary account is much like the view
I have described in this subsection, a theory-laden
view that Quine rejects as reflecting a mood of epist-
mological nihilism and abandoning objectivity. Thus it
is important that Quine make clear what his standards
of objectivity are and how his own second account of
observation sentences meets them.
Consider Quine's primary account of observation
sentences. According to it, observation sentences are
indeed impartial and objective, in that they do not in-
volve a theory of objects. Indeed, as Quine claims,
all true observation sentences are consistent with al-
ternative, incompatible theories, and conversely . I
4
In Subsection C of Section of this chapter, I
discussed the difficulties, for Quine, in showing how
a learner of the language comes to adopt a theory of
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objects. I noted then that this was an important dif-
ficulty because it was closely related to the problem
of the relation between observation and scientific
theory. And indeed the same problems arise in showing
how observation sentences are the repositories of evi-
dence for scientific theories. Observation sentences,
according to Quine, do not enable us to choose among
different theories. These theories may be radically
diffsi’ont in the objects they posit.
It is true
,
on Quine's account, that we might be
inclined to reject a theory if it were not compatible
with some observation sentence or sentences that we
believe to be true. Quine has argued, though, that one
could equally well reject the observation sentence and
accept the theory. There might be complicated reasons
for doing this . One might decide that the observation
sentence is in fact false because it depends on an in-
strument the theory of which is false. Or it might
just be rejected ad hoc. It is only a psychological
fact that observation sentences are among those that we
will be most reluctant to reject.
Moreover, sentences other than observation sen-
tences are also used in deciding whether to accept a
theory. If the theory is incompatible with any state-
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ment that we believe to be true, we will be inclined to
reject it. So being the ground for inclining us to
reject or accept a theory is not a trait of observation
sentences, as such, that makes them capable of being
repositories of evidence for theories.
Unfortunately, Quine has very little to say about
how observation sentences function in providing evi-
dence. He needs to justify his claims about their ob-
jectivity and their ability to provide evidence. It
looks as though observation sentences
,
insofar as they
are objective (theory-neutral)
,
do not help us to choose
among theories. To the extent that they do help us to
make theoretical choices
,
they do so in part
,
not be-
cause of their objectivity and impartiality, but
because of our attitude toward them, i.e.
,
our reluctance
to abandon them. Quine needs to show in addition that
these attitudes are, on the whole, justified if he is
to make his claim convincing. Moreover, he must show
clearly how the primary and secondary accounts are re-
lated . This is because it is only on the secondary--theory-
laden--account that such sentences have structure and so
are able to have inferential connections with one another
and with theoretical sentences
.
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C
. Summary
In Section I, I draw a distinction between two
views of observation sentences that are implicit in
Quine's writings on that topic. On the primary ac-
count, which I discuss in Subsection A, observation
sentences are conceived as mere learned responses to
stimulation. On this account, observation sentences
are independent (in various ways) of other observation
sentences and of theoretical sentences, unstructured,
theory-neutral, and without the usual semantical
functions
.
The secondary account is discussed in Subsection B.
On this account, observation sentences are connected with
one another and with theoretical sentences, have structure,
are theory-laden, and have the usual semantical functions.
In Subsection B I suggest a means of reconciling the
two accounts. I do not, however, present the details
of such a reconciliation; nor am I convinced that Quine
can make good all of the claims he wishes to make about
his conception of the observation sentence. Some of these
appear to be plausible only because he conflates what
I claim to be two importantly different accounts.
I find the distinction between the two accounts
important in clarifying some of Quine’s claims in con-
nection with his epistemology, philosophy of language,
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and philosophy of science. His discussions of language-
learning provide much of the support for my attribution
to Quine of the seven claims that characterize the
primary account. In Subsection C, I critically examine
Quine's discussions of language-learning. I take these
discussions to be important for several reasons. First,
his claims about the objectivity of observation sentences
are based on his claims about the ways in which such sen-
tences can be learned. It is because they can be learned
ostensively (i.e., because they are related in an appro-
w&y "to sensory stimuli) that they are objective.
These claims are important in Quine's discussions of epi-
stemology and the philosophy of science. Second, the
purported role of observation sentences in enabling the
child to learn a language has some consequences for more
general views about the relation between observation and
theory. Finally, Quine assimilates the position of the
language-learning child with that of the field linguist
attempting to learn a new language. So his claims about
the language-learner should shed light on his discussions
of the indeterminacy of translation.
In Section II, Subsection A, I examine in detail
the definition of 'observation sentence' given in Word
and Ob j ect and elaborated upon in "Epistemology Naturalized."
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After considering the criteria for the definition and how
the definition is to fit them, I discuss two issues. First
Quine s definition fails to exclude sentences that he
characterizes as analytic. Second, the two formulations
of the definition he provides are not equivalent. These
issues are related, since
.it is a failure of Quine's at-
tempt to provide a behavioral explication of a disposi-
tional term that causes the difficulty.
Quine discusses some objections to his definition
that might be raised by certain contemporary philosophers
of science. He answers these by introducing an "absolute
standard" for observationality
. At the same time, he
criticizes these philosophers for abandoning objectivity
in their discussions of observation. I take up these
criticisms at the end of the subsection.
In Subsection B, I describe an alternative view
of observation sentences. The view as I describe it
includes those of the philosophers criticized by Quine.
This view is an important one to consider in the ex-
amination of Quine's views because it is quite similar
to Quine's secondary account. Thus, Quine must explain
how it is that his theory-laden view of observation
sentences avoides the criticisms he levels at Kuhn,
Hanson, and others. Such an explanation wo._ld provide
the details of the reconciliation of the primary and
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secondary accounts of observation sentences.
The discussion of observation sentences I have
provided is used in Chapter II in my explications of
the underdetermination and indeterminacy theses. Spe-
cific discussions of the bearing of these on Quine's
claims about observation sentences are given at the end
of Sections I and II of that chapter.
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CHAPTER II
I. UNDERDETERMINATION OF THEORIES
/ i
Introduction
At the end of Chapter II of Word and Object
, "Trans-
lation and Meaning," Quine says that all our theories
and beliefs are underdetermined by all the possible
sensory evidence. 1 This is a claim that I consider under
the name 'underdetermination of theories'. A more
detailed statement of this thesis is given by Quine
in the ar tide "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of '
Translation . "2 My discussion of underdetermination
regies heavily on the explication given there.
Quine first introduces two weak forms of an
underdetermination thesis. According to the first
form, a theory is underdetermined by past evidence. Quine
says that this form of the thesis is clearly true: it
seems obvious that there are alternative
,
incompatible
theories all compatible with all past evidence. That
claim leaves open the question whether such theories
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also compatible with evidence that will become a-
vailable in the future
.
The second form of the thesis is somewhat stronger.
Naturally, [physical theory] is underdetermined by
past and future evidence combined ." 3 This is be-
cause the past and future evidence is comprised only
of those actually observed (and to-be-observed) events.
Alternative, incompatible theories could be compatible
with all these, it is claimed. That claim leaves open
the question whether such theories are also compatible
with other, observable but unobserved events.
The thesis m either of these forms is commonly
accepted. It is assumed, for example, in discussions
of pragmatic criteria for choosing theories, that al-
ternative hypotheses or theories are available. Good-
man, in his discussion of induction, argues that alter-
native hypotheses about a set of data can always be
constructed
.
The thesis of underdetermination in the form held
by Quine is stronger than either of these formulations.
He holds that physical theory is underdetermined, not
just by actual (past and future) observations, but
by all possible observations
:
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earh^h theo^ies can be at odds withach other and compatible with allpossible data even in the broadest
sense. In a word, they can be logi-Ca
.
^ incompatible and empirically
equivalent .6 y
The empirical equivalence of theories would seem
to involve their consequences about observational
data. Two theories would then be empirically equi-
valent if and only if they implied exactly the same
observation sentences. This reading is suggested by
Quine's talk, in "Epistemology Naturalized," for ex-
ample, of the empirical consequences of the more theo-
retical sentences of a theory. 7 What is suggested
in the passage just quoted, however, is not implica-
tion but compatibility with such data. Two theories
would then be empirically equivalent if and only if
they were compatible with exactly the same observation
sentences. This seems rather weak. If one theory
implied an observation sentence and the other implied
neither that sentence nor its negation, both would be
compatible with that sentence and so could be empirically
equivalent
. If this is what is meant by empirical
equivalence, the alternative, incompatible theories in
the other formulations of the underdetermination thesis
need not have the same "empirical consequences." Though
this passage suggests that empirically equivalent the-
ories are compatible with all possible data
, this is
probably not intended. It seems unlikely, since then
two theories that were compatible with all the same
observation
.-sentences
,
some of which were false, would
not be empirically equivalent. Surely, theories could
be empirically equivalent even though false. Compa-
tibility with all possible data is, however, a sufficient
condition for empirical equivalence
.
Quine elaborates the statement according to which
Physical theory is underdetermined
even by all possible observations .
^
In the elaboration, he explains his use of 'possible
observations
' in terms of place-timed sentences
.
Not to make a mystery of this mode
of possibility
,
what I mean is the
following. Consider all the observa-
tion sentences of the language : all
the occasion sentences that are suited
for use in reporting observable events
in the external world. Apply dates
and positions to them in all combina-
tions
,
without regard to whether
observers were at the place and time.
Some of these place-timed sentences
will be true and the others false
,
by
virtue simply of the observable
though unobserved past and future
events in the world. Now my point
is that physical theory is under-
determined even by all these truths.
Theory can still vary though all
possible observations be fixed. Phys-
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ical theories can be at odds with each
other and yet compatible with all
possible data even in the broadest
sense
.
a
Quine expects there to be wide agreement with his
thesis of underdetermination of theories. He admits
that there might be disagreements about which parts
of a theory are underdetermined. He himself be-
lieves that the thesis applies even to "common-sense
traits of macroscopic bodies. "10 He supposes, how-
ever, that there may be those who take the thesis to
be applicable only to the more speculative portions
of physical theory.
This expected difference between Quine and
other philosophers of science about the application
of the thesis is readily explained. Quine treats
science and common sense as continuous with one another.
For him, science is not set against common sense with,
for example, its own standards of evidence and truth.
For him, our ordinary talk of physical bodies—of
tables and trees, chairs and flowers--itself involves
a theory of the world that is to be treated like any
other scientific theory. There is no reason to sup-
pose that one physical theory (that of ordinary,
middle-sized objects) is in any better position with
respect to underdetermination than any other theory.
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The physical object theory is only a different theory
from, say, the molecular theory. It has no special
status, except as being more ancient and more widely
held than others .
H
Since he accepts the underdetermination thesis,
his view that the theory of ordinary bodies is a sci-
entific theory compels him to apply that thesis to
common-sense traits of macroscopic bodies." He
has good reason to suppose that other philosophers
of science disagree about this matter. For example,
though Feyerabend treats the "theory" of ordinary phys-
ical objects as a scientific theory, Sellars does not . 12
And both differ from Quine in their treatment of the
relation between such "theory" and other theories.
In Subsection (A) I discuss whether the thesis
is applicable to all physical theories. I follow Harre
distinguishing two kinds of theories
,
reticular
theories and explanatory theories
. I argue that
,
al-
though it appears that reticular theories are not
underdetermined, Quine would say that they are. This
discussion allows me to elaborate the thesis somewhat
and to consider one possible motivation for it. In
Subsection (B) I consider some objections to Quine's
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formulation of the thesis +•>>=+- , , ...mes that are based on criticisms
of his views on observation sentences.
A. Two Kinds of Theories
In Matter and. Method, Harre distinguishes between two
kinds of theories, reticular theories and explanatory
theories. Reticular theories are those that "connect
u£ facts of the same kind.
. .
.”13 Explanatory
theories "explain one set of facts by adducing in ex-
planation another and different set of facts." 14 Harre’
s
distinction between reticular theories and explanatory
theories is, as we shall see, much like Feyerabend's
distinction between empirical generalizations and uni-
versal theories. Harre ’ s distinction can be maintained
aL different theoretical levels, however. In my dis-
cussion, reticular theories are assumed to reticulate
or connec l up facts at the level of observation . 13
The essential point in the difference between
uhe two kinds of theories Harre discusses is that only
explanatory theories
,
and not reticular theories
,
in-
troduce theoretical concepts that are not reducible
to the concepts involved in what is to be "explained".
In the sorts of cases I consider, these concepts will
be observation concepts. So, in this case, reticular
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theories do not introduce concepts that are not reducible
to observational concepts and clusters of observational
concepts. Explanatory theories, in this case, are
theories that introduce irreducible theoretical con-
cepts— such as the concept of an atom.
Theoretical terms of a sort--do occur in reticular
theories as well. But these terms are reducible to
observational terms. They do not introduce any new set
of facts (about nonobservable objects, for example).
The "theoretical " concepts of a reticular theory serve
systema tize observational data by correlating
or connecting them.
Harre gives as an example of a reticular theory
Newtonian dynamics. He says of this theory:
Newton knew of a number of regularities
in the phenomena of motion, some from
the investigations of Kepler and Galileo,
and some from discoveries made in his
own time. His problem was essentially
to find a way of connecting up all
the x acts of motion, both terrestrial
and
. celestial
,
partially and fragmen-
tarily connected up by his predecessors.-^
Harre
' s statement of Newton's task presupposes that
the theory that will accomplish that task is to be a
reticular one, for the task is the connecting up of
a set of facts (those about motion) that are essentially
of the same kind.
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Newton introduced in the theory of dynamics the
concept of force. It is by means of this concept that
he was able to connect up the facts about motion. The
concept of force
,
Harre claims, is eliminable. The
concept "never appears in the answer to a genuine
mechanical problem. It is only part of the working.
Concepts which are only part of the working are not
used to express facts. "18 This is part of his support
for the claim that the theory is not an explanatory
theory—there are no facts expressed by principles in-
volving theoretical terms other than those about
observables. Forces are never observed in nature.
Newtonian dynamism is thus, according to him, a reti-
cular theory. It does not attempt to explain facts of
one kind (those about motion) by alluding to facts of
another kind. ihere are no additional facts about
forces as such.
Given Harre ' s distinction between reticular
and explanatory theories
,
one might suggest that at best
only explanatory theories and not reticular theories
are underdetermined by all the possible data. This
suggestion seems reasonable, because these theories
simply involve something like universal generalizations
about observables
. It seems reasonable to suppose that
one could infer that all As are Bs
,
given that every
8 8
instance of an A is also an instance of a B and that all
possible instances are included in our data. So,
it seems reasonable to suppose that all the possible data
do determine theories of a certain sort, namely, those
that involve merely the connecting up of these data.
Before discussing this suggestion in more detail,
I want to point out the importance of the question whether
reticular theories are underdetermined. First, if it
were decided that such theories are not underdetermined,
tnis limitation on the underdetermination would make
clearer what the thesis claimed. But there is even
more reason to think this question important. Some
philosophers ciaim that no theory introduces theoretical
concepts that could not be eliminated in favor of
observational concepts. In Harre’s terms, they claim
that all theories are reticular theories. So, if re-
ticular theories are not underdetermined, then we could
say that, if this view about the elimination of theore-
tical concepts were sound, the underdetermination thesis
wou~ d be false
.
Consider the view discussed by Hempel in "The
Theoretician’s Dilemma." Hempel examines a case in
which a "nonobservable entity," specific gravity, functions
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m the theory much as Harre claims force to function in
Newtonian dynamics
. Hempel says
,
in a passage remi-
niscent of Harre on reticular theories,
the
^ assumption of nonobservable
entiries serves the purpose of
systematization: it provides
connections among observables in
the
. form or laws containing theo-
retical terms.
He then suggests that the advantages obtained by in-
troducing nonobservable entities could just as well
be served without introducing them. They are said to
be eliminable in terms of observables.
Discussion of this case leads Hempel to the
question whether, in general, terms for theoretical
entities can be eliminated from theories
. Since
ti.e general principles containing theoretical terms
are used merely for purposes of systematization, it
is supposed tnat these principles can always be re-
placed by general statements in which only observa-
tional terms occur. if so, then the systematization
can be achieved without the use of theoretical concepts
or theoretical entities.
This question leads to the theoretician’s dilemma,
the conclusion of which is that "... the theoretical
terms and principles of any theory are unnecessary . "20
I* this conclusion were true, then all theories would
be reticular theories.
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I don’t plan to discuss the issue of reductionism
m detail here. I pointed it out as a possibility
to show the importance for Quine's thesis of under-
determination of the distinction Harre draws and for
the suggestion that reticular theories are not under-
determined. It is to the question whether reticular
theories are underdetermined, in Quine's sense, that
I now turn.
II beems prima facie implausible to suppose that
reticular theories are underdetermined, in the strong
sense used by Quine. I gave the intuitive reasons why
tnis is so above. Reticular theories do not "go beyond"
the data, and all possible data can be supposed to be
included. Such theories merely provide ways of connec-
ting or systematizing, or classifying the data.
Clearly
,
there will be a very large number of dif-
ferent ways of connecting the data, particularly since
we are dealing with all possible data. But it is not
clear that such ways of connecting the data are logically
incompatible with one another and yet compatible with
all possible data. There is a sense in which different
classifications are "incompatible" with one another; they
are incompatible, simply by being different classifications
.
But this is not a logical incompatibility. The state-
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ment that an item is classified as P by classification
system c and the statement that it is classified
as P by classification system C' do not contradict
one another even though P and P' are different kinds.
But though the suggestion that the underdetermina-
tion thesis holds for such theories seems implausible,
we should not be too quick to reject it. Quine does
not himself use Harre
’ s terminology, and he does not
discuss reticular theories in connection with the under-
determination thesis. Moreover, as I suggested above
,
21
there is reason to believe that Quine would not even
make the distinction that Harre makes. Some of his
work suggests that all theories are, for him, what
Harre calls explanatory theories: They posit entities . 22
Nevertheless
,
it is possible that Quine holds views
that would commit him to the view that even reticular
theories are underdetermined in his sense, or would so
commit one who held both those views and made the dis-
tinction in question. I consider two arguments that
this is so. The first argument has to do with the
cardinality of the set of data; the second with the
nature of the observation terms to which theoretical terms
of reticular theories are to be reducible.
( i ) The first argument
This first argument depends on the fact that, for
Quine, there are only denumerably many sentences. Quine
I i * »
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explains his use of the phrase 'all possible observations’
in terms of observation sentences
. He says that we take
all the observation sentences of the language and apply
dates and positions to them in all combinations irrespec-
tive of what observations have or will be made. All
of the truths that result still do not determine
physical theory. Since there are only denumerably
many sentences
,
there are only denumerably many place-
timed sentences.
I
l
can be argued that since there are only denumerably
many place-timed observation sentences even simple
hypotheses about the connections of the data are under-
determined. Considerations about curve-fitting prob-
lems in discussions of simplicity form the basis of this
argument. 23 Suppose all the possible data about some
relation, as provided by Quine's procedure, are plotted
on the real plane. There are only infinitely many
sentences
,
and so only infinitely many points are plotted
on the plane. Many different curves can be drawn that
pass through all these points--infinitely many between
any two points. Each such curve would represent a
hypothesis about the values of the relation at those
places where no values were given by the original set
of data. The hypotheses do not introduce any new theore-
93
tical terms that cannot be reducpd -m.a e to the observational
terms with which we began nor do they introduce facts
of a new kind (e.g., about unobservable objects or
entities). They serve merely to connect the previously
available data; they are, in short, simply reticular
theories. Yet they are incompatible with one another,
since they make different claims about the values of
the relation at infinitely many points on the plane.
They are compatible with all possible data, as Quine
explains this.
The problem is that there are non-denumerably points
ln the plane
’
^d we assume that the relation is to be
defined at each of these. But the value of the relation
m question is determined for only denumerably many
points. For any two pairs of values for the relation
whose values are being plotted, there are non-denumerably
many other pairs of values between them. Choice of
a curve between any two pairs of values will determine
values for the relation at the points between these.
These curves represent alternative, incompatible hypotheses
about the values of the relation at those points. Thus,
even reticular theories are underdetermined by all
possible data.
One might ask why this argument supposes that there
are only denumerably place-timed sentences. That is,
one might wish to reject that assumption, and thus the
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argument would fail to 20 thrv-m<T>. t • ,u go ough
. I consider this ob-
section in order to explain Quine's position more clearly.
The place-timed sentences were said by Quine to provide
all the possible data. Yet when we apply dates and
positions to the observation sentences in all combinations
in accordance with Quine's directions for getting all
the possible data, the result, he claims, is only de-
numerably place-timed observation sentences.
An objector might point out that many topologies
for spatial-temporal structures (for example, Carnap's) 24
have the cardinality of the real numbers : There are
non-denumerably many "points" in the structure. One
might suggest that a structure like that one should be
used in the construction of the place-timed sentences.
The dates and positions that Quine says to apply to ob-
servation sentences would be "names for" the points in
the space-time structure. Applying dates and positions
to the observation sentences in all combinations would
then result in non-denumerably many place-timed sentences
.
The values for any relation would then be given at all
points
,
since for each point the place-timed observa-
tion sentences have been constructed. The curve,
representing a hypothesis about the values of the relation,
would be uniquely determined by all possible observations.
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But I think that Quine would reject this suggestion.
First, it is not clear that Quine makes use of a
Carnapian structure of space-time in his characterization
of 'all possible observations'. When he speaks of ap-
plying dates and positions to observation sentences
m all combinations" he may not have in mind all dates
and positions in a structure of ideal space.
Quine makes use of the device of applying dates and
positions to sentences in various parts of Word and
Object
. He says, for example, that the meanings of
observation sentences are their stimulus meanings . 25
According to his definition, "a stimulus meaning is
the stimulus meaning of a sentence for a speaker at a
date. Observation sentences are thus place-timed
sentences relativized to persons
.
27
In developing the canonical notation, Quine avoids
the use of tenses by adopting temporally neutral verb
forms and applying dates and positions to sentences
.
One such use is to simplify logical deductions by
avoiding ambiguity in tensed verb forms. 2 ®
In these discussions, however, Quine does not
explain what is involved in the application of dates
and times to sentences . He does not indicate what
sort of space-time structure provides those dates and
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times. It does, however, seem reasonable to suppose
that he is not making use of an ideal space-time
structure. This is clearest in the case of the place-
timed observation sentences where the linguist may have
to be able to discriminate the spatial or temporal
areas. His handling of the other case also suggests
that these areas are to be discriminable
.
Moreover, this suggestion is supported by the
fact that Quine would certainly hold that there are at
most denumerably many sentences, and so at most de-
numerably many observation sentences. finally, Quine
does argue that there aren't enough names for non-
denumerably many objects. If he were to make use of
a Carnapian space-time structure in the manner sug-
gested, his procedure for explaining all the
possible data would require non-denumerably names--
names for the points of the structure . 29 It is, then,
reasonable to suppose that Quine would agree with the
argument given above to show that even reticular theories
are underdetermined by all the possible data. This
agreement involves a rejection of the objector's claims
about the Carnapian structure of space and time.
The objector's argument does raise a puzzle about
Quine's characterization of the mode of possibility
used in his statement of the thesis of underdetermination
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of physical theory. According to the argument,
there are alternative, incompatible hypotheses, each
compatible with all possible observations
,
about the
values of a relation at non-denumerably many points.
This, at least, is one application of the thesis. Ac-
cepting one of these hypotheses gives the value of the
relation at these points. The value of the relation
assigned by a hypothesis at any point is going to be
given by a place-timed observation sentence not in-
cluded among the original sentences. This fact raises
the question to what extent Quine's explanation of
'all possible observations' was adequate. In what
sense are the new place-timed sentences not part of
the possible data? Clearly, Quine has to say some-
thing more about the structure of space-time that is
involved in his explication of the mode of possibility
if he is to provide an adequate account of what is in-
volved in his version of the thesis of underdetermination
of physical theory. Perhaps the story he would tell
would rule out cases such as that discussed here.
One might still maintain that Quine is
wrong about' the matter of space-timed sentences
. One
might claim that a Carnapian structure should be used
in the construction of the place-timed observation
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sentences. Or one might claim that my suggestion about
Quine’s response to the objector is wrong! Such a per-
son might hold that the objection supposes too much, and
that because of the proper account of 'all possible
observations' the values of the relation are given
at all points on the real plane. This person would
not be convinced by the first argument that reticular
theories are underdetermined because he would still
refuse to accept the premise about the number of
sentences and names. Such a person might, of course,
still hold that explanatory theories are underdetermined.
The second argument I discuss speaks to such a position,
for it does not depend on any limitation on the number
of place-timed sentences
.
( ii ) The second argument
Reticular theories have two important, related
characteristics : they don't introduce a new set of
facts (of a different kind) in explaining data and, in
the sort of case I have been considering, any theoreti-
cal terms introduced by them are reducible to observa-
tional terms or complexes of these. The second argu-
ment that reticular theories are underdetermined in-
volves the reductions of theoretical terms to observa-
tional terms or complexes of these terms
.
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Quine’s account of underdetermination makes use
of the notion of observation sentences
. His explanation
of what constitutes all possible data explicitly uses
these sentences. In my earlier discussion of observa-
tion sentences I pointed out that there appear to be
two different accounts of these sentences in Quine's
work. 0 On one of these accounts, observation sentences
are given as wholes which do not have structure. They
do not contain terms as parts. This is the account that
is prominent in Quine's discussions or language-learn-
ing and radical translation. 31 It appears also to
be the one required for his explanation of the under-
determination thesis.
Given this account of observation sentences
,
the
between observation sentences and observa-
tion terms is essential. Ascription of the use of an
observation sentence to a speaker does not require
ascription to that speaker of a theory of any sort. 33
Ascription of the use of an observation term does re-
quire ascription of a theory to the speaker. Quine
claims in "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Trans-
lation" that even the theory of physical objects is
underdetermined by all possible data. The underdetermina-
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tion thesis applies even to macroscopic bodies. So
it is the "theory-neutral" account of observation sen-
tences that is needed in the explanation of underdetermi-
nation. Observation sentences do not contain terms,
on that account
.
It is, however, essential to Harre ' s characteri-
zation of reticular theories that there be observa-
tional terms available. The "wholly conceptual" theo-
retical terms introduced by such theories cannot be
reduced simply to observation sentences. There are no
simple reductions from theoretical principles to ob-
servation sentences. Theoretical terms and principles
of reticular theories serve to connect data by showing
relationships among various observational terms
. Re-
ductions of theoretical terms will not, on the whole,
be term-to-term reductions. They will be reductions
of a term to a complex of terms
. Thus
,
one-word
observation sentences, such as ’Red', ’Yellow’,
and 'Square', will not be adequate, even if one could
make good sense of reducing terms to sentences. In
order to get the observational terms needed for complex
reductions one needs not just observation sentences
that have no terms as parts
,
but sentences that have
structure
.
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Quine argues 3 5 that the introduction of terms,
even observation terms, involves the introduction of
a theory of ordinary middle-sized objects. For him,
any such theory of objects, even a theory of ordinary,
middle-sized objects, is underdetermined . 36 Since re-
ticular theories require such a theory (because they
require terms), they are underdetermined. They are
underdetermined in the sense that they cannot be ex-
plicated except given the context of some theory. Reti-
cular theories can thus be said to be underdetermined
insofar as the do in fact provide systematization of
some presupposed theory. They can be said to be under-
determined by virtue of the fact that they require
not just observation sentences taken as wholes but
sentences that have structure, that contain terms
as parts, and thus involve an (underdetermined) theory.
^-hink that much of what is said in this argu-
ment is correct. Reticular theories make sense only
in the context of a body of information that they
systematize. The reduction of the theoretical terms of
a reticular theory will, in many cases, require
the use of observation terms . Because the reductions
will be complex, observation sentences will not be
adequate
.
Of course, it does not follow from just this
that reticular theories are underdetermined
,
even in
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the extended sense suggested. The argument requires
the premise that the observation language involves a
—
-
eory- an<^ "that that theory is underdetermined. We
can assume, with Quine, that the observation language
involves a "theory" of ordinary physical objects. As
Quine notes, however, not every philosopher of science
would agree that this "theory" is a theory in the
fudged sense or that it is underdetermined.
Thus, for the argument to be fully convincing, it would
have to give some reasons for accepting the view that
this "theory" really is a theory and that it is under-
determined. What the argument does show, however,
is that Quine would be very likely to hold that reti-
cular theories are underdetermined in this extended
sense
.
The argument of this subsection has thus far
been directed to the intuitively plausible suggestion
that reticular theories are not underdetermined. Two
arguments about this suggestion support the view that
Quine would reject that suggestion. The arguments
depend, however, on a number of assumptions that would
be rejected by various philosphers
. Independent ar-
gument for these assumptions is needed to make the
objections more generally convincing. The objections
do point out some of what is involved in the under-
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determination thesis. They also show a lack of clarity
m Quine's characterization of the mode of possibility
used in his statement of the thesis.
I do not discuss the application of the thesis of
underdetermination to explanatory theories in this
subsection. My more general discussion of the thesis
in Subsection B will apply to these theories.
i
B. Observation Sentences Again
The observation sentences referred to in Quine's
explication of the underdetermination thesis are charac-
terized by the first account discussed in Chapter I.
These are sentences whose meaning is their stimulus
meaning. They do not refer to objects or contain any
referring items. They are independent of theory. It
is not clear whether critics of this account of observa-
tion sentences would hold the underdetermination thesis
in the form in which Quine holds it.
Critics of Quine's account of observation sentences
deny that observation reports can be couched in theory-
neutral language. There seem to be two reasons for this
denial. The first reason is that the introduction of
a theory introduces new sentences as observation sen-
tences . An example of such an observation sentence from
Quine's discussion of Hanson 37 is
This is an
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x-ray tube.
Smart uses as an example of an observation sentence
introduced by a theory the sentence
,
The current through the milliammeteris 35 milliamperes . 35
The point that Smart is making is that the introduction
of a theory makes possible new observation reports
,
observation reports that cannot be made by those who
are not acquainted with the theory. 3
9
This first reason does not affect Quine’s claim. 40
He maintains that, since the sentences are observation
sentence, their "meanings" are their stimulus meanings.
He appears, in his discussion of Hanson, to agree that
oniy persons acquainted with the appropriate theory
could use the observation sentence
This is an x-ray tube
.
But he suggests that there is another sentence with the
sajne stimulus meaning that someone unacquainted with
the theory could use. He suggests something like
This is a glass and metal instrument
replete with wires
,
reflectors
,
screws
,
lamps, and pushbuttons. 41
So far as Quine is concerned, then, since the
meaning of an observation sentence is just its stimu-
lus meaning, there will always be non-theoretical
sentences that have the same meaning as the newly
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introduced observation sentences. "Theoretical" ob-
servation sentences can always be translated into the
observation language. The theoretical sentence is
no more about x-ray tubes than is its common-place
counterpart
.
It takes the second reason to raise a serious ob-
jection to Quine’s form of the underdetermination
thesis, if one accepts Quine’s claim about translation.
The second reason denies that observation sentences
are units whose stimulus meaning is their full meaning.
According to this denial, the observation sentence
This is an x-ray tube
contains the predicate 'is an x-ray tube'. The meaning
of this predicate is not given just by the stimulus
meanings of sentences in which it occurs but also by
its connections with other sentences of the theory as
well as with other observation sentences. The stimulus-
synonymous sentence in the "observation language" contains
no similar predicate. It does not contain any predicates
that must be related to those other theoretical sentences
.
It would seem that someone who held this sort of
view would say that the observation sentences of the
language do determine at least what sort of objects
there are. Because of their theory-laden nature, certain
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observation sentences would determine, for example, a
theory of physical objects rather than a theory of a-
tomic particles. Different philosphers might make dif-
ferent judgments about whether all of the lawlike state-
ments are also determined. Some might hold that all of
the connections among the predicates of the theory are
determined; others might hold that only some of these
are determined. Any such views differ from Quine's
m that, for Quine, not even the objects of the theory
are determined by the observation sentences.
The difference between Quine and those who hold the
sort of view I have described is due in part to the
belief of Quine's critics that observation sentences
are theory-laden. It is also due to their belief
that the observation sentences of the language contain
referring items. The sentences can be quantified into.
On Quine's views of quantification, this means that the
sentences involve a theory of the world. This is
true for sentences that contain only observation terms
as well as for sentences that contain predicates such
as 'is an x-ray tube'. For Quine, the language of
physical objects is a scientific language.
Not every philosopher shares Quine's views on
quantification and reference. Someone might hold the
general view of observation sentences I have described
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and still agree with Quine about underdetermination on -
other grounds. Most philosphers would, I assume, agree
that physical theory is underdetermined in both of the
weaker senses discussed in the Introduction to this
section
.
Apart from these weaker senses of underdetermination
there is also a form of the underdetermination thesis
stated in Quinean terms with which some of Quine’s
critics might agree. Quine's form of the underdetermina-
tion thesis really involves the stimulus-meanings of
a certain category of sentence. The sentences in
question, observation sentences, are said by Quine to
have stimulus meanings as their meanings. We might
then consider a formulation of the thesis that replaces
discourse about observation sentences with discourse
about stimulus meanings. This suggestion seems plausible
when we consider that
,
for Quine
,
the stimulus meanings
of sentences constitute their "empirical content." Such
a formulation might be something like
:
Physical theories can be logically in-
compatible and yet compatible with
the stimulus meanings of all the
place-timed sentences of the language.
One might also formulate a thesis of underdetermi-
nation of physical theory in terms of explanatory
theories. Explanatory theories can be adduced at dif-
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ferent "levels". An example of an explanatory theory
for the theory" of physical objects is a Newtonian
atomic theory (or, as Harre calls it, a corpuscular
theory). An example of an explanatory theory for this
atomic theory is the theory of subatomic particles.
Explanatory theories, as Harre explains them, adduce
a new set of facts about a different kind of object
(say, atoms) to explain an already accepted, but perhaps
now puzzling, set of facts about familiar objects (say,
physical objects).
This terminology suggests a form of underdetermination
thesis that might be acceptable to some of those who
criticize Quine's account of observation sentences. I
shall only suggest the general lines of such a thesis:
Prior to the acceptance of a new
theory
,
there are alternative
,
incompatible theories (explanatory
theories) that are compatible with n
all the observation sentences of
the language
.
Suppose, for example, that we have a physical ob-
ject language. According to the view under discussion,
the observation sentences of the language determine
(at least) some sort of theory of physical objects. There
is no "higher-level" theory that explains the behavior
of these objects. There are, then, no connections between
the physical-object predicates and any other theoretical
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predicates. At this point, alternative, incompatible
theories are compatible with all the sentences of the
language-even though those sentences refer to physical
objects. Theories that introduce
-facts" about demons
are just as good—in this respect at least—as theories
that introduce "facts" about atomic particles.
The criticism of Quine's account of observation
sentences I have discussed here and in Chapter I is
compatible with many forms of the underdetermination
thesis, some of which can be stated in Quinean terms.
It is important, however, for Quine to hold the under-
determination thesis in the form he holds it. The char-
acter of observation sentences is important in his ex-
position of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation.
As we shall see in the next section, these two theses
are intimately related. Not to keep the reader in
suspense about this intimate relationship, I end
this section with a quotation from "On the Reasons
for Indeterminacy of Translation" about the connection
between the two theses. Then I turn to Section II, and
a discussion of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation.
My argument
. . . has been . . .
directed to you who already agree
that there can be logically in-
compatible and empirically equivalent
theories A and EL What degree of
indeterminacy of translation you must
then recognize, granted the force of
my argument
,
will depend on the amount
of empirical slack that you are
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lling to acknowledge in physics.If you were one of those who sawphysics as empirically under-determined only in its highest
theoretical reaches, then by the
argument at hand I can claim your
concurrence in the indeterminacy oftranslation only of highly theo-
retical physics. For my own part,
1 think the empirical slack inphysics extends to ordinary traits
of ordinary bodies and hence that
—
j-ndeterminacy of translationlikewise affects that level oT
discourse
.
II. INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION
Introduction
I do not see Chapter II of Word and Object as pro-
viding an argument for the indeterminacy thesis. Rather,
it is a working out of some consequences of Quine's
earlier views and an explanation of one part of the
thesis
. The thesis itself can conveniently be viewed
as having two parts. Early in the chapter, Quine states
the first part. This is that
manuals for translating one lan-
guage into another can be set up
in divergent ways
,
all compatible
with the totality of speech dis-
positions, yet incompatible with
one another.
^
The second part is given later, only after most
of the attempt to make the first part plausible has been
Ill
completed. According to this second part, some of the
hypotheses the linguist makes about the translation he
undertakes are of a special sort. These hypotheses,
which Quine calls analytical hypotheses
,
are not genu-
ine hypotheses. They differ from certain other hypo-
theses about translation and they differ from the hy-
potheses of physical science. The difference is stated
by Quine in the second part of the thesis of indetermi-
nacy of translation:
The point is not that we cannot be
sure whether the analytical hypothesis
is right
,
but that there is not even
• • . an objective matter to be right
or wrong about . 45
It is important
,
if we are to understand the thesis of
indeterminacy
,
to explain both of these parts and to
show why Quine holds each.
The first subsection of this section is devoted
to issues concerning that part of the indeterminacy
thesis according to which incompatible alternative
manuals of translation are said to be compatible with
the totality of dispositions to verbal behavior. The
second subsection deals with the second part of the
thesis
,
that part according to which certain hypo-
theses about translation of a language are not about
any objective matter.
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A. Alternative, Incompatible Manuals of Translation
The linguist’s method
Quine's discussion of the first part of the thesis
proceeds by an examination of a case of what he calls
radical translation. Quine considers to what extent,
given certain constraints on the problem of translation,
there is a unique translation of a radically foreign
language. He supposes there to be a linguist doing
field work, attempting a translation of "the language
of a hitherto untouched people.
"
4 6 The case of radical
translation is chosen to avoid the reader's natural bi-
ases about the correctness of certain translations and
so to make his claims more plausible, as well as to
make them more dramatic. Quine is concerned with lan-
guage as "the complex of present dispositions to verbal
behavior .
"
4 ^ The reason for this concern is his belief
that
v
language is first and last a system
of dispositions to verbal behavior. 4 ^
Quine considers this sort of "behaviorizing of meaning"
to be "simply a proposal to approach semantical matters
in the empirical spirit of natural science." 49 And
radical translation is "an aid to taking this proposal
seriously
. . . ,
"50
I
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He is specifically not concerned here with the ways
in which .language is learned
.
51 Because he is not
concerned with language-learning, he can introduce the
concept of a modulus of stimulation, which is impor-
tant in his definition of other essential terms. In
deciding upon a modulus of stimulation, one decides
upon a boundary for what is to count as "current",
and this decision will determine what is to count as
the speaker's current language and what is to count
as the period of acquisition.
Quine describes the task of the linguist as "the
recovery of a man's current language from his cur-
rently observed responses ." 52 He is particularly con-
cerned with verbal responses. This characterization of
the task points out the primary restraint on the en-
terprise of translation:
All the objective data [the linguist] has
to go on are the forces that he sees
impinging on the native's surfaces
and the observable behavior, vocal
and otherwise, of the native . 53
What Quine finds to be of interest is that these
data, limited as they are, appear at least to provide
translations of the native speaker's language as a whole,
with all of the sentences that the speaker might produce.
His task in this chapter is to discover to what extent
the native speaker's language is actually translatable,
given the restriction on what data are available.
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He concludes that the methods he allows the lin-
guist yield the following:
1. translation of observation sentences;
2 . translation of truth functions
;
3. recognition of stimulus-analytic
sentences and stimulus-contradictory
sentences
;
4. settling of some questions about intra-
sub jective stimulus synonymy of native
speakers * non-observational occasion
sentences
.
Quine finds, then, that the methods allowed the linguist
actually account for translation of a very small part
of the language, appearances to the contrary. In the
rest of this subsection I will explain these four
items
,
discussing the methods of the linguist
,
and
finally explain how this result yields the claim that
I have called part (1) of the indeterminacy thesis.
Quine describes the linguist's methods this way:
We have had our linguist observing native
utterances and their circumstances
passively, to begin with, and then selec-
tively querying native sentences for assent
and dissent under varying circumstances. ^
The first thing the linguist does is to make a
provisional determination of what utterances are to count
as significant units of speech. Quine does not discuss
this aspect of the translation problem in detail in
Word and Object . 56 The linguist's initial hypotheses
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about these units will guide him in his further attempts
at translation. These hypothe
subject to revision during the
Next the linguist develop
ses
,
it is assumed, are
course of the translation,
s preliminary hypotheses
about translations of the commonly uttered linguistic
items and develops hypotheses about what among the
native speakers' utterances are to be construed as
assent and dissent. Difficulties in later attempts at
using these hypotheses could lead the linguist to abandon
them and "guess again. "57
Even these relatively simple matters require the
use of strong methodological principles. In developing
early hypotheses about native speakers’ utterances, the
linguist supposes that, on the whole, a speaker is
likely to have some short expression for an item that
occurs commonly and (to the linguist) conspicuously in
the speaker’s environment. A particular hypothesis that
is adopted on the basis of this principle may, of course
be rejected at a later time, and the linguist might
well decide that the speaker does not, after all, have
3~ny expression (short or otherwise) for the item.
The hypotheses about what to translate as assent
and dissent suppose that the speakers will have some
sentences or words that correspond roughly to our
Yes" and "No", and that there are no other important
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related responses. The speakers are assumed not to
be using a three-valued system of logic, for example.
And they are assumed to be using some system of logic,
that is, they are not a "pre-logical" people. These
assumptions allow a translation of the logical connective
negation
.
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Quine states some of these methodological principles
in "Philosophical Progress in Language Theory":
When the field linguist begins his
project of breaking into a strangelanguage
,
h e is methodologically
bound to trust in the homeliness of
the native mind. The linguist has to
assume that the native will see the maindistinctions that we do
,
and that he
tell the truth. The linguist isbound to assume that the sentence which
the natives persist in affirming or
assenting to, when rabbits appear, is
a sentence which in all sincerity
announces rabbits rather than wolves.
The alternative
,
indeed
,
that natives
almost always lyingly or deludedly an-
nounce rabbits as wolves
,
reduces to
nonsense
. when we reflect that there is
nothing in meaning that is not in
behavior. 59
It is not clear what the status of these presup-
positions is. They seem to be classifiable with what
calls "natural expectations" of the linguist.
They, like other "implicit/ supplementary canons" to
which the linguist might appeal in making translations
are not to be mistaken for "substantive law[s] of
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of speech behavior. "60 Quine's stricture here is di-
rected against such supplementary canons as might be
appealed to in translation of items other than observa-
tion sentences and truth functions. If these presup-
positions are indeed like those canons, then the
whole enterprise of translation depends on assumptions
that are not substantive laws of speech behavior.
One of the most important methods available to
the linguist is that of querying native speakers with ap-
parent items of their language. Eliciting native
speakers
' .assent to and dissent from such queries
allows the linguist to make important decisions about
the translation. Quine has the following to say about
the importance of this method:
When he can
,
. . . the linguist
^ as £3. supply native sentencesfor his informants approval. 61
and
0nly by taking the initiative and
querying combinations of native
sentences and stimulations so
as to narrow down his guesses to
his eventual satisfaction
can the linguist perceive that the native would have
been willing to assent to one sentence in all the situ-
ations in which he happened to volunteer another, and
CO %
so on. This method is needed to distinguish "overlapping"
sentences such as ’Animal’, ’White’, and ’Rabbit’.
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Translation of other parts of the language relies
on the assumption that the language contains items that
can be construed as assent and dissent. There are two
issues about translations of such items. The first
involves the methodological assumption that there are
such items; this has been touched upon already. The
second concerns what appears to be an assumption made
by Quine: that translation of these items can be made
on the basis of the native speakers’ dispositions to
verbal behavior. There appears to be, in Word and
Obj_ect, an implicit assumption that such translation
is not inderdeterminate but is subject to only normal
inductive uncertainty. That is, a particular trans-
lation of these items might be wrong; but there is
something for it to be wrong about. Quine does not
state such an assumption; he does not argue for it; nor
does he provide the reader with any reasons to suppose
that the assumption would be a reasonable one.
The concepts of assenting to and dissenting from
(or, as Quine also says, expressing approval and dis-
approval) involve complex human behavior. This behavior
appears to involve such things as the intentions and
norms of the speaker, particularly in its guise as
approval or disapproval. Hintikka suggests, on what I
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take to be similar grounds
,
that
If we assume that a jungle linguist
can come to recognize assentive be-
+?
Vi°r’ [there is no] reason to suggest
at he could not in principle learn torecognize other modes of activity whichare closely related to our use oflanguage
.
b d
I
Of the translation of native speakers' utterances
as assent and dissent, Quine says,
However inconclusive these methods, theygenerate a working hypothesis. If extra-
ordinary difficulties attend all his sub-
sequent steps
,
the linguist may decide todiscard that hypothesis and guess again. 64
And once the linguist has "settled on what to treat as
native signs of assent and dissent, "65 he is in a
position to translate simple native sentences, namely
observation sentences. Quine quotes this same passage
in his Reply to Hintikka, and then goes on to say
The linguist's decision as to what to
treat as. native signs of assent and
dissent is on a par with the analytical
hypotheses of translation that he adopts
at later stages of his enterprise
; theydiffer1 from those later ones only in coming
first
,
needed as they are in defining
stimulus meaning. This initial indeterminacy,
then, carries over into the identification
of the stimulus meanings. 6
6
Thus, contrary to the impression given in Word and Object,
the whole of the linguist's translation is indeterminate.
"Guessing again" is, it appears, merely accepting a
different hypothesis. Even these- basic concepts, which
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are at "the very heart of the conceptual apparatus of
the early parts of Word and Object ," are subject to
indeterminacy . 6 7
As already noted, translations of what correspond
in the native speaker's language to assent and dissent
allow the linguist to make progress in translating
other parts of the language. To account for such trans-
lation, Quine introduces the notion of stimulus meaning.
This notion is supposed to be neutral in the sense that
it does not rely on ideas, meanings (in the ordinary sense),
or propositions. It is a basic notion in the "behavior-
izing of meaning," and is said by Quine to be a crude
concept of empirical meaning.^®
Stimulus meaning is defined for sentences. This
is important because, Quine later claims, terms raise
special problems of translation. Thus he claims that
although we can determine the stimulus meanings of some
one-word sentences (given the acceptance of hypotheses
about native speakers' terms for assent and dissent)
and thus translate them by stimulus-synonymous sentences
these translation do not ensure translations of the
related terms . Basically
,
the consideration is that
the stimulus meaning does not determine the extension
of the related term. We will see why this is so later.
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In the definition of 'stimulus meaning', reference
is made to stimulations that prompt assent or dissent.
Quine identifies these stimulations with ocular irradia-
tion patterns, and analogous items for other senses,
host or his discussion involves visual stimulation. He
emphasizes that what is at issue is stimulations, and
not oDjects. .The basic reason for this is that stimula-
tions produced by a rabbit,, for example, need not vary
from tnose produced by a counterfeit of a rabbit.
i.iis use Ox stimulations here requires that
Quine make an interesting claim. He has said that he
-s ^^Lerested in the native speaker's "socially in-
culcated linguistic usage, hence his responses to con-
ditions normally subject to social assessment . "69 This
is
,
ox course
,
because of the claimed social nature
of language-learning. So Quine must claim that stimu-
lations
,
which are such things as patterns of chromatic
irradiation, are in some interesting sense subject to
social assessment. He claims that
Ocular irradiation ij3_ intersub j ectively
checked to some degree by society and
linguist alike
,
by making allowances
for the speakers ' orientation and the
relative disposition of objects. 70
He makes similar claims in his discussions of what is
required in language-learning
.
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l.-^h this background
,
we can now consider the defi-
nition of ' stimulus meaning 1
:
The stimulus meaning of a sentence
order,ed P^r of the affirmative
stimulus meaning of that sentence andLii£ negative stimulus meaning of thatsemence. The affirmative stimulus
meaning of a sentence is the class
o^ a^x tne stimulations that wouldprompt the speaker’s assent. The nega-
"tT
e
+-
StlmUlU
? mearting is the class ofall those stimulations that would prompt
uhe speaker’s dissent. 72
Note that stimulus meaning is defined for a sentence,
^0r a s P ec-xe r> a lime. ”A stimulus meaning is the
stimulus meaning modulo n seconds of a sentence S for
speaker a at time t . ” Affirmative and negative stimu-
lus meanings of a sentence for a speaker are mutually
exclusive. Also, there may be stimulations that
ere members ox neither the affirmative nor the negative
stimulus meaning ox a sentence for a speaker. Finally,
the use of the subjunctive in the definition shows that
dispositions of a speaker are at issue, and not
just his actual utterances. Quine suggests that these
dispositions ox a speaker are to be explicated, in the
long run, in terms of the structural conditions of the
speaker. This makes clear that determination of the
stimulus meaning of a sentence is subject to inductive
uncertainty. The translations of sentences via their
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stimulus meanings involve hypotheses about the disposi-
tions of the speakers that might be discontinued at
a. later date.
Cii) "possible yield" of the linguist's method
Determining stimulus meanings in the manner described
al-ows the linguist to translate observation sentences
.
As we have already seen in Chapter I, those sentences are
such that
their1 stimulus meanings may without fear
of contradiction be said to do fulljustice to their meanings. 73
It is then the observation sentences as characterized in
tne primary account that are at issue in this part of
Quine s discussion. Tnough stimulus meaning is defined
only for individual speakers
,
observationality becomes
inters ub j eciive
. This is because response to observation
sentences is claimed not to vary under differences in
collateral information.
. .
.m behavioral terms, an occasion
sentence may be said to be the more
observational the more nearly’ its
stimulus meanings for different speakers
tend to coincide . 74
Thus there is an, intersub j ective criterion of observationality,
though this criterion does not require going beyond
dispositions to verbal behavior. Observation sentences
can be translated within the constraints put on the
translation problem-given translation of assent and dissent.
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Negation can also be translated
The
i ,
sa™ai
?
tic criterion of negation
t
S taa \ Il: turvpiS a-^y short sentence
L ° which one will assent into
a sentence from which one will dis-
sent
,
and vace versa. 7 ^
Difrerenm sorts of sentences can be used for trans-
-Lu. Ling negation. Quine distinguishes occasion sen-
tences and standing sentences. Occasion sentences are
those to which a speaker will assent or dissent only
wnen ue query is accompanied by or preceded by an ap-
propriate stimulation. Standing sentences are those
to which a speaker will respond with current stimula-
uio... Some such sentences may require an initial
stimulation on the first occasion of query. But there-
after the speaker would assent without current stimula-
tion . 7 6
The translation of negation can make use of either
standing or occasion sentences. (The latter include
observation sentences
. ) But occasion sentences must be
accompanied oy appropriate stimulation in order that
assent or dissent be eli ted.
I noted earlier that, at the time of writing Word
an^ Object
,
Quine believed conjunction and disjunction
to be translatable in this way as well. He has since
decided that this is incorrect. In an example he discusses,
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he supposes that though a speaker would dissent from
Quine was born in Pittsburgh andQuine was born in Detroit
the speaker may not be prepared to dissent either from
Quine was born in Detroit
or from
Quine was born in Pittsburgh.
This example shows that his semantic criterion for con-
junction was inadequate. That criterion was
[The semantic criterion] of conjunctionis that it produces compounds to
w ilc
'h * • • one is prepared to assent
always and only when one is prepared
to assent to each component. 7
No criterion was given in terms of dissent. The obvious
one, that one be prepared to dissent from a conjunction
always and only when one is prepared to dissent from one
of its conjuncts, will not work. Quine’s example shows
that// 8 The considerations for alternation are similar,
except that the criterion was given in terms of dissent
und the counterexample involves assent.
The third item on the list of the "possible yield"
of the linguist's method was
recognition of stimulus-analytic and
stimulus-contradictory sentences
.
The defintion of stimulus analyticity is short:
I call a sentence stimulus
-analytic
for a subject if he would assent to
it, or nothing, after every stimulus
(within the modulus). 79
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The first qualification, "or nothing”, is to discount
inhibited responses. The second qualification, reference
to a modu
,
is always made. The notion of a modulus
of stimula-cio one of the basic notions used by
Quine in his discussion of translation. It is needed
to distinguish changes in a speaker’s "attitude" to-
woxxi a sentence from differences in the stimulations.
This distinction is needed because language may change
so that, for example, what is an observation sentence
now will be one no longer at some future time and what
is stimulus-analytic now will no longer be so at some
future time. Stimulus
-contradictory sentences are
just those sentences from which a speaker would dissent,
or fail to respond, after
-every stimulus within the
modulus
.
These terms are defined here only for individual
speakers and not for the community. Like other concepts
,
these can be "socialized" by taking as socially stimulus-
analytic those sentences that are stimulus—analytic for
most speakers of the language; and similarly for
’ stimulus-contradictory ' . ^0 Stimulus-analyticity
,
even of the social variety, is not a reconstruction
of the intuitive notion of analyticity. It does not
distinguish among various kinds of sentences to which
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most speakers of the language would assent under all
stimulations. Quine uses as an example of stimulus-
analytic sentences the following:
There have been black doss
2 + 2 = 4 .
6
No bachelor is married.
This is not to be considered a shortcoming of the def-
inition. Quine does not think that the distinction be-
tween analytic and synthetic can be drawn any finer
than as a distinction between sentences to which the
community of speakers are (psychologically) disposed to
assent to "come what may" and other sentences . 81
The last item of the short list of the "possible
yield" of the linguist's methods was
settling some questions about intra-
subjective. stimulus synonymy of na-
tive speakers
' non-observation oc-
casion sentences
.
Quine notes that even though questions about stimulus
synonymy of these sentences can be settled the sentences
cannot be translated.
Stimulus synonymy, or sameness of stimulus meaning,
is defined for single speakers
. Stimulus meaning is
defined, as we have noted before, for a sentence, for
a speaker, at a time. We have seen that, for observa-
tion sentences, meaning is stimulus meaning. So, for
observation sentences, synonymy is stimulus synonymy.
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And there is no
these sentences
difficulty in defining synonymy for
Observation sentences were also those
that did not vary under the influence of collateral
information. Quine noted that
terms
3 an occasion sentence
^ ° aid to be the more observationalthe more nearly its stimulus meanings fordifferent speakers tend to coincide. 82
Since observationality for occasion sentences is defined
as degree of constancy of stimulus meaning from speaker
to speaker, 83 intrasub j ective stimulus synonymy for
observation sentences presents no difficulties.
There are some mild difficulties with establishing
intrasubj ective synonymy of non-observational occasion
sentences. For these sentences, collateral information
may affect the responses of speakers to queried sen-
tences
. The natural suggestion about synonymy for these
sentences is to suppose that sentences are stimulus-
synonymous for the community, "in the sense of being
thus for each member. "84 But
, in cases in which col-
lateral information has intruded and in which different
speakers have different amounts of information, sen-
tences that yie would intuitively say are synonymous
turn out not to be even stimulus synonymous
. This due
to false beliefs on the part of some members of the
community, for example. Quine's reply to this criticism
is that
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we can hold out for virtual con-
stance over the community . 85
Some sentences would then "still rate as stimulus-
synonymous even socially, as being intrasubjectively
stimulus-synonymous for nearly everybody . ”86
Before turning to the more interesting questions
aoout what the linguist’s method does not yield, I
want to recall a few remarks made earlier about the yield
of the method. Quine's talk about the yield of the
linguist's method suggests that the four items dis-
cussed m this subsection involve only the native
speakers' dispositions to verbal behavior. The further
suggestion is that translations of observation sentences
and negation and the rest of the "yield” are determinate.
Ir this were so, they would be subject only to "or-
dinary inductive uncertainty" but not to the indetermi-
nacy of translation.
But such a suggestion would be wrong. Translation
even of observation sentences requires translations of
the terms for assent and dissent from queried sentences,
as does recognition of stimulus-analytic sentences and
so on. Even, the paltry yield of the linguist's method
has what Quine calls "residual” indeterminacy . 8
7
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Ciii) Empirical slack
We saw in subsections (i) and (ii) that the lin-
guist’s method provides translation of only a very
small part of the language. Even that translation is
subject to what Quine calls inductive uncertainty
--even
given the acceptance of hypotheses about native terms
for assent and dissent. Translation requires that
the linguist develop hypotheses about the native
speaker's future behavior and about how the native
speaker would respond in certain circumstances that do
not, m fact, obtain. Different hypotheses about the
native speaker’s verbal behavior are compatible with
the linguist's data. Even the translation that can
be given by this method is subject to some degree of
"empirical slack".
The empirical slack with which Quine is concerned
is, however, much more pervasive. Consider some of the
linguistic items that are not translatable by the method
alone
,
items about which the linguist must advance
analytical hypotheses." Outstanding among these are
the quantificational apparatus of the language, its
general terms, plural endings, and an identity element
.
88
These comprise the "referential apparatus" of the language.
It is only when items such as these are translated
that we can say what the native speakers ’ sentences are
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about
. Translations of these are needed for speci-
fying the extension of the terms of the language. As
Quine noieo, "stimulus meanings never suffice to de-
termine even what words are terms if n, t any, much less
what terms are coextensive 89
Once hypotheses about what items are terms are ac
cepted, translation of the terms can begin. Quine
uses as an example the term 'gavagai'. The stimulus
meaning of the sentence 'Gavagai' was the same as the
stimulus meaning of the English sentence 'Rabbit'.
Thus the first part of the translation translates
'Gavagai' as 'Rabbit'. This translation of the sen-
fence does not, however, give us a translation of the
term.
Even given the translations allowed by the linguist’s
methods
--translation of observation sentences and nega-
tion— and the recognition of stimulus-analytic and stimu-
lus-contradictory sentences, we are free to choose among
radically different hypotheses about how to translate
the terms of the language. Any one of the resulting
translations will be compatible with the native speakers’
dispositions to verbal behavior. The stimulus meaning
of a sentence does not distinguish among the alternative
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translations of the associated term. In the case of
’ gavagai r
,
ror example, our choice of hypotheses might
result in translating the term, as 'rabbit', 'rabbithood
' ,
'rabbit stage', or 'rabbit time slice'. Each of these
Qirrerent translations would require acceptance of
a set of analytical hypotheses about what is to count
as identity and about the quantificational apparatus
of the language. Translations of items of the "referential
apparatus" are interdependent . 9
0
When we reflect on what the linguist is able to
translate, this result does not seem surprising. Trans-
lation of the referential items of the language at-
tributes a theory ox objects to its speakers. The
native speakers
' dispositions to verbal behavior are
not sufficient to determine what theory of objects to
attribute to them.
The stimulus situations in which rabbits are present
are those in which rabbithood is exemplified, and so
on. Nothing in the stimulus situation determines whe-
ther we are to attribute a materialist theory of enduring
bodies or a theory of recurring universals to the native
speakers. Appeal to their use of identity statements
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does not help, since translation of the identity element
"goes along with" translation of the rest of the referen
tial apparatus. As we change theories, we change the
translation of the identity element. As Quine says,
' c°uid equate a native expression
wi cn any of. the disparate Englishterms rabbit 1
,
’rabbit stage’
iindetached rabbit parti, etc.’, and
still, by compensatorily jueglin^ thetranslation of numerical idfnti?y lid
associated particles, preserve con-
xormity to stimulus meanings of oc-
casion sentences. 31
Quine considers the suggestion that by considering
some non-verbal behavior, such as pointing, one might
be able to translate the terms. This procedure, he
says, would be fruitless. His reasons involve stan-
dard objections to ostensive definitions:
Does it seem. that the imagined indecisionbetween rabbits
, stages of rabbits
,
.
. .
and rabbithood must be due merely to some
special fault in our formulation of stimu-
lus meaning, and that it should be resolubleby a little supplementary pointing and
questioning? Consider, then, how. Point
to a rabbi t and you have pointed to a stage
of a rabbit
,
and to where rabbit-
hood, is manifested.
. . . Nothing not
distinguished
. in stimulus meaning itself
is to be distinguished by pointing, unless
the. pointing is accompanied by questions
of .identity and diversity: ’Is this the
same gavagai as that?’
,
’Do we have here
one gavagai or two?
’
Such questioning
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i-h? !•
of
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the linguist a command of
1
-h ^ i.
ncit:L
^
e lan§uage far beyond anything
forM6 haVe aS ySt SSen h °W to acaount
Not only will stimulus meaning be insufficient for de-
termining these translations, but the supplementary
devices or pointing and questioning are of no help.
Pointing is
,
by itself
, inadequate to make the needed
distinctions. Questioning
' requires that the linguist
have already achieved translations of some of the lin-
guistic items whose translation is to be accounted
for
.
Thus native speakers
' dispositions to verbal
behavior are not sufficient for translating the refer-
ential apparatus of the language. They are, however,
sufficient for a concept of stimulus meaning. Stimu-
lus meanings, according to Quine, "do full justice"
to the meanings of observation sentences As we
have seen, in Subsection (ii)
,
observation sentences
can be translated.^
It might be supposed that the translation of the
observation sentences would enable one to translate the
rest of the language, much as translation of assent and
dissent enabled Quine to formulate a definition of stimu-
lus meaning and then to translate observation sentences
.
This is not so, however. Translation of the general
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terms (and the rest of the referential apparatus) deter-
mines an attribution of a physical theory to the speak-
ers of the language
.
95
As we saw in Section I, for
Quine
,
physical theory is underdetermined by all possible
observation sentences. There are alternative, in-
compatible theories that are compatible with all the
(true) observation sentences of the language. Attribu-
tion of any of these theories would be compatible with
the speakers
’
production of observation sentences
,
and
so with his dispositions to verbal behavior. Transla-
tions that attribute these theories to the speakers of
the language will be equally good translations, in that
®^ch such translation is compatible with the speakers *
dispositions to verbal behavior.
In short
,
manuals for translating one language
into another can be set up in diver-
gent ways
,
all compatible with the
totality of speech dispositions, yet
incompatible with one another.
Thus, we have seen Quine’s reasons for holding what I
have called the first part of the thesis of indeterminacy
of translation and how it depends on Quine’s form of the
underdetermination thesis. This part of the thesis of
indeterminacy is simply underdetermination in second
• ? ‘
.
•
. < | 4 i f
intension, and so far Quine's claim in the passage quoted
v v. Mil
at the end of Section I makes sense.
|
I I ' 'III I I II < I
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B. Analytical Hypotheses
In this subsection, I consider different interpreta-
tions of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation. My
primary concern is with the second part of the thesis,
according to which the linguist's analytical hypotheses
are not about any objective matter. The three inter-
pretations I consider are one that explicates indeterminacy
as simply a case of underdetermination, one according to
which the claim about indeterminacy is a form of a
verificationist theory, and one according to which the
indeterminacy thesis involves other claims about synonymy
and meaning. I reject the first two interpretations and
offer the third as a plausible and interesting interpreta-
tion .
^ i ) Indeterminacy as underdetermination
One suggestion about the indeterminacy thesis
that has been put forward is that it is simply a case
of the underdetermination thesis discussed in Section
I. From what we have learned about the thesis so far,
this suggestion seems plausible enough. The justifica-
tion of the thesis so far rests on the restrictions
placed on the linguist's method and on the thesis of
underdetermination of physical theory. The linguist's
method was restricted as a result of an attempt at
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"a behavior! zing of meaning." This, in turn, was said
e simply a proposal to approach semantical matters
in the empirical spirit of natural science."” since
linguistics is being treated in what Quine takes to be
the spirit of natural science, it is not surprising
that it should be subject to the same epistemological
thesis as are the rest of the natural sciences.
The main lines of reasoning thus far have been
these
:
(1) All the objective data the linguist
has to go on are the forces he sees
impinging on the native speakers
’ sur-
faces and the observable behavior, vocal
and otherwise, of the native speakers.
(2) In terms of the available data we can
develop a crude concept of empirical
meaning
,
which we call stimulus meaning
,
for sentences
. This concept is defined in
terms of a speaker’s dispositions to
assent to or dissent from queried
sentences of his language.
(3) The concept of stimulus meaning allows
us to provide criteria for observation
sentences that are both behavioral and
social
.
Observation sentences can be trans-
lated (given the acceptance of hypo-
theses about native speakers
' terms
for assent and dissent). This is be-
cause, for them, the notion of sameness
of meaning has behavioral criteria.
The referential apparatus of the lan-
guage is not translatable by the use
of only the native speakers
' dispositions
to verbal behavior.
Translation of the referential appara-
tus would determine what the native
speakers' theory of objects is.
Alternative
,
incompatible theories
of objects are compatible with all the
observation sentences of the language.
Translation of the observation sentences
of the language will not, therefore, aid
the linguist in his translation of the
referential apparatus of the language.
In order to translate the referential ap-
paratus of the language, the linguist
must accept some set of analytical hy-
potheses (a manual of translation) . These
hypotheses "exceed anything explicit in
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any native's dispositions to speech
behavior.
(10) There are alternative, incompatible
manuals of translation, each of which
is compatible with all the native
speakers' dispositions to verbal
behavior. 9 8
This line of reasoning suggests that analytical
hypotheses are hypotheses of linguistic theory that at-
tribute to the native speakers one of those theories that
are compatible with the translation of the observation
sentences. Different hypotheses would attribute to the
native speakers different theories. The linguitic hypo-
theses would be about which theory the native speakers
actually held.
Some such interpretation is supported by some of
Quins s remarks in Word and Object. When he first
introduces the thesis in Chapter II of Word and Object
,
he explains what he is going to do in the chapter this
way
:
In this chapter we shall consider how
much of language can be made sense of in
terms of its stimulus conditions
,
and what
scope this leaves for empirically uncon-
ditioned variation in one's conceptual scheme. 9
9
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This passages suggests that analytical hypotheses are
hypotheses about that part of the native speaker’s con-
ceptual scheme that is not determined by the stimulus
conditions. The unconditioned part of the conceptual
scheme would include that theory of objects held by
the native speakers
.
Quine's discussion of objectivity in language-lear-
ning ends with a paragraph in which he says,
Different persons growing up in the same
anguage are like different bushes trimmed
and trained to take the shape of identical
elephants
. The anatomical details of twig
and branches will fulfill the elephentine
form differently from bush to bush, but the
overall outward results are alike. 100
Here, Quine is giving an analogy to show that different
speakers of a language may come to develop essentially
the same dispositions to verbal behavior as a result
oT different sorts of training and so of different
connections between words and experience . "101
One might consider analytical hypotheses in these
terms as well. The native speakers’ dispostions to ver-
bal behavior are analogous to "the [outward] elephantine
form." Analytical hypotheses are about whatever structures
are analogous to' the "anatomical details of twigs and
branches" that make up the outward form. This analogy,
too, would support the interpretation of the thesis
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as merely a special case of the underdetermination thesis.
Analytical hypotheses, like the hypotheses of physical
theory, are underdetermined by the available data—the
native speakers' dispositions to verbal behavior.
Chomsky interprets the indeterminacy thesis in
much this way. He says, in his article on "Quine’s
empirical assumptions,"
There can surely be no doubt thatQuine s statement about analytical
hypotheses [that they exceed any-
thing implicit in any native speaker’s
dispositions to speech behavior] is
true, though the question arises why
it is
. important
. It is, to be sure,
undeniable that if a system of "ana-
lytical hypotheses" goes beyond evi-
dence then it is possible to conceive
alternatives compatible with the evi-
dence, just as in the case of Quine's
"genuine hypotheses" about stimulus
meaning and truth-functional connec-
tives . Thus the situation in the case
of language, or "common sense know-
ledge", is, in this respect, no dif-
ferent from the case of physics. 102
Chomsky, then, supposes that the thesis of indeter-
minacy of translation is just a special case of underde-
termination of physical theory. Linguistic theory, like
any other theory, is underdetermined by the evidence.
He finds the thesis not only true but obvious—and
uninteresting as well. Near the conclusion of his
paper he says,
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^Ulte certain that serious hy-potheses concerning a native speak-
er s
. knowledge of English, or con-
cerning the essential properties ofhuman language.
.
. will "go beyondth6
n
®
v
J
den
?e
"
• If they did not, they
would be without interest. Since theygo beyond mere summary of data, it
will be the case that there are com-peting assumptions consistent with
the data. 103
Quine rejects Chomsky’s interpretation of his views on
v
indeterminacy of translation in his Reply, and reaffirms
this denial in "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of
Translation," where he says,
The indeterminacy of translation is
not just an instance of the empirically
underdetermined character of physics.
The point is not just that linguistics
,
being a part of behavioral science and
hence ultimately of physics, shares the
empirically underdetermined character
of physics. 104
In the introduction to this section
,
I distinguished
two parts of the indeterminacy thesis. The first part
was a claim that
manuals for translating one language
into another can be set up in divergent
ways
,
all compatible with the totality of
speech dispositions
,
yet incompatible with
one another. 10
5
This part of the thesis does indeed seem to be supported
by the general line of reasoning I have outlined above.
If this were the only aspect of the thesis, then it would
be possible to characterize it as an epistemological thesis
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perhaps a special case of the underdetermination of phys
teal theory. The second part of the thesis is not,
however, an epistemological thesis and is not sup-
ported by this reasoning. The second part of the
thesis requires, at the very least, some additional
explanations of and justifications for the steps (1)
through (10).
According to the second part of the thesis,
The point is not that we cannot be
sure whether the analytical hy-
pothesis is right, but that there is
not even ... an objective matter
to be right or wrong about. 6
Chomsky supposes that "what distinguishes the case
of physics from the case of language is that we are,
for some reason, not permitted to have a 'tentative
theory* in the case of language.
. .
."107 Naturally,
he finds that difficult to accept. The second part of
the thesis, however, shows that that is not what dis-
tinguishes the two sorts of theories. Rather, it is
something about the status of the hypotheses of a 'ten-
taive theory' in the case of language.
On the interpretation I've been considering, analy-
tical hypothese are supposed to be about what the native
conceptual scheme (including his theory of objects) is
in fact like. Or, alternatively, they are about what
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the structures are that in fact
positions to verbal behavior.
underlie speakers
' dis-
But Quine
' s remarks in
his Reply to Chomsky and in "On the Reasons for Inde-
terminacy of Translation" show that this is wrong: Ana-
lytical hypotheses are not about any matter of fact,
"objective or sub j ective . "10 8 It is this peculiar
status of analytical hypotheses that distinguishes
linguistic theory from physical theory.
Thus, though many of Quine's remarks might suggest
that indeterminacy of translation is merely a special
case of the underdetermination thesis, the thesis clear-
ly involves a claim other than the claim that linguis-
tic theory (i.e., translation) is underdetermined by
all possible observations. Indeterminacy is not merely
a special case of the underdetermination thesis
.
(ii) Indeterminacy and verification
One question that presents itself immediately is
:
What is the relation between the two parts of the thesis?
And another is: How is the second part of the thesis
justified?
,
Quine gives little attention to these
questions in Word and Ob j ect . He introduces this
part of the thesis in Section 15 in his discussion
of the "possible yield" of the linguist's method. The
yield, it will be recalled, was quite small.
145
Quine tells that the linguist can go beyond this limited
yield by developing hypotheses about what are to count
as the terms of the language and by hypothetically
equating these words with words of English. The only
constraint on these hypotheses is that they are to con-
form to the yield of the initial method in obvious ways.
Quine emphasizes that these analytical hypotheses
"are not determinate functions of linguistic behavior." 109
He goes on to make some qualifications of his original
statement. The analytical hypotheses are not, for ex-
^P16 > generally equational in form. Then he states,
more emphatically that the analtyical hypotheses go
beyond dispositions to verbal behavior:
From the point of view of a theory
of translational meaning the most
notable thing about the analytical hy-
potheses is that they exceed anything
implicit in any native's dispositions
to speech behavior.
. . . They extend
the working limits of translation be-
yond where independent evidence can
exist . HO
Near the end of Section 15, the case is restated:
Sentences translatable outright,
translatable by independent evi-
dence of stimulatory occasions
,
are
sparse and must woefully under-de-
termine the analytical hypotheses
on which the translation of all
further sentences depends. HI
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Nothing Quine says so far explicitly shows why
analytical hypotheses are different from the hypotheses
of natural science. Since Quine is doing something like
the natural science of language, we still have some
reason to suppose--wrongly as we have seen—that the
indeterminacy of translation is a special case of under-
determination of theory applied to the hypotheses of lin-
guistic science. Even the statement that these hypo-
theses go beyond where independent evidence can exist
does not distinguish the two kinds of hypotheses. Phys-
ical theory, as we have seen, is also underdetermined
by all the possible evidence.
Section 16 of Word and Object is entitled "On
Failure'- to Perceive the Indeterminacy." There, Quine
clarifies the thesis considerably by discussing a vari-
ety of reasons for which people have not seen the inde-
terminacy. The second part of the thesis is stated in
that section. In the first paragraph, Quine says,
Thus the analytical hypotheses
,
and the
grand synthetic one that they add up to,
are only in an incomplete sense hypo-
theses. Contrast the case of trans-
lation of the occasion sentence ’Gavagai 1
by similarity of stimulus meaning. This
is a genuine hypothesis from sample ob-
servations, though possibly wrong. 'Gava-
gai' and 'There's a rabbit 1 have stimulus
meanings for the two speakers, and these
are roughly the same or significantly dif-
ferent, whether we guess right or not. On
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case of
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This claim that analytical hypotheses are not
genuine hypotheses, in the sense Quine elucidates,
is not given a justification here. Nor is its relation
to the first part of the thesis explained. The immediate
move from the claim that
Analytical hypotheses extend the lim-its of translation beyond where inde-
pendent evidence can exist
to the claim that
Analytical hypotheses are not about
any (objective or subjective) matter
of fact
might lead a reader to assume that Quine is making use
of a verificationist principle . 113 That such a principle
is involved in the inference is suggested by several re-
marks
,
in Word and Ob j ect and elsewhere, that involved
the notion of meaninglessness in connection with ana-
lytical hypotheses.
In Word and Object
,
Quine notes that
Where cultural contrasts begin to
be threatened with meaninglessness
is rather where they depend on ana-
lytical hypotheses.!14
he
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Tn On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation,"
relates the indeterminacy thesis with the issue of the
significance of a sentence more explicitly. He says
that what he is "getting at in arguing the indetermina-
cay of translation" is that questions about whether the
native speaker really believes a theory attributed to
him by one translation or believes a theory attributed
to him by another, incompatible translation are questions
"whose very significance" he would put in doubt. 115
In "Ontological Relativity," Quine claims that cer-
tain questions about the reference of linguistic items
are gi.eaningless except relative to a background lan-
guage
. His earlier emphasis on the unavailability
of evidence for analytical hypotheses suggests that this
meaninglessness is due to unverifiability
.
Quine
speaks of verification in Word and Object
,
but only in
passing. The most straightforward statement I find is
one that appears in "Epistemology Naturalized": Quine
concludes a discussion of observation and their role in
verification and in providing evidence by saying that
epistemology remains centered as always
on evidence, and meaning remains centered
on verification. . . .117
The suggestion that Quine is making use of a veri-
fication principle does answer both of the questions with
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Which I began this subsection. The principle this sug-
gestion attributes to Quine is something like the fol-
lowing
:
A statement has empirical content if
and only if there is (in principal)
objective evidence for that state-
ment .
The first part of the thesis says (in part) that analy-
tical hypotheses go beyond where independent evidence
can exist. There is, in principle, no objective evidence
for analytical hypotheses. It would follow from this
claim and the verificationist principle suggested above
that analytical hypotheses have no empirical content.
This result seems to accord with what Quine says in
his discussion of the linguist's task. For, when he
introduced the concept of stimulus meaning, he suggested
that it would provide "a crude concept of empirical
meaning. "HQ It does not seem implausible to suggest
that a statement is about a matter of fact if and only
if it has empirical content. And, if this suggestion
is also accepted, it would follow that analytical
hypotheses are not about any matter of fact.
Thus the suggestion answers the first and the sec-
ond questions by showing that the second part of the
thesis is justified by the first part of the thesis
along with the verificationist principle introduced above.
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Moreover, there is considerable, though certainly not
conclusive, textual evidence that the suggestion is
correct
.
Nevertheless, I think that the suggestion is mis-
taken. Quine argues against verificationism, most par-
ticularly in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." Though there
are, I think, traces of positivism to be found Quine’s
work—reflected in his talk, here and there, of verifi-
cation and meaninglessness--I do not think that verifi-
cation is the principal foundation of the second part
of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation. In the
next subsection I argue that Quine’s justification for
the second part of the thesis is to be found in his vari
ous attackes on synonymy and meaning, distinctions be-
tween analytic and synthetic statements, and the exis-
tence of propositions.
(iii) Meanings and synonymy
In this section I advocate an interpretation of in-
determinacy of translation that involves Quine’s rejec-
tion of the notions of meaning and synonymy
. I begin
by discussing an early statement of the thesis that ap-
pears in "The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics . "H9
In that article, Quine discusses a case of radi-
cal translation, translation of "Kalaba" into English.
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Quine points out that the linguist will, i„ the course
creating his lexicon, come to appeal to his methodo-
logical principles as justifications for his translations
He concludes that
The finished lexicon is a case, evidently,
of ex ped e Herculem. But thprp -i c =>
difference
. acting Hercules fromthe foot we risk error, but we may derive
comfort that there is something to be
wrong about. In the case of the lexicon,pending some definition of synonymy we
of the problem j we havenothing for the lexicographer to be right
or wrong about. 120 &
This conclusion is essentially the second part of
the indeterminacy thesis as it appears in Word and Object
The indeterminacy is here attributed to the lack of a
definition of synonymy. The first part of the thesis
does not appear in this article. The reasons for this,
and the reasons for the emphasis in Word and Object will
become clear, I hope, by the end of this subsection.
This passage suggests a justification for the sec-
ond part of the thesis, or at least a partial justifi-
cation. It suggests that determinateness of translation
requires a workable definition of synonymy. Quine has
a number of reasons for supposing that no such defini-
tion can be found. One of these is given in "The
Problem of Meaning in Linguistics .
"
I want to discuss
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it briefly because it suggests a view of the thesis of
indeterminacy that, though Quine rejects it later, has
vestigial remnants in some of his later works
. And this
can be a source of confusion.
The problem is that of determining what sequences
of utterance in Kalaba are significant sequences and of
determining which significant sequences in Kalaba are
synonymous with utterances in English. Quine gives an
account of how the lexicographer would go about determi-
ning how Kalaba utterances are to be correlated with
English utterances. He points out the following dif-
ficulty :
The relevant features of the situation
issuing in a given Kalaba utterance arem large part concealed in the person of
the speaker
,
where they were implanted
in the speaker by his earlier environment . 121
Because of this, the linguist faces difficulties in
his attempt to determine synonymy of utterance by at-
tending to the situations of utterance. This fact poses
serious difficulties for the development of the needed
definition of synonymy. Quine points out the seriousness
of the problem:
The difficulty here is not just that
those subjective components of the
situation are hard to ferret out. . .
. Theoretically the more important dif- ..
ficulty is that, as Cassierer and Whorf
have stressed, there is in principle
no separating language from the rest of
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the world, at least as conceived bythe speaker. Basic differences inlanguage are bound up, as likely asdlfferences in the way in
which the speakers articulate the
world itself into things and prop-
erties
,
time and space, elements,forces, spirits, and so on. It isnot clear even in principle that it
makes sense to think of words and
syntax as varying from language tolanguage while the content staysfixed; yet precisely this fictionis involved in speaking of syno-
nymy
,
at least as between expres-
sions of radically different lan-
guages .
*
This passage suggests what seems to a reader of
the late Quine a very un-Quinean view. It suggests
that the problem of indeterminacy is that there is
something "in" the speaker, his conceptualization of
the world, that one can't even in principle "ferret
out". The speaker conceptualizes the world in all
the privacy of his own mind, but his utterances do not
adequately reflect his mode of conceptualization. One
reason that this view seems un-Quinean is that it ap-
pears to conflict with the second part of the indeter-
minacy thesis.
According to the second part of the thesis, there
is nothing for analytical hypotheses to be right or
wrong about. The passage suggests that analytical hypo-
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theses are about the speaker's actual mode of conceiving
the world, and so about some matter of fact. I do not
think that there is such a conflict, though, given the
way Quine has set up his claims. In the passage quoted
above, Quine suggests that what analytical hypotheses
would be about is some supposed "content" that stays
fixed while words and syntax vary. He denies, on the
grounds of the Whorf hypothesis
,
that there need be any
such fixed content. Different modes of conceiving the
world may not share any content. Thus we cannot as-
sume that hypotheses of translation are about any mat-
ter of fact—any content shared by two languages. So
the view of the passage and the second part of the in-
determinacy thesis need not conflict. 123
As we saw in subsection (i), this way of talking
about the indeterminacy thesis is partially preserved
m Word and Object
. Thus, there is the talk of "empiri-
cally unconditioned variation in one's conceptual scheme"
at the beginning of Chapter II. It is also reflected
in Quine's statements in Word and Object that to project
linguistic (i.e., analytical) hypotheses "beyond the
independently translatable sentences ... is in effect
to impute our sense of linguistic analogy unverifiably
to the native mind." 12 14
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While there are vestigial remains of this talk of
unreachable conceptual schemes that are not reflected
m one’s speech behavior, Quine explicitly rejects the
Whorf hypothesis in Word and Object and in "Philosophi-
cal Progress in Language Theory.'.’ 125 He also rejects
the notion of privacy that is suggested by such an
account. This rejection is most pronounaed in "On-
tological Relativity" and in "Philosophical Progress
in Language Theory ."126 This rejection of privacy is
of a piece with Quine's behaviorism and with his re-
jection of what he calls "mentalism".
Though Quine rejects the particular argument against
synonymy that depends on Whorf ' s conjecture he has plenty
of arguments against a notion of synonymy left; and his
rejection of synonymy remains at the heart of the thesis
of indeterminacy of translation.
I shall not review Quine's arguments about synonymy.
My interest is rather in the importance of his rejection
of this notion for the indeterminacy thesis . If we
ask what sorts of conditions might make it possible for
there to be determinate translations, two answers are
obvious
.
Suppose that the meaning of a sentence were the
proposition that it expressed. Propositions can be
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expressed, presumably, in different ways, and indeed
in different languages. So we might suppose that a
sentence in one language
Gavagos snurat bel canto
and a sentences in another language
The rabbit ran into the forest
express the same proposition.
Such a supposition would provide us with a defi-
nition of sameness of meaning for sentences:
Two sentences have the same meaning
if and only if there is a proposition
P such that both sentences express P.
^ :*- s definition were adequate, translation would be
determinate. To translate a sentence Sq in Lq by a
sentence !32 in L2 is to put forth the hypothesis that
both Sq and S 2 express a certain proposition, the same
one. We can certainly make mistakes about what proposi-
tion a sentence expresses; our analytical hypotheses
might be wrong. But there is something for them to be
right or wrong about, namely, which proposition is being
expressed by the sentence. There is, on this view, no
difficulty in principle about translation. We could
speak in a similar way about terms expressing concepts.
Quine rejects this suggestion about the determinate-
ness of translation. He denies that there are propo-
sitions because, he says, there is no adequate theory
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that posits propositions. This is so because there are
no means of distinguishing propositions
. There are no
criteria for their identity. A problem related to that
of translation arises at the level of propositions. The
definition of sameness of meaning for sentences suggested
above is misleading. It hides the fact that the notion
of "the same proposition" is being made use of. A more
perspicuous statement would read something like:
Two sentences have the same meaningif and only if there is a proposition
r such that Si expresses P and a
proposition P' such that expresses
P and p is the same proposition as P*.
This statement is more perspicuous because it shows the
need for some way of determining when P is the same
proposition as P ?
. Until this is done, the theory that
posits propositions must be rejected. This theory of
meaning cannot be used to explain how it is that trans-
lation can be determinate . 127 The theory of concepts
must be rejected for the same reason. And with them
goes one way Qf making translation determinate.
Propositions, meanings, and concepts all have their
own difficulties. Quine suggests in "Two Dogmas of
Empiricism'* that it may not be necessary to appeal
to meanings
; what we are interested in, at least in
discussions of translation, is the notion of sameness
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of meaning. If we could say when two linguistic forms
are synonymous that would be sufficient for determining
a translation, whether we could explain in what the
"meaning" consisted or not.
The task of explaining synonymy sounds like an easier
one than that of saying what meaning is or what mean-
ings are. But Quine argues, primarily in "Two Dogmas
of Empiricism" that synonymy can be explicated only
in terms of analyticity , nr1y a d also vice- versa. The
task of explicating synonymy (non-circularly ) is, he
argues, a hopeless one. We cannot say, on the basis of
a notion of synonymy, that translation is determinate.
This
,
briefly
,
is the background for the discussion
of translation in Word and Obj ect . The main part of
the discussion }.n Word and Obj ect is an attempt to
see to what degree determinate translation of a language
can be given simply by reference to the dispositions
to verbal and other behavior of the speaker. It is an
examination of the possibility that one’s dispositions
to verbal behavior determine translation. But, as we
saw in Subsection A, only a very small part of the total
language is determined by the speaker’s dispositions to
verbal behavior. And even that part is subject to the
residual indeterminacy arising from the translation of
items of assent and dissent.
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The only sentences that are translatable, even
given acceptance of hypotheses about assent and dissent,
are observation sentences. They are translatable be-
cause there are behavioral criteria of synonymy for
them. For observation sentences, synonymy is stimulus
synonymy. Stimulus-synonymy is inadequate for trans-
lating the remainder of the sentences of the language,
though. The naturalistic approach to translation can-
not be appealed to in claiming translation to be de-
terminate. This result was the first part of the thesis
of indeterminacy of translation.
We can now see why the argument in Word and Ob-
ject makes the indeterminacy thesis plausible. The
first part of the thesis is a result of the failure of
the notion of stimulus
-synonymy as a complete account
of synonymy. Dispositions to verbal behavior do not
determine translation. Quine’s earlier work showed
the shortcomings of the general notion of synonymy. Ap-
peal to synonymy could not account for determinateness
translation. Finally, theories that posit propo-
sitions and concepts are inadequate because they lack
criteria for identity. So theories of meaning that
appeal to propositions do not support determinateness
of translation. Analytical hypotheses are not about
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facts concerning what propositions a sentence or pair
of sentences express or the concepts expressed by the
terms
,
they are not about facts concerning sameness of
meaning of pairs of sentences. For Quine, at least, it
seems plausible to maintain on the basis of the argu-
ments for these claims that
analytical hypotheses are not genu-ine hypotheses. They are not about
any objective or subjective matter
of fact.
C. Observation Sentences Again
In Chapter I(IC), I argued that there are serious
difficulties for Quine’s claims about the role of observa-
tion sentences in language-learning. In Section 11(B)
of that chapter, I suggested that the same is true
of his claim that these sentences are repositories of
evidence for science. In both places, I attributed the
difficulties to Quine's theses of underdetermination
of physical theory and indeterminacy of translation.
It should by now be clear why observation sentences can-
not perform the functions claimed for them by Quine.
Consider the language-learning case. In The Web
of Belief and ’’The Roots of Reference," Quine is con-
cerned with what he calls the psychogenesis of reference.
He wants to provide some account of how it is that the
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Child comes to master the language
,
and in particular
ho„ he comes to be able to refer. It is clear from what
he says there (as elsewhere) that referring involves a
theory of objects. 12 8 He introduces the topic at the
beginning of Lecture I by saying
,
I propose in these lectures to specu-late on how we master one of the con-
spicuous
. uses of language: its usein speaking of objects. Somehow wedo learn to speak effortlessly of
objects, and not only of physical ob-jects but of attributes, numbers, sets,
all sorts of abstract objects. 1^9
In considering when the child can be said to
have learned to refer to the color red he makes the
point more clearly. He insists that it is not suf-
ficient for having learned to refer that one "has
learned to respond, on demand, in distinctive verbal
ways according as red is conspicuously present or not. "130
Such responding is not enough for the child to be said
to have learned to refer to red: "To say that [the
child] refers to the color would be to impute our
ontology to him." 13 l
These quotations are intended to show that, on
Quine's view, for the child to have become a full-
fledged speaker of our language it is not sufficient
that he have "learned" to respond verbally in appropriate
ways in the appropriate circumstances. The child must
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have, in addition, adopted our ontology. He must refer
to the same things we refer to.
One of the claims about observation sentences I dis-
cussed in Chapter I was
(1) Learning some observation sentences
is a necessary condition of learning
to speak a language.
This claim is made in The Web of Belief and in "Grades
of Theoreticity . " The actual claim made by Quine is a
bit stronger, for learning observation sentences is sup-
posed to be not only a necessary condition of learning
a language but an "entering wedge" into a language. "They
afford the only entry to a language."
I argued that the two theses discussed in this chap-
ter--the thesis of underdetermination of physical theory
and the thesis of indeterminacy of translation--raised
very serious doubts about whether Quine could explain
how the learner is to be able to "catch on" to a theory
of objects even once the child has learned the observa-
tion sentences, or some set of these.
Now that we have seen in detail what these theses
say, the difficulties for Quine’s discussions of the
psychogenesis of' reference should be obvious. I merely
list them here.
(1) The observation sentences the child
has learned do not determine a theory
of objects. Radically different
"theories are consistent with
the observation sentences he has
learned
.
(2) What the terms of a language are
is not determinate. The child can-
not learn what linguistic items are
terms on the basis of the observa-
tion sentences he has learned.
(3) Indeterminacy applies to general
terms (and the rest of the ref-
erential apparatus of the language).
The child cannot determine a theory
of objects from his teacher on the
basis of the observation sentences
he has learned.
(4) Indeterminacy applies to general
terms. Even if we assume the child
to be using general terms
,
the teacher
cannot determine what theory of objects
the child is using from his verbal
behavior. The child’s referential
application of these terms is not
determinately reflected in his dis-
positions to speech behavior.
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No facts about the child's acquisition of disposi-
tions in learning observation sentences can explain how
the child comes to have one theory (say, the theory of
middle-sized objects) rather than any other theory (say,
a theory of events). We attribute a theory to the child
only by accepting some set of analytical hypotheses,
hypotheses that are woefully underdetermined by his
dispositions to verbal behavior and that are only one
set out of many equally acceptable alternatives. Learn-
ing some observation sentences may be a necessary con-
dition of learning a language. But it is difficult to
see how such sentences can serve as an "entering wedge"
into a language. In any case, talk of the child's
theory of objects (or ours) is misleading. It suggests
that analtyical hypotheses are about some fact--what
the child's theory is. As we have seen, Quine thinks
that questions about the accuracy of the attribution of
a theory of objects are meaningless. I discuss this
matter in more detail in Chapter III.
The problems for Quine's claims about the epistemo-
logical role of observation sentences are much the same.
He says that "Observation sentences are the repository
of evidence for scientific theories . "134 i s no
-t-
at all clear how they can have this function in any
ordinary sense, given the two theses.
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According to the underdetermination thesis
,
there
alternative, incompatible theories compatible with all
possible true observation sentences of a language. The
discussion of first part of the thesis of indetermina-
cy of translation shows that these theories may posit
radically different kinds of objects. The examples
Quine uses are theories that posit physical objects
and theories that posit events. Physical theories, as
we normally understand them, molecular and atomic theories,
for example, are also compatible with all these observa-
tion sentences. Observation sentences do not, on Quine’s
view, provide evidence for theories in the sense that
they enable one to choose among such radically different
theories
.
Observation sentences as characterized in Section
1(A) of Chapter I fail even to provide evidence in the
sense of justifying empirical generalizations. Accord-
ing to this characterization,
(3) Observation sentences do not refer
or contain referring items
and
(4) Observation sentences are learned
as single units
;
they do not have
terms as parts.
Thus
,
there are two reasons why these sentences cannot
justify empirical generalizations.
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CD Such generalizations involve quanti-
fication and so a theory of objects.
Observation sentences
,
according to
(3), are independent of any theory
of objects
.
(2) To justify an empirical generaliza-
tion of the form 'All A's are B's',
observation sentences would have
to have some structure. They would
have to contain the terms 'A' and
'B'. But, according to (4), they
do not contain terms or other parts
.
Quine's presentation of his views on observation sen
tences their roles in language-learning and evi-
dence are, at the least, incomplete. A satisfactory pre-
sentation of his views must take into account the con-
sequences of his theses of underdetermination and inde-
terminacy. This is particularly important, since, as
we shall see in Chapter III, the thesis of indeterminacy
of translation applies not only in radical translation
but to one's own use of one's language
.
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CHAPTER HI
THE INSCRUTABILITY OF REFERENCE
AND ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY
INTRODUCTION
In the John Dewey lectures for 1968, entitled "On-
tological Relativity," Quine takes up some problems raised
by the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. The
main problem arises because this thesis is general, ap-
plying to all languages and all speakers. Quine argues
that, ’'ecause of this, reference appears to be "nonsense":
Questions about the reference of terms are evidently
"meaningless". In trying to avoid this result, Quine
says that semantical claims and questions of ontology
\
are meaningful only relative to a background language.
This view is what he calls ontological relativity. Ac-
cording to it, one can "make sense of reference" in a
theory or language only when that theory or language is
translated into a background language: "Reference is
nonsense except relative to some background language."
There are a number of difficulties in understanding
Quine’s argument for ontological relativity. His initial
168
argument depends on two assumptions that are not widely *
understood. The first of these is that reference is
itself indeterminate, or as Quine says "inscrutable."
As we have seen in Chapter II, Quine argues in Word and
Object and elsewhere that the translation of the referen-
tial items of a language is indeterminate. This does not
by itself explain why reference should be indeterminate.
I take up this question in Section I
.
As already noted, the argument Quine gives requires
the assumption that the indeterminacy thesis (as it applied
to reference) is completely general. It must then apply
to what Quine calls the "home" case. The indeterminacy
of reference must be acceptable "when applied to oneself. "2
Some philosophers find the suggestion that indeterminacy
be applied in the home case either puzzling or highly
implausible. In the first part of Section II I defend
the conditional statement that
,
if the indeterminacy
thesis is applicabble to the interlinguistic case (radio-
translation)
,
then it is applicable to one's own case.
Quine proposes the view about ontological relativity
because of an argument whose conclusion is that "there
is no difference between the rabbit and each of its parts
or stages." 3 The argument as Quine sketches it is very
difficult to understand. In Section II I try to re-
construct his argument, or a near relation of it. In
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my discussion of this reconstruction I show how ontologi-
relativity is designed to avoid Quine's unwanted
conclusion. In the course of my explication, I reconstruct
two similar arguments, each of which has a conclusion simi-
lar to that of my reconstruction of Quine's argument.
n each of these arguments
,
the semantic statements are
relativized to a manual of translation and a background
language. Quine's solution, ontological relativity,
does not circumvent these arguments.
One difficulty that Quine finds with ontological
relativity as a solution of the problem about reference
is that it appears to involve a regress into background
languages. At the end of Section II I discuss the way
in which this regress gets started and the nature of the
regress. Quine says that the regress is to be stopped
by accepting the home language, as a background language,
at face value. Though I agree with Quine that there is
such a regress and that it must be stopped if he is to
give any account of reference, I find his solution unac-
ceptable. In find no satisfactory way for Quine to
state what it is to accept the home language at face
value. This failure seems to me to throw doubt on
Quine's attempt to behaviorize meaning.
I. THE INSCRUTABILITY OF REFERENCE
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A. Reference and General Terms
Throughout this chapter I treat general terms as
referring expressions. In discussing the inscrutability
of reference,, for example, I speak of the application of
the thesis of indeterminacy of translation to the general
terms of a language. The reference of general terms is,
according to Quine, "divided reference." 1* A general
term "divides" its reference among those objects to
which it applies, or of which it is true. Such a term
is true of each, severally, of any number of objects. "5
The term ’dog’
,
for example, is true of (and thus refers
to) each object that is a dog.
This "division" of reference is one of the reasons
why
,
for Quine
,
the translation of the referential items
of a language is indeterminate. A general term might
divide its reference in any one of a number of ways
,
and
there would be no behavioral criteria for determining in
which way its reference is divided. 6 Translation of these
items presupposes some principle or principles of individu-
ation that show how reference is divided, of what objects
the general terms are true. Such principles are not
adequately reflected in a speaker's dispositions to
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verbal behavior, a set of analytical hypotheses must be
accepted in order to translate general terms .
7
My treatment of general terms is consistent with
Quine's usage in "Ontological Relativity" and with his
discussion of principles of individuation and of divided
reference in Word and Object
. Nevertheless, this treat-
ment could be confusing to someone not familiar with
Quine’s other writing on reference. Although Quine in-
cludes general terms in his list of items that comprise
the referential apparatus of a natural language .in "The
Roots of Reference," he takes bound variables and quan-
tifiers and their natural language counterparts to be the
ultimate bearers of reference.
In "The Roots of Reference," he asks, "Just what
is this referential apparatus?" and he answers:
I mentioned pronouns, copulas, suffixes.
The contrast between general and singu-
lar terms is part of the mechanism; also
the copula of predication, which joins
general to singular. The plural ending
is part of the mechanism, and counting,
and the copula of identity
,
and above
all the pronouns
. The pronouns become
exalted as bound variables
,
once we
regiment our language along quantifi-
cational lines of symbolic logic, and
all references can be funnelled through
this channel. Quantification is reference
distilled .
8
In the regimentation given in Word and Object
,
names are
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to be eliminated, assimilated to general terms or re-
placed by definite descriptions. The name ’Socrates',
for example, becomes, in the regimentation, the predicate
Socratizes
. Other singular' terms are also eliminated by
assimilation to general terms. Mass terms may be treated
either as predicates or as abstract singular terms. 9
Thus, in one example, Quine treats 'red' as a general
term. 10 In an earlier discussion (section 19), he treats
it as a mass term. The distinctions among singualar,
mass
,
and general terms seem not to be made in the syn-
tax. One can't, for example, determine from the struc-
ture of a formula whether a predicate is a mass term. The
distinction, if it is to be made, is to be made in the
semantics .
H
The importance to Quine of the role of quantifica-
tion in reference comes out clearly in Word and Object
where he says
,
To decline. to explain oneself in terms
of quantification, or in terms of those
special idioms of ordinary language
by which quantification is directly
explained, is simply to decline to dis-
close one's referential intent. 12
An example of what becomes of general terms and
certain mass terms in the regimentation, where one
explains oneself in terms of quantification, shows one
way in which the distinction collapses in the regimenta-
tion. The sentences
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Rabbits are brown
becomes
(x) (Rx then Bx)
.
The English sentence, on Quine's analysis, contains both
the general term 'rabbits' and the mass term 'brown'. Thus,
according to Section 19 of Word and Object
,
two modes of
referring—dividedly and cumulatively „are made use of
m the sentence. In the regimentation, both terms appear
as predicates; no syntactical distinction is made between
them. 13 The two modes of referring are not distinguished
syntactically in the regimentation. 1 ^
Once the regimentation is completed, the referring role
role is performed by the whole structure of predicates,
quantification, and identity. Though Quine says that
quantification is reference distilled, it is not clear
in just what sense this is true. It seems, for example,
that predicates continue to be true of objects on Quine's
account. The predicate 'dog' would—on standard interpre-
tations in any case—be true of all and only dogs
,
and so
refer to all and only dogs . The purported connection be-
tween quantification and reference appears to involve
Quine's views on quantification and ontological commit-
15ment
.
Quine's views on ontological commitment are a matter
of some controversy. Whatever interpretation one puts
on his remarks, however, it is clear that the use of the
existential quantifier involves one in ontological com-
mitments. 16 The idea seems to be that the range of the
quantifiers determines what objects can be referred to
in the language in question. The assignment of those
objects to predicates determines which of the available
objects a given predicate refers to. Thus, though (for
Quine) 'Quantification is reference distilled," terms
or predicates continue to play an important role in
referring .
^
B. Indeterminacy (Inscrutability) of Reference
( i ) Translation and reference
We saw in Chapter II that the thesis of indeterminacy
of translation applied to the referential items of the
radically foreign language. In "Ontological Relativity",
Quine introduces the phrases "indeterminacy of reference"
and inscrutability of reference." He suggests that in-
determinacy of reference is either a case of or a conse-
quence of the indeterminacy of translation of the re-
ferential apparatus (and, in particular, of the general
terms of the language).
One might ask why reference should be indeterminate
,
just because the translation of the referential items
of the language is indeterminate. It does not seem in-
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itially implausible to suppose that a term should be
capable of referring to a given thing, even though
a linguist is incapable
--even in principle--of trans-
lating the term correctly. It might be supposed that
even though there were conflicting, equally correct
manuals of translation, terms do refer--and refer in
some determinate way.
Such suggestions seem to me to miss one of the
main points of Quine’s discussion of indeterminacy. As
I pointed out in Chapter II, Quine is concerned to de-
velop an empirical science of language. According to
him, such a science will be a behavioristic one--thus
Quine’s behavioristic account of the field linguist's
activities. Because of Quine's views about the con-
ditions for an empirical science of language, the re-
sults about translation do show something about ref-
erence: If reference were determinate, there would be
3. determinate translation of the referential items of
the language.
There are several ways in which one might clarify
this claim. One might put the point in terms of trans-
lations of native speakers ' sentences that contain seman-
tical words. We might consider a semantical sentence
of the native language:
'gavagai' srefer ot gavagoi
.
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If the translation of this sentence is indeterminate, we
might have (among others) the following translations,
each of which translates 'srefer of as 'refers to': 18
|
gavagai ? refers to rabbits;
^
gavagai' refers to rabbit parts-
gavagai* refers to rabbithood. *
The manuals of translation that yield these dif _
ferent translations of our native sentence are equally
good manuals of translation in that each is compatible
with all the native speakers' dispositions to verbal
behavior. We might also suppose that they are equally
simple, preserve informal principles of translation
equally well, and so on. The suggestion is that, since
the translations of these semantical sentences, sentences
which give the reference of the term 'gavagai* is in-
determinate, the reference of the term is itself in-
determinate
.
So far as I know, Quine does not explicitly discuss
the translations of such semantical sentences. It seems
likely, however, that he would claim that the translation
such sentences is indeterminate. A second suggestion
concerns issues on which Quine has more clearly taken
a position, and I turn now to discussion of that suggestion..
According to the second suggestion, the indeterminacy
of reference is a fairly direct result of the indetermi-
nacy of translation of general terms, along with that
Of the rest of the referential apparatus. Translation of
the term 'gavagai' is indeterminate. Some of the trans-
lations given by different manuals of translation are
'rabbit
'
'rabbit part'
'rabbithood
'
.
The intuition on which this suggestion is based is
that the manual of translation makes use of a .background
language the semantic statements (about reference) of
which are assumed to have already been established. How
this has been done is a question that I discuss in the
next section. For the time, I shall suppose that there
is no difficulty about establishing the reference of terms
in the background, or translating, language. Thus,
gavagai is translated in a given manual by 'rabbit-
hood', and 'rabbithood' refers to rabbithood. So 'ga-
vagai refers to rabbithood. Since there are different,
and equally acceptable, manuals of translation, there are
di-f
f
er>ent
,
and equally acceptable
,
statements about the
reference of the term. Choice of a manual of translation
not only determines the translation of the native speakers
term; it also fixes its reference. Since the translation
of the term is indeterminate
,
the reference of the term
is indeterminate as well.
In a recent, as yet unpublished, paper, B. Aune re-
constructs in more detail this Quinean argument for the
indeterminacy of reference. His reconstruction captures
the intuition on which the second suggestion is based. He
quotes Quine as saying,
The terms ’'rabbit," "undetached rabbitpart, and "rabbit stage" differ not onlyin meaning; they are true of differentthings. Reference itself proves behavior-
ally inscrutable. 19
Aune then suggests the following reconstruction of Quine's
argument for the inscrutability of reference.
(1) Absolutely speaking, the following
translations for 'gavagai' are
equally defensible: 'rabbit',
'rabbit stage', and 'undetached
rabbit part.'
(2) If 'gavagai' were translated as
'rabbit'
,
it would refer to (or
be true of) rabbits.
(3) If 'gavagai' were translated as
'rabbit stage', it would refer
to rabbit stages
.
(4) If 'gavagai' were translated as
'undetached rabbit part', it
would refer to undetached ra-
bit parts.
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(5) Since, absolutely speaking, the ante-
cedents of (2), (3), and (4) are equally
defensible
:
(a) 'gavagai' refers to rabbits.
(b) 'gavagai* refers to rabbit stages.
(c) 'gavagai' refers to undetached
rabbit parts
.
(6) But if (5a), (5b), and (5c) are, abso-
lutely speaking, equally defensible, the
reference of 'gavagai' is, absolutely
speaking
, indeterminate
.
(7) Therefore, the reference of 'gavagai' is,
absolutely speaking, indeterminate.^
This reconstruction of Quine's argument is, I think,
an accurate rendering of the argument implicit in Quine's
discussions of the indeterminacy of reference. As Aune
points out, however, some account of the justification of
premises (2)-(4) is needed to clarify the relation be-
tween reference and translation. These premises are them-
selves instances of a general claim about a relation be-
tween translation and reference. As Aune says, until
we can answer certain questions about the justification
for these premises and about the logical form of state-
ments such as '0 refers to K's', "we shall not really
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understand Quine's view of reference or its precise rela-
tion to the notion of translation . ”21
It is difficult to provide such a justification. One
suggestion made by Aune requires a particular account of
the logical form of '0 refers to Ks '
.
Aune believes that
some remarks made by Quine in "Ontological Relativity"
imply that
for Quine, statements of the kind
0 refers to (denotes, is true of)
K s actually relate words to other
words rather than (at least directly)
relating words to the world. 2
2
If this suggestion is correct, Quine is committed
to denying that statements of the form ? 0 refers to
K's’ specify a direct relation of words to the world.
On such an account, semantic statements provide classifi-
cations for terms. '0 refers to K's’, on this view, is
a statement that classfies the term 0 as a term of the
same sort as the term ' K f . There may be, of course, many
^ff^rent such systems of classification.
One connection between translation and reference is
that manuals for translation are also classificatory
systems. For Quine, such manuals correlate--among other
things--the referential items of one language with the
referential items of the same or another language
. Manuals
of translation, in the interlinguistic case, classify what
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are taken to be the referential items of the translated
language, using the referential items of the translating
language for the classification system.
Typically, however, sentences such as '0 refers to
K s are metalinguistic sentences in which the variable
’0’ and are associated with items in the same object
language. 2 3 The classification provided by such sentences
is typically intralinguistic
. Manuals of translation,
however, typically provide interlinguistic translations.
The similarity of function of manuals of translation and
semantic statements about reference can be used to provide
a justification of premises (2)-(4) of Aune’s reconstruc-
tion of Quine’s argument.
A natural suggestion to be used in such a justification
is that semantical statements about the reference of terms
relate words to other words rather than relating words to
the world, and this was in fact part of Aune’s suggested
justification. Aune notes that such a suggestion would
not provide a complete justification for the premises. Two
terms may be co-referential and yet the one not be a good
translation of the other. Thus, the relation between
reference and translation may not be a direct one. Aune
suggests "an appropriate word-word relation between co-
referential terms" that bringd out this relation between
translation and reference:
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i
ve ly speaking, we may assent to
0 refers to K'sjust in case we are prepared to assent
There is a general term 0 be-longing to the language of 0
such that 9 is coextensive
with 0 and 0 is the translation,
relatively speaking, of 'K' 2l+
This last statement does appear to provide a justi-
fication for premises (2)-(4). In order to complete the
clarification of the logical form of '0 refers to K's',
however, an explication of 'is coextensive with' is need-
ed. As Aune notes, such an explication must be given
"in such a way that it does not simply mean 'is corefer-
ential with ' . " 25
A definition of 'co-extensiveness' that preserves
the notion that reference is a word-word relation might
make use of substitutional quantification. 26 To do so
would avoid possible difficulties due to the role of ob-
jectual quantification in reference. 2 ^ Moreover, objec-
tual quantification gives us a relation between words and
the world, between words and objects. On the line that
we are now pursuing, the analysis of referential state-
ments is to provide a relation, not between words and
(non-linguistic) objects, but between words and words. Sub-
stitutional quantification seems to be ideally suited for
such an analysis.
Ad
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One might, then, give the following explication of
’is coextensive with':
is coextensive with
^
in L
iff is a singular term of L
, r -
r
then 0C\) is true iff f C\)'is true). 2 8
In this explication, co-extensiveness of predi-
cates of a language is explained in terms of the results
of substituting singular terms for the variables in open
sentences. More natural characterizations such as
A and B are co-extensive in L iff
A and B are true of the same things
are not, of course, available. Given the purpose of the
definition, co-extensiveness cannot be explicated in
terms of co-referentiality
.
The suggestion seems quite promising as an attempt
to complete the justification for premises ( 2 ) — ( 4
)
of
the reconstructed argument in such a way that reference
is construed as a word-word relation. It will not, how-
ever, serve as an explication of Quine *
s
views on ref-
erence. In the next subsection, I argue that Quine's
views on quantification will not allow him to accept the
proposed justification. This is because he rejects the
substitution interpretation of quantifiers. I try in that
subsection to make plausible a claim that, for Quine,
Ad
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Following their suggestion, I characterize the
substitution interpretation for the existential quan-
the following way:
For the uaer of substitutional quan-
tification
, '(Ex)Fx ' is false if
every substitution instance in every
extension of the theory is false.
Otherwise, it is true. 3
1
The universal quantifier is characterized in an analogous
way
.
It is quite clear that Quine does not make use of this
interpretation of the quantifiers. In an early paper,
A Logiais tical Approach to the Ontological Problem,"
and in his logic text, Mathematical Logic
,
his account of
quantification is what he calls the objectual or classical
interpretation of quantification theory. In Word and
Object, he continues to use this account. In a dis-
cussion of ontic commitment in Word and Object
,
for ex-
\
ample, he says,
Insofar as we adhere to this [canonical]
notation, the objects we are to be under-
stood to admit are precisely the objects
which we reckon to the universe of values
over which the bound variables of quan-
tification are to be considered to range.
Such is simply the intended sense of the
quantifiers '(x)' and '(Ex)': 'every
object x is such that', 'there is an
object x such that'. The quantifiers
are encapsulations of these specially
selected, unequivocally referential id-
ioms of ordinary language. 3
2
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Quine has, then, explicitly committed himself to
the use of objectual quantification. The case I want
to make is stronger than this, however: Quine explicitly
-
jeCtS the substitution interpretation of quantifiers.
He has a variety of arguments against the use of this
interpretation. I will discuss only those that occur
m several more recent papers, including "Existence
and Quantification" (1966) and the Carus Lectures,
"The Roots of Reference" (December 1971). There are
several reasons, other than limitations of space, for
considering only these later works. One reason is that
Quine’s views about the substitution interpretation have
changed considerably since his earlier papers
;
he is
much more tolerant of it now. Another reason is that
the argument with which we are concerned appears in "On-
tological Relativity," which was published in 1968. So
I want to include arguments that were roughly contempora-
neous with that essay or else appeared later. I will not
discuss the merits of Quine’s arguments about this in-
terpretation in any detail. My point is that he rejects
the substitution interpretation.
In "Existence and Quantification," Quine finds a
certain virtue in substitutional quantification. This
is that, he finds, substitutional quantification is less
subject to indeterminacy of translation than is objectual
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quantification. He says that substitutional quantifica-
tion "doas admit behavioral criteria of tranalation as sub-
stantial as those for the truth functions
. . . .
"33
Quine then argues that "substitutional quantification
gives no acceptable version of existence properly so-
ailed.
. .
. He seems to take this to be an objection
to substitutional quantification
.
36 For him,
existence is what existential quan-
^ific&tion expresses. There are things
of kind F if and only if (Ex)Fx. This
is as unhelpful as it is undebatable
,
since it is how one explains the
symbolic notation of quantification to
begin with. 36
He points out, moreover, that Lesniewski
,
one who "favored"
substitutional quantification, "did not himself relate
his kind of quantification to ontological commitments." 3 ^
Quine raises another objection to this form of quantifi-
cation in Existence and Quantification . " He claims
\
that any theory that has "an indenumerable or indefinite
universe is irreducibly committed to something like
objectual quantification. Indenumerable and indefinite
universes are what, in the end, give point to objectual
quantification and ontology." 38 Quine thinks that such
universes are needed for higher mathematics and physical
theory
.
In "The Roots of Reference," Quine introduces other
objections to the substitution interpretation. Substitu-
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tional quantification is, he says, important in explica-
ting the "psychogenesis" of reference. Quine claims that
variables, as they would be initially learned, are
substitutional
;
39 but, he claims, once categoricals
such as * An r,\ is a
f
i * are introduced, the variable
goes objectual." He argues this way:
Since the categorical construction 'An
\ ls a ( ’ ’is learned through such ex-
amples as 'An apple is a fruit, 'A rabbit
is an animal
' ,
it would be inappropriate
to read '(x)(if Fx then Gx ) 1 in the sub-
stitutional way as meaning merely that
every substituted name that verifies 'Fx'
verifies 'Gx'. It is unnatural if not
absurd to imagine names
,
or singular
descriptions either, for all apples and
rabbits . 40
There is in this argument an implicit objection to the
use of the substitution interpretation on the ground that
the substitution interpretation would require that each
object have a name. It is not clear whether the objec-
tion is that we not in fact have names for all objects or
that there cannot be names for all objects. Quine says
only that "the namelessness of apples and rabbits was
what showed us that our variables had gone objectual ."41
An objection based on a law of class theory involves
a similar consideration. The law is what Quine calls
the law of unit subclasses. He describes it this way:
"any class that has members has some unit subclass ." 42
He claims that this law comes out false when substitution-
ally interpreted. According to him,
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t requires that whenever we can write
a class abstract or relative clause thatis true of a lot of individuals, we can
write another that is true of exactly
one of those individuals
.
I say it is false. Well, it is im-plausible. It says that whenever we
can somehow
. demarcate a multiplicity ofphysical objects we can also specify a
unique sample. This is about as implau-
sible as supposing a distinctive designa-
tion for every physical object. 43
There are other, related objections based on similar
considerations about the numerousness of names. Thus,
Quine believes that the substitution interpretation is
not adequate for class theory as a whole. And, of course,
he believes that class theory is required for mathematics.
So he finds that he must reject the substitution interpre-
tation of quantifiers in favor of what he calls objectual
quantification
.
Quine has other objections, but these should suffice
show that he rejects the substitution interpretation.
He would not, then, accept the suggested justification of
premises (2)- (4) of the argument for indeterminacy of
reference, since this justification makes use of the sub-
stitution interpretation.
My discussion thus far does not show that Quine would
be unwilling to accept substitutional quantification as
a logical device that can be explicitly defined by using
. .
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° actual quantification. One might suggest, then, sou-
thing like the following. Quine could make use Qf sufa _
etitutional quantification in the context under discussion,
though in other contexts he makes use of objectual quanti-
fication. The substitutional quantifiers can be ’•trans-
lated" into ob j actual quantifiers. So far as X know, Quine
has not discussed this sort of suggestion . 44 It does,
however, seem correct to suppose that if Quine were to make
use of some form of mixed quantification, the substitutional
quantifiers would be defined by translation into objectual
quantification. 45 If this were the case, the translated
variables would be taken to range over names.
Given the sort of objections Quine makes to substitu^
tional quantification, however, such a move seems somewhat
implausible. His objections are based primarily on claims
about the availability of names. Similar objections would
naturally be raised about the availability of names for
the (objectually interpreted) quantifiers to range over.
On the face of it, this proposal seems unlikely to be one
that Quine would find acceptable.
In any case, there seems to be a problem with the def-
inition. On this definition, the coextensiveness of gen-
eral terms depends on which of the items falling under the
terms in question are named. Consider an example. Ac-
cording to the definition, the following bi-conditional
is true:
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'Apple' is coextensive with 'fruit' in L
iff (a) (a is a singular term of L
then ' apple(a) is true iff ' fruit(a) 1
is true)
.
But one can easily find cases in which the first part of
the biconditional is false and the second true. Suppose
that in L the only items of fruit that are named are
apples. (Whether all apples are named is irrelevant;
Quine finds this supposition absurd.) Speakers of L do,
however, use the term 'fruit' when speaking of items other
than apples (when speaking of oranges, for example). On
these suppositions
,
the following is true
:
(a) (a is a singular term of L then ' apple(a) 1
is true iff rfruit(a) 7 is true).
According to the characterization of 'is coextensive with.
. . in L'
,
the following should also be true:
'apple' is coextensive with 'fruit' in L.
But, according to our story, this is false. The story is
not wildly implausible. The speakers of L may have some
reason for paying special attention to apples and so
naming (at least some of) them. What does seem implausible
is that the coextensiveness of terms should be tied to
the use of singular terms in the language as suggested.
One would get similar unfortunate results, of course, when
considering general terms the referents of which are not
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named. Examples that seem most likely to be convincing
are ’electron’, ’photon’,
-blade of grass'.
Exactly what part of the analysis Quine must reject
for these reasons is not clear. Use of substitutional
quantification is made in the definition of coextensiveness.
This definition is used in giving the logical form of
statements of the form ’0 refers to K’s’. A different
definition of coextensiveness might be developed that would
not make use of the term 'refers' (and thus not be cir-
cular) and that would not conflict with the suggestion that
"statements of the kind ’0 refers to (denotes, is true
of) K ’ s
’
actually relate words to other words, rather than
(at least directly) relating words to the world." 46 It is
very difficult to see how such a view can be made out,
however
.
I do not believe that Quine holds a view of state-
ments about reference of the sort described by Aune in the
passage just quoted. In the remainder of this subsection
I want to do two things: (1) make plausible that Quine
takes reference to be a relation between words and the
world and (2) provide an alternative to Aune’s justifica-
tion of premises ( 2 ) — ( 4
)
of the argument about indeter-
minacy of reference.
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As we saw in subsection A, "Reference and General
Terms," for Quine, quantification is an essential part of
the referential apparatus. He says in Word and Object
,
Such is simply the intended sense of thequantifiers:
'(x)' and '(Ex)': 'every
object x is such that', 'there is an ob-ject x such that'. The quantifiers are
encapsulations of these specially se-lected, unequivocally referential idioms
of ordinary language
.
^
'
Quine reiterates this idea when he says, "Quantification
is a welcome encapsulation of the referential apparatus ." 48
This view is reflected later in "The Roots of Reference,"
where he says, "referring in the fullest sense to objects
of some sort" is a result of "handling something tanta-
mount to quantification." 48
Much of my attempt to make my interpretation of
Quine's views on reference plausible will, because of the
importance of quantification for reference, concern
Quine s views on quantification. I will also consider
some of his less technical remarks
.
As we have seen, Quine rejects the substitution
interpretation of quantification in favor of what he
calls the objectual interpretation. We also saw that, for
Quine, quantification, in particular existential quantifi-
cation, expresses existence. In "Existence and Quantifi-
cation," Quine gives various reasons why one looks to
quantified variables to determine the existential force
of a theory.
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In arguing that quantifiers, rather than names, have
existential import, Quine says this:
An expression "a" may occur in a theory,
we saw, with or without purporting to
name an object. What clinches mattersis rather the quantification (Ex) (x = a)
.
th
1!
"
existential quantifier, not
—
e a itself, that carries existentialimport. This is just what existential
quantification is for, of course. It is
a logically regimented rendering of the
there is" idiom. The bound variable
2£. ranges over the universe, and the
existential quantification says that atleast one of the objects in the universe
satisfies the appended condition—in
this case the condition of being the
object a. 50
Quine's talk here of objects and the universe in
connection with quantification is difficult to explicate
except as involving a relation between words (or logical
symbols) and the world, at least in the light of Quine's
rejection of substitutional quantification. Moreover,
many of Quine's remarks in rejecting the substitution
interpretation support the view that the interpretation
of quantifiers, and so of reference, involve a relation
between words and the world.
As we saw before, one of Quine's objections was that
there are insufficient names for objects . As Quine says,
"It is unnatural if not absurd to imagine names
,
or
singular descriptions either, for all apples and rabbits."
Reviewing this point in connection with another objection
based on the law of unit subclasses, he says,
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• * ‘ Sure ly for individual physical
ob] ects
,
the case for objectual quanti-fication was conclusive. Quantification
over physical objects was objectualbecause of its categorical root, in
sentences
. like .
' Rabbits are animals' thattreat of individually nameless objects. 5 *
In a lighter mood, he describes what happens when the
variables go objectual": Our rake is engaging in quantifi-
cation now ...
,
and it is objectual quantification. He
is referring flagrantly and unequivocally to objects ." 53
These statements by Quine do not, of course, constitute
a proof that, for him, reference is a relation between words
and the world. They are, however, very difficult to under-
stand in any other way. There is no clear and detailed
statement of Quine's position on this question in works
appearing after Words and Ob j ects . The remarks he does
make about quantification, of which I have given examples,
do, however, suggest a view very like that which appears
in his earlier works. The obvious alternative to this
earlier view, one that makes use of substitutional quanti-
fication as the basis of reference, has been explicitly
rejected by Quine. Surely, anyone who wishes to attribute
to Quine the view that reference is a relation between
words and words must provide some appropriate explication
of these and similar passages from Quine's later works. 5 ^
I have made no claims about the details of Quine's
view about the logical form of statements with the term
' refers '
.
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I have tried to show that it is plausible to
suppose that the sort of view he holds is one in which
reference is a relation between words and objects, not
words and words. Further support for my interpretation
of Quine’s views on reference is given by the fact that I
can provide a justification of premises C 2 ) - ( 4
)
that is
consistent with the above remarks.
^
Aune's reconstruction of Quine's argument for indeter-
minacy of reference seems to me to be correct. Now I want
to describe an alternative to Aune's justification for
premises ( 2 ) - ( 4
)
of that argument. Consider the second
premise, as an example.
(2) If 'gavagai' were translated as
'rabbit'
,
it would refer to rabbits.
There is, I think, a very natural justification for
premises of this sort. The translation of 'gavagai' is
given by accepting a manual of translation that is comprised
of analytical hypotheses about various items of the language
to be translated. There are, of course, different manuals
of translation that one might decide to accept. Each manual
of translation makes use of a language into which the
translation is made. It is supposed that the reference of
the terms of this language is established. Thus accepting
a manual of translation that includes an analytical hypo-
thesis equating the term 'gavagai' with the term 'rabbit'
is a decision that 'gavagai' refers to, or is true of,
rabbits
.
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This suggestion about the justification of premises
like (2)- (4) is supported by a passage from "The Roots
of Reference":
assessment of the foreigner's word
awaits only our systematic English
manual of translation of his elaboratelanguage. Such a manual would enable
us to fall back upon our familiar
English referential apparatus and sodecide whether to regard his word asdesignating the color red or as denoting
patches or as denoting bodies or
whatever. Different manuals may lead
to different answers, but one will do. 57
This passage makes clear the connection between accepting
a manual of translation and establishing the reference
of a term.
The argument that shows a particular term of a
foreign language to refer to certain objects would pre-
suppose that some manual of translation has been
accepted. It would also presuppose that the reference
of terms in the language (e. g. , English) into which
the translation is made is established. An argument
that 'gavagai' refers to rabbits would look like this:
(a) 'gavagai' is translated, in manual
R
,
as 'rabbit '
.
(b) We have decided to accept manual R.
(c) 'gavagai' refers to (is true of)
what 'rabbit' is true of, since
accepting the analytical hypothesis
that equates 'gavagai' and 'rabbit'
is the decision to accept 'gavagai'
as co-referential with 'rabbit'.
198
Cd) 'rabbit' refers to (is true of)
rabbits.
So ( e ) 'gavagai' refers to (is true of)
rabbits.
On my account of the justification of Quine's argu-
ment, part of the import of accepting analytical hypo-
theses is that doing so allows one to establish the
reference of terms to be translated. So part of the
import of translation is given in terms of 'refers'.
Translation does not explain what reference is. This
result is, it seems to me, what one should expect of
manuals of translation that include analytical hypo-
theses about the referential apparatus of a language.
To see more clearly what is involved in Quine's
argument, we must consider Quine's notion of a background
language and the role this notion plays in the justifi-
cation of premises (2)- (4) of the reconstructed argument.
Quine introduces the notion of a background language when
he proposes ontological relativity as a solution to a
^^iculTy arising as a consequence of a special appli-
cation of the indeterminacy of reference
.
,In Section II I discuss this consequence. The claim
that indeterminacy of reference applies in the home case—
to one's own use of one's language— is an important premise
in Quine's argument. Thus, I begin Section II with a
discussion of this application of indeterminacy. Then I
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reconstruct the remainder of Quine’s argument and discuss
his solution.
II. ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY
A. Reference as "Nonsense"
(i) Indeterminacy in the home case
As we saw m the preceding section, translations of
the referential apparatus of a language are subject to
indeterminacy; and this indeterminacy implies, for Quine,
an indeterminacy of reference. Though Quine initially
presents the argument for indeterminacy in the context
of radical translation, indeterminacy is claimed to hold
for all languages, including the linguist's own. Thus,
Quine says
,
If if is to make sense to say even
of oneself that one is referring to
rabbits and formulas and not to rab-
bit stages and Godel numbers
,
then
it should make sense equally to say
it of someone else. ®
And, in the same place:
. . . if there is really no fact of
the matter, then the inscrutability
of reference can be brought even
closer to home than the neighbor's
case: we can apply it to ourselves.
This extension of the thesis of indeterminacy to one's
own case is bound to be objectionable to many phil-
osophers who could agree with the principle as it is
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first presented, for the interlinguistic case. 59
Though I think that Quine is quite right to extend his
thesis this way, I think it instructive to consider the
objections that two sorts of philosophers would make to
Quine's extension. In showing how these objections fail,
I shall be bringing out some common misunderstandings of
the thesis and defending Quine's claims that I have quoted
above. Thus I am here defending the conditional statement
that
If the principle of indeterminacy is
accepted for the interlinguistic case
,
then it should be accepted for one's
own case.
In their criticisms of Quine the critics I am con-
cerned with accept the claim that when the linguist sets
out to translate the native speaker's language,
All the objective data he has to go on
are the forces that he sees impinging
on the native's surfaces and the ob-
servable behavior, vocal and otherwise,
of the native. 60
They also accept the linguist's method of assessing these
data. The method, it will be remembered, consists of
picking out what appear to be sentences of the language
and querying the native speaker with these sentences
under varying circumstances. In this way the linguist,
it is supposed, decides what are the stimulatory con-
ditions under which he is disposed to dissent from the
queried sentences. 51
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The critics find the thesis unexceptionable in the
mterlinguistic case and at least comprehensible in the
case of other users of his language. Each is, however,
unable to accept the thesis for his own case. Such
critics might have any number of reasons for accepting
the thesis for the interlinguistic case. I discuss two
sorts of reasons and sketch the positions briefly.
One critic might claim that referring is an activity
that can be understood only in terms of the intentions of
a speaker. These intentions, while they manifest them-
selves in a speaker's dispositions to verbal behavior are
not determined by such behavior: A variety of different
intentions might result in the same set of dispositions
to behave, verbally or otherwise. On this view, one
cannot determine, i. e., discover what the (intended)
reference of a term is, on the basis of the native's
dispositions to verbal behavior . 62
Another critic might claim that using terms to refer
is an activity governed by rules or conventions. Under-
standing the reference of a term, on such a view, re-
quires the ability to apply those rules or conventions.
But though the applications of the rules or conventions
according to which reference is to be understood may
produce a set of dispositions to verbal behavior, the
rules or conventions are not determined by that behavior:
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The same dispositions might be produced in connection with
different sets of rules. The linguist cannot determine,
i. e., discover or be sure he's right about, the rules of
the native speaker, and thus the speaker's reference, from
the speaker's dispositions to verbal behavior. 63
In cases of these sorts it may be supposed that the
linguist develops hypotheses about the intentions or rules
and conventions governing the terms of the native language.
These hypotheses about the native speaker's language are
developed to account for or to organize the objective data
garnered by the linguist from his study of the native
speaker's use of the language, namely what he has learned
of the native speaker's dispositions to verbal behavior.
The acceptance of some group of hypotheses is to provide
an account or translation of the language. This picture
of the activity of translating is thus similar to the
picture of the physicist in action commonly drawn by
Quine, and by other philosophers of science as well.
The scientist is often supposed to be in a situation
in which his data do not determine any one theory of the
world but are rather consistent with alternative incom-
patible theories
. The theories are said to be under-
determined by the data (or, as Quine would have it, by all
possible data). According to the views I have sketched,
the two pictures--that of the linguist laboring in the
field and that of the physicist hard at work in the
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laboratory-are very similar. It would not be surprising,
on these views, to find that the linguist's theory of the
native is underdetermined
. In the way 'determine' is
used in these accounts, the reference of the native speaker'
terms is indeterminate. I believe that some such mis -
understanding of Quine's views on translation is at the
core of the critics' positions, irrespective of the par-
ticular view of what reference involves may be. It is
a misunderstanding because it supposes determining the
reference of a term to be a matter of discovering some
fact, what the actual reference of a term is. We saw in
Chapter II, Section II that this is not the case.
Application of the thesis to the case of the fellow
speakers of one's own language engenders some uneasiness
for such critics. The uneasiness is engendered by the
not very interesting fact that both we and our fellow
speakers tend to produce similar strings of symbols in
similar situations, strings of symbols with which we all
are more or less familiar. Unless given some reason to
suppose that their linguistic use of these symbols differs
from ours
,
we tend to suppose their use of these symbols
in referring to be roughly the same as ours. We do not
suppose ourselves to be developing hypotheses about their
language and thus do not see so clearly how the problem
of indeterminacy of translation arises in such cases.
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Nevertheless, these reflections do not affect the
philosophical point being made by Quine. Given the lin-
guist’s methods as described and given that the only ob-
jective data available are the neighbor’s dispositions
to verbal behavior, the reference of the neighbor's
terms is indeterminate.
Notice that neither of the critics' positions as I
have described them precludes such application of the
principle in the neighbor's case. So long as the critic
has no reason to reject the constraints placed on the
translation problem, he can naturally suppose that the
theory about, or translation of, his neighbor's use of
these strings of symbols is underdetermined by the avail-
able data--namely
,
the neighbor's dispositions to verbal
behavior
.
happens
,
though
,
when we come "even closer to
home than the neighbor's case ?" 65 Each of our critics re-
fuses to accept the thesis when he (as linguist) is to
apply it to himself (as native). In each case the refusal
reflects a rejection, for one's own case, of the first
constraint on the translation problem: namely, the con-
straint that the only objective data available to the
linguist (now oneself) are the native's (now one's own)
dispositions to verbal behavior. In each of the two
positions we can find plausible and natural grounds for
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rejecting the principle in our own case.
On the first critic's view, we cannot "determine" the
intentions of another speaker on the basis of his dispo-
sitions to verbal behavior. Thus we cannot "determine"
his reference given the objective data available. But
surely, it is exclaimed, we have insight into our own
intentions. In our own case, the objective data are not
limited to dispositions to verbal behavior. The data
now include those intentions. No hypotheses concerning
them are needed. Thus, there being no theory to be under-
determined, the reference of our own terms is determinate.
The thesis of indeterminacy of translation does not hold
for oneself.
The second critic would make a similar claim about
the rules or conventions governing reference. Though we
cannot determine the applications of these for another
speaker, even of "our own" language, surely we know the
applications of the rules that we are following. Again,
in our own case
,
our data are not limited to dispositions
to verbal behavior. We need no hypotheses about the rules
we ourselves are following. Our own referring is clear
enough to us because we know the applications of the rules
that produce our dispositions to verbal behavior.
In both of these cases the first constraint on trans-
lation has been rejected. The supposition that, in one's
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own case, all one has to go on in "determining" the
reference of terms are the speaker's (i. e.
,
one's own)
dispositions to verbal behavior is denied. It is supposed
that reflection on one's own use of one's language, and
specifically on one's own use of its referential apparatus
provides objective data that are not available in the
other cases the case of the foreigner and that of the
neighbor.
The picture of the linguist laboring in the field has
been redrawn by the critics. In the home case, the
linguist's activity does not resemble that of the phy-
sicist. The linguist does not advance hypotheses about
the reference of the native speaker's (i. e., his own)
terms. There is no theory to be underdetermined. All
the requisite data about reference are at hand. Reference
is not "indeterminate."
Quine might well have objections to the specific
views of reference appealed to in such rejections of the
constraints on translation. One would assume, for
example
,
that he would not find the view that relies on
the notion of speakers' intentions unproblematical
. I
shall not deal with such objections, however. The two
views sketched are intended merely as examples to give
an idea of the sort of views that might be held and the
line of reasoning that might be followed by one who
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accepted the indeterminacy theses in all but the home case
Quine has a reply to all such critics, irrespective of the
particular views that they hold. I shall first discuss
the reply that Quine makes and then offer a separate
defense of Quine on this point, based on my interpreta-
tion of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation.
Quine’s reply is given in "Ontological Relativity"
where he discusses the application of the thesis to one-
self more explicitly than in Word and Object. In
"Ontological Relativity," Quine claims that to suppose
that the thesis of indeterminacy of translation holds
for others but not for oneself presupposes that one has
a private language. This, he says, is not so.
If it is to make sense to say even of
oneself that one is referring to rab-
bits and formulas and not to rabbit
stages and Godel numbers
,
then it should
make sense equally to say it of someone
else. After all, as Dewey stressed,
there is no private language.
No more is said here about private languages, nor is the
claim that there are none defended. We should remember,
however, that the intersub j ective
,
objective nature of
language-learning and language use is an important
theme, not only in Chapter II of Word and Object
,
where
it is dominant, but in other works as well. It is, for
example, the intersubj ective nature of language that
accounts for objectivity in science as well as in the
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common sense understanding of the world.
Though I think there is much to be said for the view
that language is essentially public or intersub j ective
,
I
am not prepared to support this somewhat dogmatic state-
ment made in "Ontological Relativity." Nor am I willing
to argue for his claim, made earlier in the same article,
that "... there cannot be, in any useful sense, a pri-
vate language ." 68 I am content to leave Quine and his
critics, of whatever persuasions, to defend their views
as best they can. I suggest for Quine another point of
defense. This defense requires returning to the thesis
of indeterminacy itself
,
and to the claim--re j ected by
the critics under discussion--that the only objective
data available to the linguist are the native's disposi-
tions to verbal behavior.
The first thing I want to point out is that the sen-
tence beginning "the only objective data available.
.
and the critics' understanding of 'determine'— is ambigu-
ous. The critics' use of the phrase "the only objective
data available" suggests that the phrase belongs in a
methodological or epistemological claim. This use
suggests that, though there might be more facts about the
native speaker's use of his language--or about the neigh-
bor's use of his--the linguist is unable (in principle) to
"get at" these facts. Such facts are inaccessible to the
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linguist, though presumably they are accessible to the
native or the neighbor, just as, in one's own case, the
facts about one's own use of one's language are accessible
to oneself. Unfortunately, Quine's choice of the word
'inscrutability' to describe the indeterminacy of refer-
ence encourages this reading of the phrase.
Each of the critics accepts the idea that, while the
—
nguist cannot determine the native's reference, the native
could, simply by reflecting on what he does when he refers,
"determine" his own reference. And each of us could do
the same for his own use of his language. It is no wonder
that the critic is surprised by the claim that the thesis
of indeterminacy applies to one's use of one's language.
There is, of course, another way of understanding
the sentence that contains the phrase "the only objective
data available," a way that, I believe, provides a more
accurate account of Quine's views. On this understanding,
one could replace the original sentence by a sentence some-
"t--di nS like. The only objective data there are are the
native's dispositions to verbal behavior." Some of the
more illuminating statements about the principle of indet-
erminacy of translation would then be seen to include the
following
:
The point is not that we cannot be sure
whether the analytical hypothesis is
right, but that there is not even, as
there was in the case of 'Gavagai', an
objective matter to be right or wrong
about . 69
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...The inscrutability of reference isnot the inscrutability of a fact; thereis no fact of the matter. 70
and
The question whether, in the situation lastdescribed, the foreigner really believes Aor elieves rather B, is a question whose-
very significance I would put in doubt.This
^ is what
. I am getting at in arguingthe indeterminacy of translation . 71
On this reading of the sentence, Quine's claim in the
thesis is not about the status of linguistic theory considered
as a science, nor is he making a claim about the possibility,
or impossibility, on one's coming to know certain facts
about other persons. Rather, he is claiming something about
the nature of language and language-users. He is claiming
that there are no meanings beyond what is given in a speaker's
dispositions to verbal behavior. If we must speak of meanings,
we are compelled to do so in terms of such dispositions. 72
These dispositions themselves, he suggests, are eventually
to be explained in terms of neurological structures. Note
also that meaning' is not here used in oppositon to
reference
. The application of the thesis to reference
,
i.e., the inscrutability of reference, appears to transcend
the distinction between the theory of meaning and the theory
of reference as Quine distinguished these in his early work. 72
Understood in this way, the thesis surely applies
to oneself if it applies to speakers of other languages
or to other speakers of one's own language. For suppose
we were to accept the principle for the foreigner, and for
the neighbor, but to reject it in our own case. What would
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this amount to? It would seem to be a claim that one
is a different kind of being than the foreigner or the
neighbor, that for oneself—but not for others—there is
something beyond the neurological structures that account
for dispositions to verbal behavior. Exactly what this
"something" might be is left open, though the claim sug-
gests that one belongs on a different link of The Great
Cham of Being from that occupied by other "human beings."
There is another problem: Everyone would have equally
good grounds for making such a claim about himself. If
there is a fact of the matter in each individual case,
there are facts in all cases. This would seem to result
m a denial of the original thesis as applied to others.
In any case, I hope that we can agree that the claim that
one is a special sort of being set apart from other human
beings is unacceptable. If so, we should also agree to
the following conditional
:
If the principle is acceptable in the in-
terlinguistic case and in the case of the
neighbor,, it is equally acceptable when
applied to oneself.
Whether the critics whom I have described would find
the principle as I explicate it plausible for the inter-
linguistic case or for the neighbor's case is, of course,
a separate question. My defense of Quine in this section
is limited to a defense of the conditional given above.
I do not defend either the antecedent or the consequent.
An assessment of the principle must take into account,
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among other things, its consequences. The conditional
I have defended is one of the premises used by Quine in
his argument about the consequences of indeterminacy. I
discuss this argument in the next subsection.
^ ) A consequence of indeterminacy
In subsection (i) I defended the conditional statement
that
if there is really. no fact of the matter,
then the inscrutability of reference can
be. brought even closer to home than the
neighbor's case: we can apply it to
ourselves .
'
5
I did not defend either the antecedent or the consequent
of this conditional. Quine affirms both. Moreover, he
believes that the consequent--the applicability of indeter-
minacy of reference to one's case--raises difficulties
about reference. He presents the following argument:
We seem to be maneuvering ourselves into the
absurd position that there is no difference
on . any terms, interlinguistic or intralin-
guistic, objective or subjective, between
referring to rabbits and referring to rabbit
parts or stages.
. . . Surely this is absurd,
for it would imply that there is no difference
between the rabbit and each of its parts or
stages .... Reference would seem now to
become nonsense not just in radical trans-
lation but at home
.
This argument is very puzzling, and very important.
It is puzzling because it is difficult to find a way to
justify the purported implication. It is important because
it provides Quine with the motivation for introducing his
theory of ontological relativity. Before discussing on-
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tological relativity, therefore, I want to discuss the
argument in some detail.
Consider, first, the claim that
there
. is . no difference on any terms, inter-linguistic or intralinguistic
,
objective or
subjective
,
between referring to rabbits and
referring to rabbit parts. 77
Note that it is not claimed merely that there is no objec-
tive difference between referring to rabbits and referring
to rabbit parts
,
but that there is no subjective difference
either. In WO it was claimed that there were no objective
data that would determine the reference of a term. To
fix reference one must translate the referential apparatus,
and this requires accepting a set of analytical hypotheses
that are not about any objective matter. The addition
here of both "intralinguistic" and "subjective" needs some
explanation
.
It should be fairly clear why Quine adds the phrase
"or intralinguistic." The indeterminacy of translation,
and of reference
,
has been shown to extend beyond the in-
terlinguis tic case to apply to one's own language and
even to one's own use of one’s language. The addition of
"or subjective" appears to be connected with the extension
of the indeterminacy of translation and indeterminacy of
reference to one’s own case as well. Quine’s reasoning
seems to be that if there were subjective differences
between referring to rabbits and referring to rabbit
parts, one could, on the basis of these subjective dif-
214
ferences, determine the actual reference of the terms
rabbit* and 'rabbit stage* as used by oneself. One's
own use of the referential apparatus of one's language
would be determinate. But this is not so: indeterminacy
applies even to one’s own case. So Quine concludes that
there are no subjective differences between referring to
rabbits and referring to rabbit parts. Something like
this seems to be the import of Quine's denial of the
possibility of a private language.
It seems clear that the premise of Quine's argument
is supposed to be a statement of the indeterminacy thesis
as it applies to reference. The justification that I
have given for this premise seems to me to be a fairly
natural one. It is difficult to see, however, why this
premise "would imply that there is no difference between
the rabbit and each of its parts." Part of the difficulty
may be that the statement of the premise is not so clear
as it seems to be.
Attempting to "regiment" the premise according to
the methods Quine suggests in Word and Object does not
clarify it or suggest any general principles to use in
arriving at the conclusion. No natural reading of the
premise that makes use of identity, for example, provides
a formulation that supports such an implication.
Since the premise is a statement of the indeterminacy
of reference
,
I try to work out the argument by making use
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of the earlier discussion of indeterminacy of reference.
Something very close to Quine’s conclusion can be reached
by considering the argument for indeterminacy of reference,
especially premises (2)-(4) of that argument. Statements
about the difference or sameness of rabbits and rabbit
stages can be couched in terms of the coextensiveness of
terms and in terms of what two terms are true of. Thus,
the contrary of Quine’s conclusion that there is no dif-
ference between rabbits and rabbit stages might be given
by
(1) 'rabbit' is not coextensive with 'rabbit
stage
'
or, more accurately,
(2) 'rabbit' does not overlap with 'rabbit
stage '
.
7 9
Since we have not given a definition of ' overlaps
' (and
have seen that Quine would reject a substitutional account
of such terms), it is more convenient to use a related
terminology
,
one that brings us closer to statements about
indeterminacy of reference:
(3) 'rabbit' is not true of anything 'rabbit
stage' is true of. 80
Now we are in a position to ask whether, given the
first premise, i.e., the indeterminacy of reference, sen-
tence (3) can be justified. According to the argument
for indeterminacy of reference, it cannot be justified.
The reference of 'rabbit' and of 'rabbit stage' is indet-
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emuriate
. We could devise manuals of translation that
are compatible with speakers' dispositions to verbal behavior
that translated both ’rabbit' and 'rabbit stage' by the
same term. Thus, among the analytical hypotheses of such
a manual we might have
(4) 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit'
and
(5) 'rabbit stage' is translated as 'rabbit'.
According to the argument for indeterminacy of reference
,
(6) If ' rabbit
. stage ' is translated as 'rabbit'
then rabbit stage' is true of rabbits
and
(7) If 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit',
then 'rabbit' is true of rabbits.
Statements ( 4 ) — ( 7 ) give us the conclusions
(8) 'rabbit' is true of rabbits
and
(9) 'rabbit stage' is true of rabbits.
These statements together give us a contrary of sentence (3),
i . e
.
,
(10)
'rabbit' is true of the same things as
'rabbit stage' is true of.
One might suggest the following objection to this argument.® 1
Even if both 'rabbit' and 'rabbit stage' are translated as
'rabbit' and thus true of rabbits, it does not follow that
'rabbit' and rabbit stage' are coextensive. According to
this objection 'rabbit' might be true of something (other
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than rabbits ) that 'rabbit stage' is not true of, and
vice versa.
In answering this objection, I return to the thesis
of indeterminacy of translation. According to the the-
sis, a term cannot be said to refer to any items apart
from a choice of a background language and a manual of
translation. The suggestion appears to ignore the thesis,
for it supposes that the terms being translated can be
said to be true of (refer to) items other than those
to whcih its translation refers. If this were so, it
would be because other analytical hypotheses in the manual
m question specify different items of which the term is
true and so the purported translation is not in fact a
translation. The manual I am considering is not of this
sort. On my account of Quine’s views on translation and
reference, "part of the import of accepting a manual of
translation is that doing so allows one to establish the
reference of the terms to be translated."^ On this ac-
count, the fact that in the manual of translation chosen the
the term t ± is a translation of another term t ensures
the coextensiveness of t
± and t 2 . The decision to accept
the manual of translation is in part the decision to treat
the terms as coextensive. Given this account, the objec-
tion is clearly mistaken. The argument offered does show
the terms to be coextensive.
Of course, one need not adopt the manual of translation
according to which the terms 'rabbit' and 'rabbit stage »
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are translated as the same term. Indeed, one might argue
that such a manual of translation would be inconsistent,
because sentences (4) and (5) would require different
principles of individuation. I don't think that this is
correct. Translations of the relevent linguistic items,
e.g., identity, could be made that are consistent with
these translations of the terms. They could be made dis-
junctive, for example.
In any case, one can get the same result by taking
a more aesthetically pleasing manual. Consider the manual
according to which
(12) 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit stage'
and
(13) 'rabbit stage' is translated as 'rabbit'.
By the argument of indeterminacy of reference we get
(14) 'rabbit' refers to rabbit stages.
and
(15) 'rabbit stage' refers to rabbits.
These statements give us
(16) 'rabbit' and 'rabbit stage' are coreferential
.
So
(17) 'rabbit' is true of the same things that
'rabbit stage' is true of.
Unlike the other manual of translation, manuals of
translation that include hypotheses (12) and (13) seem
quite inoffensive. Indeed, it seems natural, given that
218
one translated 'rabbit' as 'rabbit stage', that 'rabbit
stage should be translated as 'rabbit'. And certainly
Quine finds nothing wrong with this first hypothesis.
It is important to realize that Quine has argued that
there are no reasons to choose any other manual of trans-
lationover the manuals described. Both manuals discussed
can be supposed to conform to speakers' dispositions to
verbal behavior. The second manual might be favored over
the first because it seems to be simpler. Of course one
would have to see the rest of the manual to decide that
question. One might even argue that there is a sense in
which it would be simpler to accept the more complicated
principles of individuation than to accept a set of hypo-
theses that has the air of paradox of the second manual.
What we have now is something very like Quine's
conclusion: viz., there are manuals of translation according
to which (3) is false and (10) is true. 83 Thus, in a straight-
forward sense, there is given the hypothesis "no difference"
between rabbits and rabbit stages. Of course, there are
other acceptable manuals of translation for these terms
which would not give these results. But there are no
reasons to choose those manuals over manuals like the two
I have discussed. Our choice is more or less an arbitrary
one. The difficulty about reference arises, then, because
our decision about which manual of translation to accept
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is not determined by speakers' dispositions to verbal
behavior. It is not determined by any matter of fact
"objective or subjective." As we will see in the next
subsection, Quine's resolution of the problem makes use
of the fact that a manual of translation must be accepted.
He avoids this result by relativizing reference to a
manual of translation. Thus he says,
Reference ijs nonsense except relative to
a coordinate
. system. In this principle of
relativity lies the resolution of our quandry
.
84
B. Ontological Relativity and the Background Language
(i) Making relative sense of reference
In the last subsection we saw that an argument can
be constructed from Quine’s principles about translation
and reference to show that there is no difference between
rabbits and rabbit stages. ^ It seems, then, that Quine
needs some supplement to his account of reference to avoid
this conclusion. Even one who did not accept the argument
in the previous subsection might find the premise of that
argument sufficiently non-intuitive to require some qual-
ification of the account of reference. That premise, as
we saw, is simply a version of the thesis of indeterminacy
of translation as it applies to reference.
Quine does accept the conclusion of the argument,
with an important qualification. He says, in "ontological
Relativity"
Reference is_ nonsense except relative to a co-
ordinate system. In this principle of relativ-
ity lies the resolution of our quandry.
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It is meaningless to ask whether, ingeneral our terms "rabbit," "rabbit part,"
number, etc.
,
really refer respectivelyto rabbits, rabbit parts, numbers, etc.
rather than to some ingeniously permuteddenotations. It is meaningless to askthis absolutely; we can ask it only
relative to some background language
. .
we need the background language to regressinto. The background language gives thequery sense, if only relative sense; sense
relative in turn to it, this backgroundlanguage .
°
b
Quine's solution requires that the use of ’refers*
be restricted to contexts in which a background lan-
guage and a manual of translation are provided. He
supposes that the problem to which ontological relati-
vity is a solution depends on some "absolute" sense of
reference
.
I note at this point (and explain in greater detail
later) that my arguments of the previous subsection do not
make use of this absolute sense of reference. In those
arguments, reference is relativized. In particular, in
the argument that shows that
,
if reference is indeterminate
,
there is "no difference" between rabbits and rabbit
stages
,
two kinds of manuals of translation are discussed.
According to each of these, rabbits turn out to be the same
as rabbit stages
,
given the acceptance of the sort of
manual of translation described. Quine’s thesis of
ontological relativity does not then speak to any defi-
ciency in these arguments.
The justification I offered for the premises of the
argument for indeterminacy of reference already included
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the sort of relativization that Quine presents in on-
tological relativity. The sort of argument he has in
mind involves a misunderstanding of premises like
premises (2)- 4) of the argument for indeterminacy of
reference. It is easy to reconstruct an argument of the
sort he has in mind.
Consider premises like Aune ' s premises (2)-(4):
(2) If
' rabbit
J
is translated as 'rabbit*
then 'rabbit' refers to rabbits.
(3) If 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit part'then 'rabbit' refers to rabbit parts.
(4) If 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit
stage', then 'rabbit' refers to rabbit
stages
.
Given these premises
,
and the existence of manuals of
translation, R, P, and S, that translate 'rabbit' as
'rabbit', 'rabbit part', and 'rabbit stage', respectively,
one might think oneself justified in detaching the con-
sequents of these conditionals. Thus one might think that
the existence of the three manuals of translation would
give the following additional premises
:
(2') 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit' ( n
manual R).
(3') 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit part'
(in manual P)
.
(4') 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit stage'
( in manual S )
These premises with (2), (3), and (4) seem to justify, by
modus ponens
,
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(2'')
'rabbit' refers to rabbits (by (2)
and (2')) y ;
(3,,)
/o?bbit
' refers to rabbit parts (by
and
C4'') 'rabbit' refers to rabbit stages (by(4) and (4' ) ) . y
In my justification of premises (2)-(4), I assumed
that sentences like (2"), (3"), and (4") establish
coreferentiality
. If this is so, it follows from (2'')
and (4'') that 'rabbit' and 'rabbit stage' are true of
the same things. It is assumed that (2'') and (4'') are
proven unconditionally. This gives us the conclusion
that there is "no difference" between rabbits and rabbit
stages. 87
This argument, or something very like it, seems to
be what Quine avoids when he advocates ontological rela-
tivity. When we consider the justification for premises
(2), (3), and (4), we can see clearly why such an argument
is not allowable. The term 'rabbit' is translated only
upon the acceptance of some manual of translation, say
manual R. We have premise (2') then, only if manual R
_is accepted . Manual R is incompatible with manuals P and
S. We cannot accept manual R and manual P and manual S. We
will not, then, ever be able to get all three of premises
(2'), (3'), and (4'). So we will not be able to get all
three of statements (2''), (3''), and (4'') together to
construct the argument that shows reference to be nonsense.
An argument of tne sort Quine envisages clearly rests on
223
a mistake in understanding the premises (2), (3), and
(4).
The restriction of the use of 'refers* given in
"Ontological Relativity" makes it clear that an argument
of th is sort
,
one that does not take into account the
relativization to background language and manual of trans-
lation, will be invalid. Ontological relativity makes
explicit the conditions on premises like premises (2)-
( 4) that are implicit in the justification for these
premises that I gave in the last subsection.
Note that the arguments I presented in the last sub-
section to show that there is "no difference" between
rabbits and rabbit stages are not affected by the intro-
duction of ontological relativity. In those arguments,
I did not violate the restriction implicit in my justifi-
cation of premises like (2) — (4)
.
The sentences in my
argument are relativized to a manual of translation in
eac ^ which one could get the result that there is
"no difference" between rabbits and rabbit stages. The
arguments do not depend on the sort of mistake Quine
avoids by introducing ontological relativity. There is,
on Quine's own grounds, no reason why these manuals
should not be accepted. They cannot be ruled out except
by some ad hoc restriction ruling out manuals that have
this consequence . Thus
,
though Quine may free himself
sketched in this subsection—arguments which appear to
infer correctly that there is "no difference" between
rabbits and rabbit stages from truths about the exis-
tence of manuals of translation.
(ll) Other difficulties for ontological relativity
The relativization of reference to a coordinate
system, or background language, is, not by itself a com
pletely adequate supplement
, to Quine’s account of re-
ference. To see why this is so, I want to review some
points about translation and reference. These points
should make clear a difficulty that Quine raises for
his relative account of reference, and prepare for my
discussion of this difficulty in the next subsection.
(1)
Any language can serve as a background
language
.
(2) For any background language, there will
be equally acceptable alternative
,
in-
compatible manuals of translation from
the foreign language into that back-
ground .
(3) Though we typically use examples in
which English serves as a background
language, English has no special pro-
perties that make it peculiarly ap-
propriate for use as a background
language
.
(4) Like any language, the background lan-
guage we choose is subject to inde-
terminacy of translation.
(5) Translation of a term into a background
language specifies the reference of that
term. (Example: If 'rabbit* is trans-
lated as 'rabbit stage', then 'rabbit'
refers to rabbit stages.)
I
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(6) The appeal to a background language in
specifying the reference of a term pre-
supposes that ,the reference of the itemsin the background language is established.Otherwise translation into the backgroundlanguage would not specify the reference
of the terms being translated.
Statements (4), (5), and (6) may already suggest to
the reader the difficulty that Quine finds with ontolo-
gical relativity: Simply translating into a backgorund
.language is not adequate to establish the reference of a
term unless reference is established in the background
language. But reference is established (in the background
language) only relative to some (other) background lan-
guage.
To see this point more clearly, consider an English-
to-English translation, one of those ingenious "permuta-
tions" to which Quine alludes in stating the thesis of
ontological relativity. Suppose we wish to discover the
answer to a question about the reference of the term ’rab-
bit* as it occurs in L (i. e., English). Having read "Ontolo-
gical Relativity," we realize that we cannot ask, "in
general," whether ’rabbit’ (in L) refers to rabbit stages.
We can ask this only relative to a background language and
some manual of translation. English is our background
language, and we may choose manual R, mentioned in the
previous section. We can, according to what Quine has
told us thus far, ask
(Ql) Relative to manual R, what is the re-
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ference of 'rabbit' (in L)?
From our earlier descitption of manual R, we know
that
(2') 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit' (in
manual R).
The argument for the indeterminacy of reference (in II A
(ii)) then justifies this answer to our question:
(2") 'rabbit' refers to rabbits relative to
manual R)
.
This answer is given, however, only on the assumption that
the term 'rabbit' in the language used in manual R (which
I will call LR) has some determinate reference. We know
that every language is subject to the indeterminacy of
translation. So LR, in particular, is subject to inde-
terminacy. It can be used, in conjunction with the manual
of translation, to establish the reference of 'rabbit' in
L only if we can answer the question
(Q2 ) What does 'rabbit' (in LR) refer to?
Now, this question is meaningless absolutely speaking.
We can ask a similar question, however, relative to some
background language and some manual of translation. One
question we can ask is
(Q3 ) What does 'rabbit' (in LR) refer to,
relative to P and LP?
where LP is a background language and P, a manual of trans-
i i
lation. We can answer the question, given acceptance of
the manual of translation P. According to manual P, de-
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scribed earlier,
O') 'rabbit* is translated as 'rabbit part'(m manual P). F
We can then get the result that
(3") 'rabbit' (in LR) refers to rabbit parts
relative to manual P).
Now that we have ensured that our original background
language has a fixed reference, we see that the answer to
our original question is
(2"')
'rabbit' (in L) refers to rabbit parts(relative to manual R, relative to
manual P)
.
It should be obvious that we are going to be involved
in a regress. The regress is, moreover, of a problema-
tical sort. The problem is not only that for every back-
ground language we can raise the question what the re-
ference of the term is, in that language. The problem is
worse than this. We look to the background language LR
to establish the reference of the term in L. The re-
ference of the term in L can be established only if the
reference of the term in LR is established. This can,
in turn, be established only if a manual of translation
into some background language has been accepted. So we
must ask the .question about LR in order to establish the
reference of the term of L.
My point stands out clearly if we consider an aug-
mented form of the argument for premise (2) of the argument
from indeterminacy of translation to indeterminacy of re-
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ference. The argument I gave then is
(a) ' gavagai ' is translated, in manual R,
as 'rabbit 1
.
5
(b) We have decided to accept manual R.
(C)
!
ga
K??
a;
r refers to (is true of) whatrabbit refers to (is true of), since
accepting the analytical hypothesis that
equates 'gavagai* and 'rabbit' is thedecision to accept 'gavagai' as co-
referential with 'rabbit'.
(d) 'rabbit' refers to (is true of) rabbits.
—
(e) 'gavagai' refers to (is true of) rabbits.
Written with the augmentation suggested by the ac-
count of ontological relativity, the argument form of
which the above is an instance is
:
(a') In M, 0 (in L) is translated as 0 (in B).
( b
'
)
We have decided to accept M which trans-
lates terms of L into the background lan-
guage
,
B.
(c') 0
.
( in L) refers to (is true of) what 9(in B) refers to (is true of), since
accepting the analytical hypothesis
that equates 0 (in L) and 0 (in B) is
the decision to accept 0 (in L) as co-
referential with 0 (in B).
(d') 0 (in B) refers to (is true of) Ks
.
(e') 0 (in L) refers to (is true of) Ks
Note the sentence (d'). This is a sentence of exact-
ly the same logical form as the sentence (e*). Since the
background language is not
,
qua background language,
privileged, (d') can be established only by an argument
of exactly the same sort as the one above. Moreover, it
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must be established if we are to obtain (e') and thus
answer
> even relatively
, the question
Wh3-t does 0 (in L) refer to?
The difficulty I have described is precisely the one
that Quine raises in "Ontological Relativity," though he
does not discuss the regress in any detail. He says,
We need a background language, I said, to
regress into. Are we involved now in aninfinite regress? If questions of re-ference of the sort we are considering
make sense only relative to a backgroundlanguage, then evidently questions of re-ference for the background language make
sense only relative to a further back-
ground language. y
8
The point about the regress that Quine does not make
sufficiently clear is this
:
The initial question about reference can-
not be answered unless the question about
reference for the background language has
been answered.
Though he doesn't make this point explicit, Quine
does make it explicit that the regress must be stopped
if he is to make even "relative sense" of questions
about reference. Though, he says in describing the re-
gress, "in these terms the situation sounds disparate,
he thinks it is possible to end the regress. His proposal
for doing so is this:
We end the regress of background lan-
guages, in discussions of reference, by
acquiescing in our mother tongue and taking
its words at face value.
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(iii) Accepting the home lancni^
We saw in the last subsection that Quine's supple-
ment to his account of reference
. involved him in a re-
gress into background languages. Because of the nature
of the regress, Quine must find a way to stop the regress
if his account is to make "relative sense" of the reference
of a term in the language for which the question of re-
ference was originally raised. Quine's proposal for end-
ing the regress is that one accept our home language at
"face value." Quine does not show in what accepting the
home language consists, or how accepting the home language
at face value will stop the regress. In this subsection
I argue that Quine has not given us an adequate account
of reference, even relatively speaking, because his pro-
posal for ending the regress into background languages
will not work.
First I want to state what must be accomplished in
stopping the regress. To stop the regress one must
establish the reference of the terms of
some language
in a way that
either
(a) does not introduce new analytical hypo-
theses and so another background lan-
guage
or
(b) introduces new analytical hypotheses
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and another background language in
such a way that the reference in that
new background language is established.
That these are the only alternatives can be seen by con-
sidering my treatment, in the last subsection, of the
argument with the sentences (a')-(e'). It is clear that
the disjunct (b) actually reduces to (a). If we could
accomplish (b)
,
then (a) would be true for the new back-
ground language introduced.
I argue, first, that Quine's way of introducing the
idea of accepting one's home language at face value shows
his solution to be prima facie unacceptable. Then I
consider other suggestions about what it is to accept
the home language at face value. Finally, I consider a
suggestion that is based on some remarks by Quine in
"The Roots of Reference."
To see why Quine's proposal for ending the regress
i- s prima facie unacceptable
,
I look at the way in which
it was introduced in "Ontological Relativity." Quine's
introduction of this proposal suggests something about
the face value of the home language that is false. The
idea of accepting the home language at face value is
introduced in aa analogy between the regress into back-
ground languages and a regress into coordinate systems
in physics. Thus Quine says, after noting that there is
a regress that must be stopped:
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In these terms the situation sounds des-parate, but m fact it is little dif-ferent from questions of position and
velocity. When we are given position
and velocity relative to a given coor-dinate system, we can always ask inturn about the placing of origin and
orientation of axes of that system of
coordinates; and there is no end to the
succession of further coordinate sys-tems that could be adduced in answer-ing the successive questions thus gene-
rated. &
In practice of course, we end the
regress of coordinate systems by some-
thing like pointing. And in practice,
we end the regress of background lan-
guages, in discussions of reference,
by acquiescing in our mother tongue and
taking its words at face value.
Examination of the analogy will show an obvious difficulty.
The regress into coordinate systems arises when one
attempts to specify position and velocity of a particle.
This specification can be made
,
Quine says
,
only in rela-
tion to a spatio-temporal coordinate system. What is to
be specified is the space-time point at which the particle
occurs. Such a point can be specified only in the context
of some coordinate system. A coordinate system can be
established, or specified, only if one is able to specify
an origin for the system. That is, one must be able to
specify some space-time point that is to serve as an
origin. In order to specify that point, however, one must
first have a coordinate system. And so on. The regress
does look very like the regress into background languages.
The two regresses share the property that some further sys-
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tem is always required in order to answer the initial
question raised.
Quine says that in the case of physics the regress
is ended by specifying an origin by "something like
pointing." What one does by pointing is, he suggests, to
specify some space-time point as origin. This space-
time point is specified without reference to any other
coordinate system. Because the specification is accom-
plished without reference to another coordinate system, th
regress is ended. It is crucial that what is given by
pointing is an item of the sort whose specification raised
the problem of the regress in the first place--a space-
time point.
Ending the regress into background languages by
accepting the home language at face value is
,
according
to Quine
,
analogous to pointing to end the regress into
coordinate systems. If this is so, the following should
be true
:
(i) Accepting the home language at face
value does not require any further
background language.
and
(ii) Accepting the home language at face
value provides a way of specifying
an item of the sort whose specification
raised the problem of the regress into
background languages in the first
place: it gives the reference of the
terms of the home language.
Note that if (i) and (ii) are true, the conditions set
down earlier for ending the regress would be met. But
these cannot be true. The home language, like any other
language, has no reference except relative to a background
language and a set of analytical hypotheses. In the list
of items at the beginning of the previous subsection I
noted that the home language has no properties that make
it peculiarly suited to serve as a background language
or that make it privileged if it is chosen to serve as a
background language. The point is that the home lan-
guage, like any other, is subject to indeterminacy of
reference. This solution, as explicated in terms of
Quine's analogy, is unacceptable: It suggests that ques-
tions about reference are meaningful
,
in the home lan-
guage
,
absolutely speaking. But Quine has argued that
this is false.
There is another, similar solution to which the
same objections can be raised. It might be suggested
that when we have asked
What is the reference of 'rabbit* relative
to the home language and manual R?
we get a perfectly good answer:
'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit'
(relative to the home language and
manual R)
So 'rabbit' refers to rabbits (relative
to the home language and manual R)
.
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And if we ask further what the reference of 'rabbit' is—
in the home language—the answer is that we are using
'rabbit', in the home language, in just the sense men-
tioned. Further questions about reference in the home
language are superfluous
.
There are two difficulties with such a response. The
first is that, according to the indeterminacy thesis, there
is no sense mentioned--except of course relative to a
background language and a manual of translation. For the
response to be a solution it would have to presuppose
that reference is determinate in the home language, which
Quine has shown to be false. Thus far, this solution is
subject to exactly the same problems as the solution
suggested by the analogy.
Second, this solution involves a false supposition.
It supposes that it is sometimes sufficient to correlate
the linguistic items in one language with the linguistic
items in another language to establish the reference of
the items in the first language. It ignores the general
character of the regress as Quine describes it: Re-
ference in the translated language is not established un-
less referenge in the translating language is established.
We can never refuse to raise the question about the re-
ference of terms in the translating language if we are
to answer the question about the reference of terms in
the translated language.
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There is another very plausible suggestion. We
might suppose that to accept, the home language is to
accept that set of analytical hypotheses that one sup-
poses would ordinarily be accepted by speakers of the
home language. In the home language, for example,
’rabbit’ is translated as ’rabbit’
’horse’ is translated as 'horse’,
and so on. Accepting the home language would be accepting
that set of analytical hypotheses that give us homophonic
translations of all of our terms.
So far the suggestion is plausible. The homophonic
translation does seem to be the natural choice of analy-
tical hypotheses for translation from English to English.
As we have already noted, however, the simple translation
does not establish reference. Unless more is said, the
regress is not stopped.
We might suppose that there is no difficulty in
establishing the reference of the home language because
we always have available the homophonic translation. It
is always possible to choose a homophonic manual of trans-
lation, and we could make it a policy always to do so.
It is essential to realize, however, that reference
is not established unless a manual of translation is
actually accepted. Neither the simple existence of a
manual of translation nor the possibility of choosing that
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manual is sufficient for establishing reference.
That this is so is a direct result of Quine's argu-
ment for ontological relativity. If the mere existence
of, or possibility of choosing, a manual of translation
were sufficient for establishing reference, the invalid
argument discussed in the previous subsection would be
acceptable. What made that argument invalid is that it
violated the restrictions to the effect that the con-
sequent of a conditional such as
If 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit
stage', then 'rabbit' refers to rabbit
stages
can be detached only if a manual of translation that
translated 'rabbit' as 'rabbit stage' is actually accepted
If we no longer accept this restriction, the argument
that attempts to show that there is no difference between
rabbits and rabbit stages is acceptable. This, of
course
,
is what Quine argues against in "Ontological
Relativity." So, if this suggestion for stopping the
regress is acceptable, so is the argument that shows
reference to be "nonsense."
It seems, then, that none of the obvious moves in-
volving analytical hypotheses will help in explaining
what accepting the home language at face value consists
in and how it can stop the regress. The problem with all
these attempts is that they introduce languages to which
239
indeterminacy of reference applies. Indeterminacy of
reference applies to every language, even our own, and
thus to every background language.
In "The Roots of Reference," Quine talks about
reference in a way, he claims, that avoids indeterminacy
of reference. Perhaps the remarks in those lectures could
help to provide an account of accepting the home language
at face value that avoids indeterminacy.
In this lecture Quine discusses two kinds of cases
involving reference. In both cases, he claims, it is
possible to "escape from problems of translation ." 92
These cases might serve us as models for understanding
the notion of accepting the home language at face value
while escaping from problems of translation.
The first case discussed is that in which the child
as language-learner, comes to "bandy about" those portions
of English that Quine calls its "referential apparatus."
The other case is that in which one is able to engage
in "fluent dialogue" with competent speakers of the
language. In both these cases, Quine says, he is able
to avoid indeterminacy because he is not "going to make
capital of relations of sameness and difference of meaning ." 99
Common to both these cases is a treatment of
"reference" that involves only the classification of the
syntactical items of the language. The "referential
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apparatus" consists merely of those items of English
that are said to be involved in reference. Among these
items are the identity sign, the. copula, and the pro-
nouns. Later, quantifiers are included as more sophisti-
cated counterparts of pronouns. The fluency with which
Quine is concerned in the second case is the mere fluency
of utterance by two speakers of linguistic items. He
is specifically not concerned with conveying of "meanings"
or with a shared theory.
In both these cases, the notion of reference used is
a truncated one. As Quine points out early in these lec-
tures, the mere verbal response in an appropriate situa-
tion, the m^^e production of linguistic items, is not
adequate for referring in the full sense. Reference in
the full sense involves designation of items in one's
ontology; it involves a theory of the world.
It is by avoiding this richer sense of reference that
Quine avoids the problems of translation. The sparse
sense of reference is what we have to look to in finding
a sense of accepting the language that does not involve
one in indeterminacy. Suppose we do model an account on
'
»
these other two cases. Accepting the home language would
then be recognizing that in our home language fluency is
achieved by the production of certain groups of syntac-
tical items. We might also classify these items in
various ways
,
as Quine does in the case of the referen-
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tial apparatus. What the model does not allow us to do
is to explain the function of any of these items. Such
an account of the home language is not, as Quine says,
an adequate account of reference.
There does not seem to be any explanation of what
it is to accept the home language that will serve to stop
the regress into background languages. Until Quine pro-
vides such an explanation, he has failed to stop the re-
gress. Moreover, I think that I have shown it to be
highly implausible that such an explanation can be given.
Unless Quine is able to stop the regress, however--
whether by providing an explanation of accepting the home
language at face value or by some other proposal--he
has not given us an account, even a relative account,
of reference. One of the consequences of the indeter-
minacy of translation and the indeterminacy of reference
thus seems to be that no adequate account can be given
of the conditions under which statements in the form
'0 refers to Ks ' are accepted. Clearly, such a conse-
quence would throw serious doubt upon the acceptability
of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation and of in-
determinacy of reference.
CONCLUDING REMARK
Schuldenfrei begins his "Quine in Perspective" by
claiming that, in order to understand Quine's views on
indeterminacy of translation, it is necessary to con-
sider Quine's "world view."l Though I disagree with
Schuldenfrei elsewhere, I think he is clearly right
that it is important to consider Quine's views as a
whole if one is to understand the indeterminacy thesis.
I have tried to do that, showing how his views
on translation and meaning are related to his episte-
mological views and his philosophy of science. There
is, of course, much more to be said about these views
than I have been able to do here. Nevertheless, I think
that I have shown there to be serious difficulties with
these views that become clear when one considers them
in the context of his theory of meaning. Quine's views
on language
-learning and evidence
,
for example
,
are
thrown into doubt when one takes into account the un-
derdetermination and indeterminacy theses
.
The consequences of indeterminacy, as Quine de-
scribes them, are radical and quite unappealing, even
to Quine. His attempt at handling these consequences
involves the introduction of ontological relativity and
the acceptance of some background language. I argued in
Chapter III that this attempt fails
. This failure leaves
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Quine with a radically skeptical view, not only about
meaning, but about reference as well. In effect, he has
no (even relative) account of semantical statements
about reference. Much of Quine's recent work can be
seen as an attempt to answer the question: "How is a
science of language possible?" Quine's response is an
attempt to behaviorize meaning. I have
,
I think, shown
that this response is inadequate.
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17. Harre (1964), pp. 20f.
18
. Harre (1964).
19. Hempel (1965e), p. 182.
20. Hempel (1965e)
,
p. 186.
21. See footnote 15.
and his (19 61b)
amPle
’
S°me Pai>tS °f hiS <1966)
> his <1961d)
,
23.
For discussion of curve-fitting, see Hempel (1966)especially Chapter III and Chapter IV; Ackermann (1963)*
and Scheffler. (1963)
. Ackermann argues that curve-fittingdoes not provide a non-circular solution to problems about
simplicity.
24. Carnap (1958), Chapter VI.
25. Quine (1960), p. 42.
26. Quine
.
(19 60)
,
p. 33. There, the point was to allowfor the possibility that a speaker might "change his ways"m responding to sentences.
27. Or at le'ast dated sentences, since no position is
given, but, this can be altered by including all places.
28. Quine (1960), pp. 170-173.
29. See Lectures 2 and 3 of "The Roots of Reference,"
in which he argues on this ground against a substitution
interpretation of quantifiers.
30 . See Chapter I.
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31. See the firstH of this chapter. section of my Chapter I and Section
For further discussion
Subsection B of this section.
of this point
,
see also
33.
above
,
See my Chapter. I, especially Section I.
section I of this chapter; Quine (1970c).
See
this
34. See above, and Quine
35. Quine (1960), Section
36
. See Quine (1970c)
, p.
chapter.
(1970c)
,
p. 179
.
12
; ,
Quine (1971), pp. 1- 4 .
179; and the early part of
37
.
Quine (1969a)
,
p. 88
.
3 8
. Smart (19 68 )
,
p. 80
.
39. He is explicating objections
the Hempelian account of explanation,
own views
.
of Feyerabend to
not discussing his
40 .It. does raise difficulties for his criterion formembership m a linguistic community. See Chapter ISection 11(B). 5
41. In his discussion of Hanson in his (1969a), p88. Note that the recognition of the x-ray tube as ’aninstrument (and not, for example, a modern sculpture)
requires some degree of knowledge about its function.
.
42
•
?ee Chapter III, Section I for discussion ofQuine's views of reference and quantification.
43. Quine (1970c) 5 P . 181; my emphasis.
44. Quine (1960)
,
P- 27.
45. Quine (1960), P- 73.
46 . Quine (1960) P* 29.
47. Quine (1960) P* 27.
48. Quine (1967)
, P* 52. Quine is arguing against
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49. Quine (1970d)
,
p. 8.
50. Quine (1970d)
, p. 8.
•u._
’ views on language-learning do, however affecthis approach to the translation case. For example
,
’thoseitems most readily translated by the linguist (i e ob-
the'child
Be
^
nc
^ the items first ieir^ed by
. Quine takes this to be an important fact.
52. Quine (I960), p. 28.
53
. Quine (I960 )
,
p. 28.
that
1960 } 5 P * 68 ’ In later works, Quine notesonly negation, and not conjunction or
translatable by these methods. See below and QuiSe^lSjot?6
pp. 12f; (1969b), and (1969i), p. 314.
55. Quine (1960), p. 68.
56. This aspect of translation is discussed in Quine(1961b). That essay, presented as a lecture in 1951, con-
tains an early formulation of the second part of the in-
determinacy thesis. The problems of discovering what the
significant sequences of a language are is an "offspring”
of the problem of meaning. See also my Chapter I, Section I.
57. Quine (1960), p. 30. As we will see below, Quine's
use of "guess again" is misleading, since these hypotheses
are analytical hypotheses.
58. Quine (1960), pp. 57-61. And, as Quine thought at
the
. time of writing Word and Object
,
translations of other
logical connectives, but not of the quantifiers. See also
his ( 19 70d
)
, pp. 14-16
.
59. Quine (1970d), p. 16.
60. Quine (1960), p. 74. For further discussions of
such principles, see Landesman (1970), Young (1972), and
Hintikka (1969). See also Quine (1969i) and (1970d).
61. Quine (1960), p. 29; my emphasis.
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62. Quine (1960), p. 29; my emphasis.
64. Quine (1960 )
, p. 30.
65
. Quine (1960 )
, p. 30
.
66 . Quine (1969i)
, p. 312 .
67. Hintikka (1969).
68 . Quine (1960 )
,
p. 32.
69. Quine (1960), p. 31. Seehis ( 19 69g)
,
and Lecture 1 of his
related issues.
Chapter I of his (1960),
(1971) for discussion of
70. Quine (1960 )
,
p. 31.
71. See Quine (1960), Section 2
,
especially pp. 7f
.
72. Quine (1960 )
,
p. 33.
-i
73,
_9uine ( 19t^), p. 42. For discussion of Quine'slater refinements of this definition, see Chapter I, Section
74. Quine (1960 )
,
p. 42
.
75. Quine (1960), p. 57.
76.
This statement requires refinement, of course. Inthe example, the speaker would no longer assent after suffi-
cient time had passed for the crocuses to wither and die.Quine notes that the distinction is a rough one
,
and that
standing sentences grade off toward occasion sentences asthe
. interval between possible repromptings diminishes.
.
."
LQuine (1960), p. 36], Nonny Burack informs me that the
example should be "The crocuses are up."
77. Quine (1960), p. 58.
78. The example is given in Quine (1970d).
79. Quine (1960), p. 55.
80. Quine (1960), p. 66.
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Quine"*” ( 1 9 7na
^U "*"ne
^-i-
960 ^ Section 14; Quine (1961d)*gume 0d)
,
especially pp . 7f.
u;
’
82
83
84
85
86
,
87,
88
.
Quine (1960 )
, p. 43.
Quine (1960 )
,
p. 43.
Quine (1960 ) , p. 46.
Quine (1960 )
,
p. 51.
Quine (1960 )
,
p. 51.
See his (1969i) and his (1970d).
.
Quine notes that we- should not expect to find con-
function^
1
T
thS nat
t
Ve lanSuaS e that perform exactly thesections.
. In general
, analytical hypotheses won't beequational m form. See his (I960), pp. 52-54.
89
.
Quine (1960 ) , p. 70
.
90. See Quine (1960), p. 54, and Quine (1969d)
,
p. 32.
91. Quine (1960 )
,
p. 54.
92. Quine (1960), pp. 52f.
93
. Quine (1960 ) , p. 43 .
94.. Though this translation is subject to inductive
uncertainty
. and to the residual indeterminacy that attaches
to translations of native speakers' assent and dissent.
5
For discussion of the related issue of the con-
nection of indeterminacy of transaltion of the referential
apparatus of the language and indeterminacy of reference
see Bruce Aune (1973) and Section I of my Chapter III.
96. Quine (1960), p. 27.
97. Both quotations are from his (1970d)
, p. 8.
98. Step (1) is a fairly direct paraphrase from his
(1960), p. 28. The suggestion that stimulus meaning is a
crude concept of empirical meaning is given in Word and
Object
, p. 33. Step (7) is the thesis of underdetermination
.
The quotation in Step (9) is from his (1960), p. 70.
99.
Quine (1960), p. 26.
I
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100
.
Quine (19 60 )
, p. 8 .
101. Quine (1960 )
, p. 8
102. Chomsky (1969), p. 61.
103. Chomsky (1969), pp. 66f.
104. Quine (1970c).
105. Quine (1960), p. 27.
106
.
Quine (1960 )
,
p. 73
.
107. Chomsky supposes that "what distinguishes the caqpo p ysics from the case of language is that we are forsome reason, not permitted to have a 'tentative theory? inthe case of language.
. . "[Chomsky (1969), p. 62].
108. Quine (19 69d)
, p . 47
109 . Quine (I960), p. 69 .
110. Quine (1960)
,
p. 70.
111. Quine (1960), p . 72.
112. Quine (1960), p . 73.
113. Such a principle wou be something like: "A
syarement
. nas empirical content if and only if there is(m principal) objective evidence for that statement."
Compare one of Ayer's formulations of a verificationist
principle : "A sentence is factually signficiant to a givenperson if,
. and only if, he knows 'how to verify the prop-
osition which it purports to express." [Ayer (1946),
p . 35.]
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119 .
Quine (1960), p. 77; my emphasis.
Quine (1970c), pp. 180f.
Quine (1969d), pp. 48f.
Quine (1969a)
, p. 89
.
Quine (1960 )
,
p. 32
.
Quine (1961c)
.
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120. Quine (1961c), p. 61.
121. Quine (1961c), p. 61.
122. Quine (1961c)
,
p. 61.
Quine ' s moves here seem to me to be a bit un-satisfactory. It is not clear why we must suppose the hvpotheses to purport to be about some conlenl?hat „two
y ~
conceptualizations share. Given that Quine is willingin this passage, to speak of different ways of conceiving
are abo,!t’rh
hy could ”e not claim that the hypotheses
®
hypothesizl tha?
Y
?hI t
C°n0eiVinE th
? world > and that theyn e t t e wo ways are similar in certainrespects. These hypotheses could still turn out to be
of°rldicallv°d?ff
f th
+
m W
S
Uld perhaps be wrong in the cases
S i erent modes of conceiving the world. If
5 the Vlew under consideration wouldconflict with the second part of the thesis. (See sub-section (i) of this section.)
124. Quine (1960 )
,
p. 72.
125. Quine (1960)
,
p. 77 ; (1970d)
, pp.
126. Quine ( 1969d)
, pp. 26-29 ; (1970d)
127. See Section 1(B) of Chapter III.
128 . Quine (1971)
,
p. 1.
129 . Quine (1971)
,
p. 1.
130 . Quine (1971)
,
p. 2.
131. Quine ( 19 69a)
, p . 89
.
132. Section 1(C) of Chapter I.
133. Quine (1969a), p . 89
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2 .
NOTES TO
Quine (1969d)
,
p.
Quine (1969d)
,
p.
CHAPTER III
48 .
47 .
3.
Quine (1969d), p. 47
4.
Quine (1960), pp . 90-95 (section 19) and p. 108
arS £°ntraSted both with singular terms andwitn mass tennis
. Mass terms
"cumulatively"
.
are said by Quine to refer
5.
Quine (1960), pp . 190f.
6
.
Singular terms
,
which do not divide their referenceare also subject to indeterminacy of translation. Mass ’
erms may not
. be subject to indeterminacy, however. Thatthey are not is suggested by some of Quine's remarks,
such as that the child can learn 'mamma', 'red', and
water (as mass terms) "before he has mastered the ins
and
_ outs of our adult conceptual scheme or mobile, en-durmg physical objects, identical from time to time and[Quine (1960 ), p. 92]. Quine's discussion of quan-tification and mass terms in "The Roots of Reference"(Lectures 2 and 3) also suggests that mass terms are not
subject to indeterminacy. Questions about the translation
of mass terms are still open, however; some of Quine's
remarks seem to depend on ambiguities in the use of such
words as 'mamma', 'water', and so on.
7*. See Chapter II, Section 11(B) for a detailed
discussion of analytical hypotheses.
8. Quine (1971), p. 7. The earlier mention of pro-
nouns, copulas, and suffixes is on p. 4.
9. See Burge (1972) and Parsons (1970).
10. But see his discussion of 'red' on p. 121 of
his (1960).
,
11. Thus, all terms—mass terms included—are treated
in the same way in the regimentation, and mass terms
are thus treated as though they had the same referential
function as do general terms and singular terms . If this
te^rSfnot'subiect'to
0
^/^ Qu±ne t0 Suppose *«* -ssare nor suh^ect t indeterminacy. The distinrtion
^
t"ee
;,
mass and other terms would be a semantic one It
~ ?°:s ~-n,has said about translation: ^ume
12. Quine (1960), p. 243.
,, !
dn dds (I960 ), Section 19, Quine suggests thatthere xs a grammatical, i.e., syntactical® §fs?iSoS"
on the
n
other
ral
Co
ermS
°l the °n ® hand and sinSular termsn . mpare the passage from "The Roots ofReference" quoted above. There Ihe contras? Setwlengeneral and singular terms is said to be part of themechanism of the language's referential apparatus Thereferenda! apparatus is
,
it seems
,
part of ?he ^ntaxof the language. See Section of this chapter for fur-ther discussion.
14. For the details of the elimination of namesand singularjterms
,
see Word and Object [Quine (1960 )1Chapter V. For a discussion of Quine's views on ref-erence and quantification, see Hooker (1971). Hookerpoints out that it is not always clear what the ref-
erential function or functions of bound variables andquantifiers are. He discerns "three mutually con-f
it
Ctl
n
S models fo]
f
the referential character of vari-
ables, none of which he finds to be satisfactory byitself (p. 496). See also Sicha (1973).
15. Though I don't discuss the latter views in detail,
some of my remarks in the course of the discussion ofQuine's vies on
_ the interpretation of the quantifiersbear on these views. See Subsection B of this section.
16. See Quine (1961b); Jubien (1972); and Parsons (1970).
17
.
Quine (1971)
,
p . 7
.
18. There may be other manuals of translation that
provide different translations of the semantical terms
of a language. Quine does not discuss this matter, and
I do not consider the additional complication.
19.
Quine (1969d), p. 35. Punctuation and use of
quotation marks follow Quine's use. Quoted by Aune (1973),
p . 13 .
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20 Aune (1973 )
, pp . i 3 f
vtsririf
in
relate terms of thrSblirt theory to terms of ?he back-ground theory; for we have the inscrutability of ref-erence to allow for." He thinks that his interpretationIS
of
_
'-‘i-J-iiJXO LUtiL :further supported by remakrs of Quinethat essay s on page 48
22. Aune (1973) 14 .
Tr.
At
^?
ast in Philosophical discussions of referenceIn ordinary discourse, the classification is more likelyto be an interlinguistic one. y
j .
2L[
’ (1973), p. 15. Aune's reasons for intro-
er onoehh P^
ase relatively speaking' will become clear-
pleted
t dlscusslon of ontological relativity is com-
25
.
Qune (1973 ) , p . 16
.
. .
,
2 ®: S ?
e the n
?
xt section for an explanation of sub-
stitutional and objectual quantification.
27
. Quine (1971)
,
p. 2 .
28. Aune suggested a similar explication in an early
version of ^ his
^
paper
. He did not make use of substitution-
al quantification, however. Rather, he made use of objec-tual quantification where the variables ranged over lin-guistic
^
items . The Quinean objections to substitutional
quantification I discuss in the next subsection apply
equally. to objectual quantification of this sort. Aune's
suggestion about 'is co-extensive with' has since been
revised
.
29 . Quine ( 1969b)
,
p . 104
.
30 . Dunn and Belnap (1968).
31. Thomason (1971).
32. Quine (1960)
,
p. 242 .
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33
.
Quine (1969b)
, p. 104 .
34. Quine (1969b), p. ioB.
of
i
substi?t^
U
“Ff ^^“oSe^ers^f ^orrnf'
about
Ud
o
11
?
the use of quantification without bringinr;
reQt
c mmitment to abstract or otehr entities though?to be undesirable. See, for example, Wilfrid SeUaS'use of quantification in "Abstract Entities" (1967a).
36 . Quine (1969b), p. 97* my emphasis.
37. Quine (1969b)
,
p. 107
.
38 . Quine (1969b)
, p . 107
39 . Quine (1971)
, pp . 32-36
.
40 . Quine (1971), p. 36; my emphasis.
41. Quine (1971), p. 41.
42 . Quine (1971)
,
p. 47.
43 . Quine (1971)
,
p. 47.
44. C. Parsons (1971)
.
45. See, for example, his discussion in his ('
^bjectual and substitutional quantification (pp
46 . Aune (19 73 )
, p . 14 .
47. Quine (1960 )
,
p. 242 .
48. Quine (1971)
,
p. 10.
49 . Quine (1971)
,
p. 38
.
50 . Quine (1969b)
, p . 94
.
51. Quine (1971), p. 36.
52 . Quine (1971)
,
p. 48.
53. Quine (1971)
,
p. 43
.
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54. Aune
'
s
account is, of course, intended as ananalysis of the logical form of '0 refers'
T
kVIt might be that 'reW' . TO * s •
is a word-word relation, even though
U
tL
1
Sverall
C
°account
?ion
e
^
e
^
nCi reqUlreS word -w°rld relations
-
! See^ Subsec-t A for discussion of reference and general terms.
for It fh1S 1™P°r 'i:ant to remember that I have arguedtwo different points. I argued first that the fus-tification for premises (2)-(4) under consideration J™
,
d no
T b ® acceptable to Quine. I showed that Quine
cause it'refl^’ £ lea^’.°f that justification be-a ®. rel!es on the substitution interpretation ofquantification. Then I tried to make it plausible thatQ"?ne ® vlew ’ reference is a relation between words ’
S him? ’ C° Pary t0 the
'
view that Aune attributes
, ,
6
‘ Questions about the reference of terms in thec ground language
. may
,
of course, be raised. The back-ground language is itself subject to indeterminacy, as
ejection 11(A). We can, nevertheless,
reference of the items in the back-
has been established in some way. This
n°t presuppose determinateness of refer-ence m the background language. The background languageis discussed m Section II. 6
we shall see in
assume that the
ground language
assumption does
57
.
Quine (1971)
,
p
.
3
.
58. Quine (1969d)
,
p. 47.
59.
My talk here of the "extension" of the thesis shou
should not mislead the reader. From the first statements
of the thesis in Word and Ob j ect , Quine intends the
application of the thesis to the home case. He did notfirst propose the thesis for the interlinguistic case andthen extend it to the intralinguistic cases
.
It is
clear that he wished to make a quite general claim and
couched this cla in terms of radical translation in an
attemp to make clear the issues involved in the claim.
At the oeginning of Chapter II of Word and Object, he
says, after making the general claim, that he will put
the point "less abstractly and more realistically by
switching to translation." [p. 27 of Quine's (I960).]
60 Quine ( 1960 ) , p
.
28.
263
quotation
I
tte
h
u“uist
n
?fd 1 ?hatJ Mhile in the ab°ve
sew.hio k 7 linguis is allowed to make use of "ob-
speaker^ it aT^saenUaS “S' otherwise," of the native
that is discussed by Quine behavior
limits of this method.
attempt to discover the
62. Grice (1957) and (1969).
63. Quine discusses a view of this sort hin his (1970b)
Sat
2
“d Section
i0
?I°of
Un '
derdetermination and
C
inde?e™fnac;.
C°nne0ti0n b6tWeen
65 Quine (1969d)
,
p. 47 .
f
Obvious ly
,
.not every philosopher who holds a view
wi1 ^
e
£
S
^
en
^.
COI
f?
atlble with the sketches I have offered
,
*7 lme. Many who hold something like thesecond view, for example, would either deny that the thesisholds for the neighbor’s case or agree that it holds forhis own. Moreover, the second critic will have to be
knnw^
U
ih
abOUt
n
l:7ha1:
-
he 1S cl *iming in claiming that one
p ,
e aPPli ca"tions of his own rules or conventions.robably none would want to claim that such rules areexplicitly known in the sense that a speaker of a languageean state these
_
rules or even that one must always bf Sable to determine whether it is appropriate to apply
a given rule or convention or that one cannot make er-rors in their application. See Quine's criticisms of aview like the second in his (1970b).
57 . Quine (1969d)
,
68. Quine (1969d)
,
69 . Quine (1960 ) ,
70 . Quine (1969d)
,
71. Quine (19 70c)
,
49 .
. 180; Quine's emphasis,
tnai
,
in general, descriptions of propositional a
are subject to indeterminacy of translation.
Note
72. This is the interpretation of the thesis for
which I have argued in Chapter II.
26473.
See, for example, Quine (1961c).
74.
By similar argument
, acceptance in the inter-linguistic case should be extended to all cases. Thusrefusing to accept the thesis for the intralingiistic
’
case would
. not be any more reasonable than refusing to
case, given .that one accepts itor the interlinguistic case. Quine seems to have somesuch argument in mind in his (1969d), p. 47.
75. Quine (1969d), p. 47.
76. Quine (1969d)
,
p. 48.
.
/
77. Quine (1969d), p. 48.
78. See, for example, Quine (1969d), p. 27.
79. A. condition on 'overlaps' is that if neitherpredicate is true of anything, they do not overlap,
are, of course, coextensive in that condition.
They
80. The condition on this sentence is like the onegiyen in footnote 79 : (3) is false in the case that
neither predicate is true of anything.
81. And that which appears below as well, with ap-
propriate changes.
82
.
See above
.
83.
Similarly, under such manuals, (3') ais false and(10
'
)
is true
.
84. Quine (1969d), pp . 48f.
85. A similar argument can be reconstructed by using
Aune ' s justification of the premises of the argument for
indeterminacy of reference.
86. Quine (1969d), pp . 48f. Punctuation is Quine's.
87. If sentences like (2") are understood to provide
only inclusion and not coextensiveness
,
there is no dif-
ficulty in getting the needed conclusion. We simply add
additional manuals of translation: for example, the
manual in which
(5') 'rabbit stage' is translated as 'rabbit'.
This gives us
,
(5!,)
'rabbit stage' is true of rabbitsand so the conclusion.
88. Quine (1969d)
,
p. 49 .
89 . Quine (19S9d)
, p
.
49 .
90 . Quine (1969d)
, p. 49 .
91. Quine ( 19 6 9d)
, p. 49 .
92 . Quine (1971)
, p. 4.
Quine (1971)
,
p. 4
.
93.
NOTE TO CONCLUDING REMARK
1. Schuldenfrei (1972).
r
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iAPPENDIX
Objections and Replies
>
Since the material which follows is no doubt some-
\
what unusual as part of a doctoral dissertation, I have
provided a brief introduction explaining its inclusion.
To understand the issues discussed, the reader should
be familiar with at least Chapter I, and perhaps
Chapter II, of the dissertation.
The inclusion of this appendix was suggested by
Professor Robert Ackermann
,
a member of my dissertation
committee, as a way of resolving disagreements between
us about some of the material in my Chapter 1. It resolves
these disagreements, however, only in the sense that it
provides him with the opportunity to record his rather
serious objections to the material and me with an op-
portunity to respond to these objections.
Essentially, the objections involve a denial that
what I call the first or primary account of observation
sentences can reasonably be attributed to Quine. Professor
Ackermann first raised objections to this attribution,
though in rather different form, in January 1973 after
I had submitted a draft of the dissertation to the
members of my committee. I wrote detailed responses to
then© firat objections. Though ho did not find my defense
11
of my interpretation of Quine convincing, Professor
Ackermann did approve my dissertation for the oral
examination in May.
In response to Ackermann' s criticisms, I revised
the first subsection of Chapter I, the subsection in
which I attribute the primary account to Quine. In
support of my attribution of this view to Quine in the
earlier version, I had made use of material that
Ackermann believed to be inappropriate, namely, The Web
of Belief [Quine and Ullian (1971)]. In the revision,
I deleted all textual references to that material and
expanded my discussion of other texts, also used in
the earlier version, to support my interpretation.
Ackermann 's comments here are directed to this
revised material and to some of my responses to his
earlier objections. The latter involve claims made in
the dissertation about the role of the primary account
of observation sentences in, for example, the statement
of the underdetermination thesis. Ackermann' s comments
here are based on two of the questions he asked at my
oral examination. Professor Ackermann did not find my
responses to these questions satisfactory, and I was
asked to prepare written answers to them. These written
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answers were thought by Ackermann to be inadequate.
Nevertheless, Ackermann proposed, as a compromise,
that a more formal statement of his objections and my
replies be included in the dissertation as an appendix.
This proposal seemed to me to be a reasonable solution.
These objections and replies follow:
TWO COMMENTS ON THOMASON’S THESIS
COMMENT ONE:
I don't think that Quine is committed to your first
account of observation sentences. My attention is
directed particularly to the third claim, which says that
on the first account observation sentences do not refer
or contain referring items. Observation sentences do
refer; a person learning a language simply doesn't yet
understand their reference.
Whether or not I'm correct in my view, I don't think
that you have established your interpretation as a scholarly
and reasonable reading of passages from Quine. Your major
textual source is page 42 of Word and Object . The sen-
tences you quote do not state the third claim in any
straightforward way, since they are about stimulus mean-
ings and the claim is about reference. Further, 1 don't
think any claim should be based on what you quote because
iv
your quotation is immediately followed by a sentence
beginning "Or, better, we may speak. ..." which
suggests that the sentence you quote in support of your
claim is not a full statement of Quine's views.
The accuracy of your reading is also brought into
question by the fact that you draw consequences from it
that seem to contradict clear claims made elsewhere by
Quine. You say "Since translation of observation sen-
tences is not indeterminate. ..." but this seems wrong.
It i£ indeterminate as Quine plainly says
,
for example
in his replies to Hintikka (p. 312 ) and Stroud (p. 317 )
in Words and Objections
. I realize that later in the
thesis you mention this indeterminacy. It seems more
relevant to the legitimacy of ascribing the first account
to Quine than you take note of here.
COMMENT TWO:
As a general philosophical defense of ascribing
the first account of observation sentences to Quine, you
argue that he must use the first account to state the
problems associated with the indeterminacy and under-
determination of theories. I believe this is wrong;
and also that you have not provided sufficient argument
to make your views plausible.
VUnderdetermination and indeterminacy appear for
fully mature speakers who understand some native lan-
guage and reference in it. They are part of the logic
of the relationship between sentences strong in observa-
tionality and more theoretical sentences which are not.
If the referring structure of sentences was not pre-
supposed, underdetermination would be trivial and unin-
teresting. Quine can suppose a contextual distinction
between observation and theoretical sentences for some
competent speaker of a language and still coherently
state the theses about underdetermination and indeter-
minacy. Nothing like the first account need be mentioned
in this connection.
You suggest that the first account must be involved
in how we ’’catch on” to our first theories in learning
our native language or getting to know a strange language.
It seems to me that this involves certain problems
,
but
not problems susceptible to philosophical analysis. Quine
does not give an account of how we initially "catch on”
to our first theories. This is part of our natural his-
tory and is to be described by empirical psychology which
will gradually fill in the outlines of the innate quality
spaces that causes initial entry to the theory of reference
of our native language.
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REPLY TO ACKERMANN
COMMENT ONE:
i
Before turning to Ackermann
' s specific objections,
I want to say a few things about the interpretation of
Quine's work to which he objects. In the first section
of Chapter I, I distinguish what I call two accounts
of observation sentences. These "accounts" are recon-
structed from Quine's characterizations, in various
places, of observation sentences. I distinguish these
two accounts because they involve claims that are dif-
ficult to reconcile. Some of Quine's important claims
about, for example, evidence hold only if one takes him
to be discussing what I call the first account; other
claims hold only if one takes him to be discussing what
I call the second account. Quine would have difficulty
in reconciling these different accounts--or
,
if you will,
the different claims he makes about observation sentences.
There are difficulties in maintaining the claims he makes
if one considers his total view of observation sentences.
Ackermann 's objections are directed toward my at-
tribution to Quine of the first account of observation
sentences. I characterize this account by seven claims
about observation sentences that I find in Qnine's works.
In this set of comments, Ackermann concentrates on the
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the third of these claims
Observation sentences do not refer or
contain referring items.
It is important to remember that we are not here discussing
Quine's complete views on observation sentences. This is
important because the claims that characterize the first
account do not hold for the total view. Ackermann's first
comment tends to obscure this fact. He says,
Observation sentences do refer; a person learning
a language simply doesn * t yet understand their
reference
.
On my view, this statement is ambiguous. It is
ambiguous because it doesn't specify which aspects of
Quine's views (or which account of observation sentences)
is under discussion. If he is discussing what I call
the second account or the reconciled view, he is surely
correct. He is then not disagreeing with anything I have
said, however. My discussion of the second account of
observation sentences makes it quite clear that, on this
account
,
observation sentences do have structure and
refer or contain referring items. Ackermann's objection
must then be directed at my discussion of what I have
called the first or primary account of observation sen-
tences, and not at my discussion of Quine's total views
on such sentences.
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His more specific remarks are directed at part of
the textual support I offer for my attribution of claim
(3) to Quine as part of the characterization of observation
sentences on the first account. I quote the following
sentence from Word and Object and support my attribution
of claim (3) to Quine in a discussion of this sentence:
•
•
:
their [observation sentences'] stimulus
meanings may without fear of contradiction be
said to do full justice to their meanings.
[Quine (1960)
,
p. 42]
Ackermann
' s first objection to my discussion of this
passage is that the sentences I quote "do not state the
claim in any straightforward way, since they are about
stimulus meanings and the claim is about reference."
Obviously, this is correct. The issue, however, is
whether sentences whose meanings are their stimulus
meanings refer or contain referring items. I argued in
Chapter I that they do not. Ackermann does not address
himself to this issue, or to the argument I offered there.
Consider what Quine has to say about stimulus mean-
ings and radical translation. Once the linguist has ac-
cepted initial analytical hypotheses about native speakers'
signs of assent and dissent, he is in a position to identify
the stimulus meanings of native sentences. He can then
develop and test genuine hypotheses about these stimulus
(
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meanings. Because this is so, he is capable of providing
a translation of any sentences whose meanings consist
of their stimulus meanings (i.e., observation sentences)
-
i
-
thout accepting an^ additional analytical hypotheses
.
This is why Quine includes the translations of observation
sentences among the "possible yield" of the linguist's
method. It is also why he says in "Epistemology Naturalized"
that
The predicament of the indeterminacy of
translation has little bearing on observation
sentences. The equating of an observation
sentence of our language to an observation
sentence of another language is mostly a
matter of identity between the range of
stimulations that would prompt assent to
the other [Quine (1969a), p. 89.]
This does not by itself show that observation sentences
do not refer or contain referring items. Quine also says,
however, that translation of the referential apparatus
of the language requires the acceptance by the linguist
of additional analytical hypotheses
,
which are not re-
quired for the translation of the observation sentences
of the language. This seems sufficient to show that
observation sentences are not and do not contain part
of the referential apparatus of the language. They do
not refer or contain referring items.
Quine does not, of course, state claim (3) in the
passage I quote and discuss
;
nor did I suggest that he
did so. Nevertheless, given his views on translation
Xwhich X do discuss, the passage provides strong support
for my attribution to Quine of claim (3).
Ackermann, however, does not think that any claim
should be based on this passage. Even if he believed
the line of argument pursued above to be otherwise cor-
rect, he would not be willing to accept my attribution
of claim (3) insofar as it depends on the passage from
—?rc*
-
Object
. [In fact, I discuss some material from
"The Roots of Reference" as additional support for the
claim.] Ackermann's second objection is based on the
fact that the passage I discuss is followed by a sentence
which, he says, suggests that the sentence I quote in
support of claim (3) "is not a full statement of Quine's
views .
"
This objection is rather odd. Since I spend about
eighty pages of the thesis discussing Quine's rather
complicated views on observation sentences
,
it should
be obvious that I would not expect a single sentence to
be a full statement of Quine's views on the subject.
Moreover, I am here discussing only the first account
of observation sentences, and not Quine's total view
of them. It is true that the sentence I quote is not
a full statement of Quine's views. But I do not see
xi
why Ackermann thinks it follows that the passage should
not be used as the basis for any claim.
His earlier remarks on my discussion of this passage
suggest an explanation of this view. In those remarks
he took the sentence beginning "Or, better,..." to be
a qualification of the passage I discuss, thereby making
it inappropriate to use the passage in support of
claim (3).
It might be helpful to the reader to have the
complete passage before him:
Occasion sentences whose stimulus
meanings vary none under the in-
fluence of collateral information
may naturally be called observation
sentences
, and their stimulus
meanings may without fear of con-
tradiction be said to do full justice
to their meanings
. These are the
occasion sentences that wear their
meanings on their sleeves. Or better,
we may speak of degrees of observa-
tionality; for even the stimulus
meaning of 'Red' can, we noted, be
made to fluctuate a little from
occasion to occasion by collateral
information on lighting conditions.
What we have is a gradation of
observationality from one extreme
,
at 'Red* or above, to the other ex-
treme at 'Bachelor' or below. [Quine
(1960), p. 42.]
The question one should ask, I think, is why it
is better to speak of degrees of observationality than
of observation sentences. Ackermann 's comments suggest
that it is better to speak of degrees of observationality
xii
because the previous statement about the meanings of
observation sentences was somehow mistaken and requires
qualification. This seems wrong to me, since what
follows is not a qualification of the claim about the
meaning of observation sentences. Rather, it is the
notion of degrees of observationality is, in practice, a
more useful one than that of observation sentence. Few,
if any
,
sentences will count as observation sentences under
the stringent requirements Quine sets up in this passage-
collateral information may always (or almost always)
affect speakers' dispositions to respond to stimuli.
1 ii,,
i , ,
Moreover, Quine thinks it important to introduce the
notion of degrees of observationality because he thinks
no hard and fast line can be drawn between observation
sentences and theoretical sentences. He also thinks that
"
• •
•
no systematic experimental sense is to be made of a
distinction between usage due to meaning and usage due to
generally shared collateral information". [Quine (1960),
p. 43.] This belief throws doubt on whether the notion
of observation sentence as described in the passage quoted
can be analyzed in the spirit of empirical science.
Thus, it is more reasonable--or better—to speak of
degrees of observationality simply because even the most
highly observational sentences may (for some persons, in
xiii
some circumstances) be responded to not only because of
the sensory stimulations the speaker undergoes but also
because of other information the speaker has which is
relevant to his verdict about a queried sentence. Quine's
example in the passage quoted above is a case in point.
But this is not a qualification of the statement about the
meaning of observation sentences. It is merely a reminder
that the notion of an observation sentence, so described,
will not be terribly useful in practice. This is so, in
part, because it is the second (and not the first) account
of observation sentences that describes the practice of
full-fledged speakers of the language. Thus, I tend to
agree with Ackermann's earlier statement that the view
I want to impute to Quine is an idea one never encountered
in practice.
I disagree with Ackermann
,
however, about the con-
sequences of all this for my discussion of observation
sentences. Ackermann seems to take one consequence to be
that the statement about observation sentences that I
quote is weakened or discarded by Quine when he goes on
to say "Or better, we may speak of degrees of observationality .
"
I take it that the statement about observation sentences
holds
,
that it is not in any qualified by what follows
,
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but that Quine wants the reader to be clear that he is
not—by providing this characterization or definition of
'observation sentence '
--committing himself to the view
that one can, in general, parcel out sentences into ob-
servational and theoretical ones. Thus, I see no reason
why the sentence I quote and discuss ought not to be
used as the basis for any claim. And
,
as I argued above,
I think that the sentence, along with the discussion of
radical translation, supports my attribution to Quine of
claim (3).
Ackermann’s final objection in this comment is that,
he claims
,
I draw consequences from my reading of the
passage in question that seem to contradict clear claims
made elsewhere by Quine. He quotes a sentence in which
I say that translation of observation sentences is not
indeterminate. This is, as Ackermann points out, a mis-
take. In Chapter II of the dissertation, I discussed in
rather boring detail the fact that the linguist's hypotheses
about signs of assent and dissent are analytical hypotheses.
The identification of stimulus meanings
,
and so the trans-
lation of observation sentences
,
depends on the acceptance
of such hypotheses. Thus, they have what Quine calls a
residual indeterminacy due to the indeterminacy attaching
XV
to »ign« of assent and dissent.
Since I treated this indeterminacy as negligible
for the purpose at hand (distinguishing the treatment of
observation sentences from that of other linguistic items),
I concluded that the translation of observation sentences
is not indeterminate. I was
,
I think, following Quine
in this treatment both of problems about assent and dissent
and of translation of observation sentences. He does,
for example, say that the yield of the linguist's method
included determinate translations of observation senten-
ces. This is because he was concerned, not with the
problems about attributing signs of assent and dissent
to native speakers, but with the more interesting result
that he arrived at once he assumed that the problem was
settled
.
Neither Quine nor I should have been so careless.
If indeterminacy comes in with the attribution of assent
and dissent
,
then the translation of observation sentences
will be indeterminate. It will depend on the arbitrary
acceptance of analytical hypotheses
,
hypotheses that are
not genuine hypotheses. I appreciate Ackermann's having
pointed this out to me
,
and have made the appropriate
changes in the text of the dissertation.
These facts do not, however, undermine my use of the
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passage as support for my attribution of claim (3) to
Quine. I am puzzled by Ackermann
* s statement that I draw
as a consequence of my reading of that passage that
translation of observation sentences is determinate. The
latter (mistaken) claim was made in the course of my
discussion of the passage. I can see no way in which it
could be taken to be a consequence of the passage, or my
reading of the passage.
Moreover, the argument that I offered holds when the
appropriate changes are made. What brought about my
carelessness was an emphasis on the differences in the
treatment of observation sentences and sentences that
involve reference. That difference still remains. Here
I will give an abbreviated form of the argument offered
above in support of my attribution to Quine of claim (3),
Given the acceptance of hypotheses concerning signs
of assent and dissent, the linguist can identify stimulus
meanings of sentences (with only ordinary inductive un-
certainty). If stimulus meanings do full justice to the
meanings of observation sentences
,
as Quine says
,
then
the translation of observation sentences involves only in-
ductive uncertainty, and not (additional) indeterminacy.
The acceptance hypotheses concerning assent and dissent
xvii
ie sufficient to enable the linguist to translate the
observation sentences of the language. The same is not
true of general terms and the rest of the referential
apparatus
. Additional analytical hypotheses must be
accepted if the linguist is to translate these. Trans-
lation of the referential apparatus of the language is
indeterminate, even given the acceptance of analytical
hypotheses concerning signs of assent and dissent. Trans-
lation of observation sentences is determinate, given
the acceptance of those analytical hypotheses.
The indeterminacy of translation of observation
sentences is due to indeterminacy involved in "identifi-
cation" of native speakers' signs of assent and dissent.
The indeterminacy where reference is involved goes beyond
th_is. So it seems reasonable to conclude that observations
sentences do not contain referring items.
COMMENT TWO:
Ackermann calls my discussions of the uses Quine makes
of the first account of observation sentences "a general
philosophical defense of ascribing" this account to Quine.
This description attributes to me something more compli-
cated than what I have actually done. I have merely
claimed— in several places in my dissertation and in my
xviii
replies to his earlier objections--that some of Quine's
important remarks hold only_ if he is discussing observation
sentences as characterized by the first account. Among
these are Quine's statement of the underdetermination
thesis and his claim that the observation sentences of a
language
,
but none of its referential apparatus
,
are
translatable once hypotheses concerning native speakers'
signs of assent and dissent are accepted. Note that I do
not claim that this account is sufficient for explaining
underdetermination. I'm inclined to agree that, for
—
ome what is involved, the referring structure of
observation sentences is presupposed. If this is correct,
then it is very important to find a means of reconciling
the different accounts of observation sentences to be
found in Quine's work. I am not at all convinced that
this can be done.
I will summarize here my reasons for holding that
the first account is used by Quine in his discussions of
the underdetermination and indeterminacy theses.
The underdetermination thesis is supposed to apply
not only to what one might ordinarily call scientific
theories, but to common sense theories as well. Quine
does not distinguish between the theory of ordinary en-
during bodies, for example, and other sorts of theories.
The former are scientific theories for him. The point
xix
that Quine makes in "On The Reasons for Indeterminacy of
Translation" that indeterminacy can be thought of as
underdetermination in second intension depends on this,
and on the related claim that underdetermination applies
to common sense theories as well as to "higher-level"
theories. Different theories, theories that posit
radically different sorts of objects are compatible with
all possible observation sentences, according to these
claims. All possible observation sentences do not de-
termine a choice among theories that posit ordinary en-
during bodies, time-slices of bodies, exemplifications of
Forms, and so on. (Nor do they enable one to choose
among "higher-level" theories.)
It is clear that Quine holds that the reference of
terms (via the range of the quantifiers) does force a
choice of theories. Reference and theoretical (or
ontological) commitment are, for him, bound together. If
observation sentences were supposed to have structure and
to be or contain seems that referred, they would already
involve ontological or theoretical commitment. It would
not be true that all possible observation sentences do
not determine a choice among theories that posit ordinary
enduring bodies, time-slices, exemplifications of Forms,
and so on.
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This sort of eons idarat ion leads me to oiaim that
Quine needs the first account of observation sentences
for his statement of the underdetermination thesis.
Quine distinguishes, in Word and Object, "Philosophical
Progress in Language Theory," "Epistemology Naturalized,"
and Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic
Theory," between linguistic items that can be translated
(given the linguist's acceptance of hypotheses concerning
assent and dissent) with only normal inductive uncertainty
and other linguistic items that can be translated (given
the acceptance of those initial hypotheses) only if
additional analytical hypotheses are accepted. There
are, with the qualifications noted above, behavioral
criteria for translation of the former but not for trans-
lation of the latter.
The linguistic items for which there are behavioral
criteria are observation sentences. The remaining items
are those items translation of which attributes to the
native speakers some theory (say, the theory of ordinary,
enduring bodies). Among these items are what might be
said to function as the copula, the identity sign and
general terms. Quine notes in the articles mentioned
above and in "The Roots of Reference" that it is only
xxi
when these items are considered that it is appropriate
to attribute to the speaker a theory.
It is only on the first account of observation
sentences that their translation does not attribute a
theory to the speakers whose language is being translated.
Quine thus appears to make use of the first account of
observation sentences in his discussions of radical
translation
.
Ackermann says that Quine can "suppose a contextual
c^ s^nc^on between observation and theoretical sentences
for some competent speakers of the language and still
coherently state the theses" in question. He suggests
that a consequence of his view is that the first account
of observation sentences is not required for Quine’s
discussions of the theses, that is, that a theory-neutral
account is not required. Ackermann has not explained the
import of the phrase ’ contextual distinction'. Nor has
he explained how Quine can, by using some such distinction,
avoid the problems I have raised. I do not, therefore,
think it necessary to comment further on his claims.
Ackermann* s final objection concerns my discussion
of Quine's views on the role of observation sentences in
language-learning. He says both that I suggest that the
first account must be involved in how we "catch on" to a
xxii
theory and that Quine gives no account of how we catch on
to our first theories.
My actual view is that Quine's description of language
learning, and in particular of how one "catches on" to
theories, makes use of the first account. Surely, Quine
does give an account—though perhaps not an adequate one—
of how one catches on to one’s first theories. Whether
or not the problems involved are in fact susceptible to
philosophical analysis
,
Quine spends considerable time
and effort (e.g.
,
in Word and Ob j ect
,
Chapter I: "Natural
Kinds," and "The Roots of Reference") in discussing such
problems. He describes the Carus Lectures ("The Roots of
Reference") this way: In these lectures I shall speculate
on the steps by which the child might progress from that
primitive stage [in which "there is no sense in ascribing
reference at all"] until we are satisfied by his easy
communication with us that he has mastered our apparatus
of reference" (p. 3). And, of course, the child's mastery
of the apparatus of reference goes hand-in-hand with his
mastery of a theory.
Quine’s assimilation of the language-learner and the
field linguist might be a partial explanation of this
interest. In "Epistemology Naturalized" he says "What I
1 I # # IIhave said of infant learning applies equally to the lin-
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guist's learning of a new language in the field.” (p. 81)
Here, and again on p. 89, where he says that "observation
sentences are the ones we are in a position to learn to
understand first, both as children and as field linguists,"
he is concerned primarily with the learning of observation
sentences. But part of the point of the discussions of
observation sentences in Word and Object and elsewhere is
to show how they differ from more theoretical sentences.
And the point is not merely to consider problems about
methodology in linguistics. The point is also to eluci-
date matters about the nature of language and meaning.
But even if my construal of Quine's reasons for interest
in language-learning and theory is mistaken, it seems
clear that he does have that interest.
Ackermann's statement that Quine relegates the
problems involved in the acquisition of theories to our
natural history and empirical psychological is mistaken
in several respects. It suggests a dichotomy between
philosophy and science that Quine explicitly rejects.
(See, especially, "Epistemology Naturalized" and "Philo-
sophical Progress in Language Theory".) Moreover, he says
that Quine's positing of innate quality spaces is to explain
the acquisition of theories. It is true that Quine posits
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innate quality spaces, and that he takes them to be
"obviously a prerequisite to learning". (Reply to Chomsky).
His discussion of quality spaces, however, concern the
requisites for learning observation sentences
. He does
not, to my knowledge, discuss innate quality spaces in
connection with the acquisition of theories
.


